

2017
Quadrangle
Graduate
Conference
on


Asian Philosophy

**April
29-30**

0900-1700

**Room 106,
Bainian Building**
百年樓106會議室

Mencius National Chengchi University Jainism
dualism Kyoto University Catuṣkoṭi Zhongyong
Mind material implication
saptabhāṅgī Zhuānzi Seoul National University
National University of Singapore Vasubandhu



Website: <http://conference.nccu.edu.tw/actnews/?Sn=155>
<http://buddhica.nccu.edu.tw/>

Registration: <https://goo.gl/2Q99p9>

Contact: Ms. Wu, Chih-ying (einoedeberg@gmail.com)

Sponsor: **The Buddhist Study Group
Department of Philosophy
National Chengchi University
Sheng Yen Education Foundation**

Contents

Program	2
Keynote Speech	4
Abstract	6
Wu, Chih-ying, Dharmapāla's Refutation of the Existence of External Objects	6
Masahuya Ichiki, The Difference between Dichotomy and Dualism	7
Huang, Zu-jie, A Comparative Analysis of Confucianism and Mohism on Arguments by Appeals to the Past	7
Ryo Ito, Bradley's Notion of Judgment and Russell's Theories of Truth	7
Gilsan Lee, On the 1st Proof of the 7th vijñāna in Mahāyānasamgraha	8
Leo, Sing-ann, Can the Same Arguments Arrive at Different Conclusions? ——A Comparison Study between Viṃś and AKBh	9
Kim, Tae-soo, The Validity of a Robinsonian Interpretation of the Logics of Catuskoṭi II: Comparing Nāgārjunian Prasāṅga with Hegel's Dialectics	10
Ryosuke Igarasgi, An anti-realistic interpretation of catuskoṭi	10
Lin, Fang ming, Consciousness, Qualia, and the Awakened Beings	11
Takuro Onishi, A non-many-valued approach to the sevenfold predication in Jainism	12
John R. Williams, Neither Far-reaching nor Unfettered: A Message to English-Language Zhuangzi Scholars	12
Wilson Lee, Laughing at One's Own Moral Failure with the Zhuangzi	14
Keng Yang, The Contrast of Late Ming Weishi Commentaries and Edo Weishi Commentaries on Xuanzang's Guan suoyuanyuan lun	14
Wang Shang, On Mencius' View of Friendship	15
Kim, Han-na, Dai Zhen's View on Three Universal Virtues of Zhongyong	16
Luk, Yee-chun, An Interpretation of Yi Hwang and Ki Tae-seung's Four-Seven Debate through examining the different usages of <i>Jian</i> (兼) by the two thinkers	17
General information	18
(Location, Transportation, Accommodation)	

2017 Quadrangle Graduate Student Conference on Asian Philosophy Program

Saturday, April 29th

Section / Time	Presenter / Title of Paper
09:00-09:10	Opening Ceremony
Section 1 09:10-11:00	Chair: Professor Lin, Chen-kuo (NCCU) Keynote speech: Professor Deguchi Yasuo (Kyoto University) Title: TBA Presenter 1: Wu, Chih-ying (NCCU) “Dharmapāla’s Refutation of the Existence of External Objects” Presenter 2: Masahuyu Ichiki (Kyoto University) “The Difference between Dichotomy and Dualism”
11:00-11:10	Tea Break
Section 2 11:10-12:10	Chair: Professor Malcolm Keating (Yale-NUS) Presenter 1: Huang, Zu-jie (NUS) “A Comparative Analysis of Confucianism and Mohism on Arguments by Appeals to the Past” Presenter 2: Ryo Ito (Kyoto University) “Bradley's Notion of Judgment and Russell's Theories of Truth”
12:10-13:40	Lunch Break
Section 3 13:40-15:30	Chair: Professor Ahn, Sung-doo (Seoul National University) Keynote Speech: Professor Keng, Ching (NCCU) “How Does One Understand the Meaning of a Sentence? On the Yogācāra's Theory of Understanding” Presenter 1: Lee, Gil-san (Seoul National University) “On the 1st Proof of the 7th vijñāna in <i>Mahāyānasamgraha</i> ” Presenter 2: Leo, Sing-ann (NCCU) “How Can the Same Arguments Arrive at Different Conclusions? ——A Comparison Study between Viṃ and AKBh”
15:30-16:00	Coffee Break
Section 4 16:00-17:00	Chair: Professor Wang, Hua (NCCU) Presenter 1: Kim, Tae-soo (Seoul National University) “The Validity of a Robinsonian Interpretation of the Logics of <i>Catuskoṭi</i> II: Comparing Nāgārjunian Prasāṅga with Hegel's Dialectics” Presenter 2: Ryosuke Igarashi (Kyoto University) “An anti-realistic interpretation of catuskoti”

Section / Time	Presenter / Title of Paper
Section 1 09:10-11:00	Chair: Professor Ho, Chien-hsing (Academia Sinica) Keynote speech: Prof. Ahn, Sung-doo (Seoul National University) Title: TBA Presenter 1: Lin, Fang-ming (NCCU) “Consciousness, Qualia, and the Awakened Beings” Presenter 2: Takuro Onishi (Kyoto University) “A non-many-valued approach to the sevenfold predication in Jainism”
11:00-11:10	Tea Break
Section 2 11:10-12:10	Chair: Professor Chan, Kang (NCCU) Presenter 1: John R. Williams (NUS) “Neither Far-reaching nor Unfettered: A Message to English-Language Zhuangzi Scholars” Presenter 2: Wilson Lee (NUS) “Laughing at One’s Own Moral Failure with the <i>Zhuangzi</i> ”
12:10-13:40	Lunch Break
Section 3 13:40-15:30	Chair: Professor Yasuo Deguchi (Kyoto University) Keynote Speech: Professor Malcolm Keating (Yale-NUS) “Metaphor or Delusion? Kumārila Bhaṭṭa on Figurative Language” Presenter 1: Ken Yang (NCCU) “The Contrast of Late Ming Weishi Commentaries and Edo Weishi Commentaries on Xuanzang’s <i>Guan suoyuanyuan lun</i> ” Presenter 2: Wang, Shang (NCCU) “On Mencius’ View of Friendship”
15:30-16:00	Coffee Break
Section 4 16:00-17:00	Chair: Professor Kai Marchal (NCCU) Presenter 1: Kim, Han-na (Seoul National University) “Dai Zhen’s View on Three Universal Virtues of <i>Zhongyong</i> ” Presenter 2: Luk, Yee-chun (Seoul National University) “An Interpretation of Yi Hwang and Ki Tae-seung’s Four-Seven Debate through examining the different usages of <i>Jian</i> (兼) by the two thinkers”

Keynote Speech

Professor Deguchi, Yasuo (Kyoto University)

Self as Anyone: Dōgen viewed from analytic Asian philosophy

Self as Anyone: Dōgen viewed from analytic Asian philosophy Yasuo DEGUCHI (Kyoto University) ‘Self’ is among key concepts of Dōgen, a thirteenth century Japanese Zen master. This talk will interpret his philosophy of self from perspectives of Analytic Asian Philosophy. On my reading, Dōgen’s ideas imply the following philosophical stances: Buddha-nature tropism, Eventism, Presentism, Hecism, and Solipsism. Against those philosophical backgrounds, he holds, I claim, the replaceable view of self, according to which self is taken as anyone.

Professor Keng, Ching (NCCU)

How Does One Understand the Meaning of a Sentence? On the Yogâcāra's Theory of Understanding

Understand the meaning of a sentence is crucial for Buddhist soteriology given its emphasis on the importance of hearing the teachings of the Buddha. But how understanding could be possible becomes a difficult issue if we take into account the premises of momentariness (each word of a sentence stays only for a moment) and of the absence of a unifying subject (each mode of cognition (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, mental consciousness, etc.) works independently). This paper investigates how understanding is possible under the Yogâcāra model of five minds (五心). Under such a model, it is the mental consciousness that plays the role of retaining the ever-ceasing sounds and "synthesize" them, so to speak. After examining the various views of Kuiji (632-682), Wōnch’ūk (613-696), and the criticism of Wōnch’ūk by Kuiji’s disciple Huizhao (650-714), I conclude that the notion of "mental consciousness simultaneous with the five sensory consciousnesses" (五俱意識) proposed by Dignāga plays a central role between the different theories held by Kuiji and Wōnch’ūk. The former endorses this new notion and incorporate it into their theory of understanding. In contrast, despite his acceptance of this notion, Wōnch’ūk does not fully develop this notion and hence his theory is haunted by internal tension.

Keynote speech

Professor Malcolm Keating (Yale-NUS)

Metaphor or Delusion?

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa on Figurative Language

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is a seventh century CE Indian philosopher who argues that figurative expressions such as "Devadatta is a lion," communicate two kinds of meaning: a primary meaning about Devadatta and lionhood, and a secondary meaning about the similar qualities that Devadatta and lions share. He argues against a competing view on which such metaphors are cognitive superimpositions--what contemporary philosophers might characterize as "seeing-as." I argue that Kumārila's analysis can be usefully employed against contemporary linguists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, who argue that "the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another." Instead, on this cognitive superimposition view, metaphor turns out to be a kind of conceptual confusion rather than a way of generating useful relationships that can be used for inference.

Abstract

Saturday, April 29th

Wu, Chih-ying

MA student, Graduate Institute of Religious Studies,
National Chengchi University

Dharmapāla's Refutation of the Existence of External Objects

This paper, based on the commentary *Dasheng Guangbailun Shilun* (henceforth DGBS) on Āryadeva's *Catuhśataka*, aims to analyze Dharmapāla's criticisms against the existence of external objects favored by the Indian orthodox schools, in particular the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika, as well as the Abhidharmic realists, that is, the Sarvāstivādins. The statement that no sensory objects exist other than the mind (citta) has been consistently defended by the well-known Yogācāra lineage back to Vasubandhu, followed by Dignāga. In both Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (henceforth Viṃśatika) and Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā* (henceforth Āp), the major opponents that Vasubandhu and Dignāga argue against, though not explicitly indicated, are realist Buddhist fellows; on the other hand, Dharmapāla, when commenting on Āryadeva's *Catuhśataka*, shifts his target and takes issue chiefly with the heretics.

In the 7th chapter, Refutation of the Sense Organs and Their Objects, of DGBS, Dharmapāla first proposes two types of mereology to refute Kapila, a Sāṃkhya master: 1) objects such as pot, because of consisting of form (rūpa), taste (rasa), and so on, cannot be perceived by the eye, and 2) objects such as pot, because of being corporeal, cannot be substantial existence (dravyasat) and therefore cannot be causally efficacious in perceptual process. Dharmapāla also censures the Vaiśeṣikas for their theory of category (padārtha). Dharmapāla argues that the existence of qualificand, substantial independent-existing entity as the Vaiśeṣikas claim, cannot be proved valid, since what is perceived—and further known—is nothing but qualifiers. Besides his objections against the heretics, Dharmapāla also disproves the substantial existence of atoms (paramāṇu) and that of shape defended by the Sarvāstivādins.

Through the investigation of Dharmapāla's refutation presented in DGBS, which preserves valuable conversations between the Yogācāra school and the Indian orthodoxies, this paper aims to clarify the important issues regarding perceptual objects—parts vs. whole, color vs. shape, qualifier vs. qualified—and to further inquire into defense for the substantiality of shape proposed by Saṃghabhadra in the

**Nyāyānusara*.

Masahuya Ichiki
Kyoto University

The difference between Dichotomy and Dualism

The purpose of this presentation is to show the difference between two concepts, Dichotomy and Dualism, which are usually taken as almost similar concepts. In order to show, I pick out Husserl and sketch his theory of subject-object relation. His theory can be called an intentionality monism, in which the subject and the object themselves are supposed to ontologically depend on the intentional relation between them. So this theory should be regarded as subject-object dichotomous but subject-object non-dualistic. Here, we find a good example to show the two concepts are not equal to each other.

Huang, Zujie Jeremy
National University of Singapore

A Comparative Analysis of Confucianism and Mohism on Arguments by Appeals to the Past

This paper is part of a larger project that aims to explain the reasoning and mechanism behind a widely observed and commented upon feature of Early Chinese Philosophical Texts: appealing to the past in order to advance ethical or political proposals. I call this phenomenon “Arguments by Appeals to the Past”. The present paper is a comparison between Confucianism and Mohism vis-à-vis their employment of “Arguments by Appeals to the Past”. I will first show that although the Early Confucian texts – namely the Analects, Mengzi and Xunzi – and the Mozi shares a similar attitude of reverence to a shared past, they invoke the past in arguments in very different ways. I then argue that the Early Confucian texts had a richer and more complex narrative about the past which thereby produced a similarly complex system of referencing the past in arguments. The Mohists, on the other hand, developed a more monolithic conception of the past where the same principles or doctrines they argue for are often simultaneously substantiated by different historical characters or aspects of the past. Finally, I argue that the differences in the way the past is used in their arguments can be accounted for by differences in aims and content of the Confucian and Mohist philosophical programs.

Ryo Ito
Kyoto University

Bradley's notion of judgment and Russell's theories of truth

Around 1909 Russell abandoned the view of propositions as complex objects existing independently of our cognition. His stated objections to the ontology of propositions are not convincing and this has driven some commentators to seek the genuine reason for his abandonment of the ontology. In this talk I will sketch Bradley's theory of judgment, before I argue that it was a certain commonality between the theory and Russell's view of propositions that led him to abandon the view in favour of his multiple-relation theory of judgment.

On the 1st proof of the 7th vijñāna in Mahāyānasamgraha

In this paper, I would like to examine the 1st proof of the existence of the 7th vijñāna in Mahāyānasamgraha I. 7A. It has a very simple structure: “How can one know that there is such a thing as Defiled Mind(kliṣṭam manas)?” “Without it, one would fall into the fallacy of denying Exclusive Ignorance(*āveṇikyāvidyā).” Defiled Mind which is another name for the 7th vijñāna in the Yogācāra system is just beforehand defined as being always associated with four defilements such as the view of Self(satkāyadrṣṭi), the feeling of identity(asmimāna), clinging to Self(ātmasneha), and Ignorance(avidyā) and forming the basis of afflicting the mind, which seems to be restricted to the 6th vijñāna. Exclusive Ignorance which is a somewhat unfamiliar concept even to those who are engaged in Buddhist studies is immediately after defined as being an obstacle to the mind which otherwise would proceed to the truth and working all the time. This is the only information on this matter available in the text itself, but it is not self-evident that the argument is successful.

What make this reductio ad absurdum successful are as follows: (1) the existence of Exclusive Ignorance is taken for granted; (2) it is only Defiled Mind that is compatible with Exclusive Ignorance. To satisfy the former condition I attempt to examine several passages which include the notion of Exclusive Ignorance, some of which do not belong to the Yogācāra tradition. There is no suggestion that Exclusive Ignorance was doubted in the scholastic tradition, to say nothing of disagreement on its conception. And to meet the latter condition I try to make clear exactly what kind of compatibility is in question at first, and then I will show that at least ordinary minds cannot satisfy the compatibility condition by reference to the two commentaries on the text by Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva respectively and relevant passages by anonymous commentators in Chengweishilun(成唯識論). The passage clarifying the compatibility condition includes such background knowledge as the central position Ignorance occupies, the subcategories of Ignorance, the exact meaning of an association of mind with its mental factors plus the preconditions for it, and so on.

The next step is to evaluate the power of those arguments with emphasis on the limit innated in the elimination method, one of the implications of which is that there still remain alternative approaches for those who want to reject anything subconscious without abandoning Exclusive Ignorance. And lastly, I would like to make some responses to the challenges, which substitutes for conclusion.

Can the same arguments arrive at different conclusions?

——A comparison study between Viṃ and AKBh

In this paper, I would like to argue that the argument of Vasubandhu from stanzas 11 to 13 had failed to draw his conclusion to deny his opponent who maintains atom as a singular substance because the same arguments had been applied by him in AKBh. In order to support my interpretation to Viṃśikā1 (“Twenty Stanzas,” henceforth abbreviated as Viṃ later), I shall trace back to his earlier work, which is called Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (“A Commentary on the Treasury of MetaphysicsAbhidharmakośa,” henceforth abbreviated as AKBh later). So, this paper tries to point out that Vasubandhu arrive at different conclusions by using the same arguments. From stanzas 11 to 13 of Viṃ, Vasubandhu shows his application to reject the theories of atom by claiming that atoms can never become compounded things either they conjoin (saṃhata) or not conjoin. So, the atom cannot be proved as partlessness even the atoms not conjoin with each other. Hence, he concludes that the atom is not proved as a singular substance. His commentator, Kuiji, reconstructs his arguments and summarizes them into six kinds of contradiction (pratiśedha) which face by the realists from the aspect of Buddhist logic.² But our question is: Has Vasubandhu successfully defeated the theories of atom? In his earlier works, which is called AKBh, Vasubandhu is clearly intent on establishing a refutation that the atoms can never conjoin into another compounded thing. In AKBh chapter one, he lists out four kinds of theory that either the atoms can compound or not. Vasubandhu, who was a realists in his earlier life, not only support the partlessness and not conjoining of the atoms, but also denied the three other theories by using the same arguments in Viṃ. From the above, it still remains a clue that theory of atom hasn’t been defeated. Just like Bhadanta Dharmatrāta’s theory, which is interpreted by Vasubandhu in AKBh, holding that mere atoms could still accumulate into a large mass without conflict to their definition of atoms as being partlessness because they do not conjoin with each other. I follow Jonathan. S’s newest critical edition of twenty stanzas because his research provides us a useful edition to compare with translation of Xuan Zhuang (玄奘). Jonathan A. Silk, Materials toward the study of Vasubandhu's Viṃśikā. (I), Sanskrit and Tibetan critical editions of the verses and autocommentary, an English translation and annotations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016. other. Hence, the theory of atom could not easily be treated as self-refutation and it will too fast for Vasubandhu to arrive at his conclusion before get into his argument of stanzas 14 in Viṃ. Giving a new interpretation of Viṃ’s argument under the light of AKBh, I would like to draw my conclusion that from stanzas 11 to 13 of Viṃ cannot support Vasubandhu to arrive at his conclusion because it still remains a possible for the realists to maintain a theory which can refrains from the criticism of Vasubandhu. But, standing on the ground of idealism, I would argue that Vasubandhu still success to demonstrate his refusal to theory of atom in stanzas 14 through arguments of shadow and obstruction.

Taesoo Kim
PhD candidate, Department of philosophy,
Seoul National University

The Validity of a Robinsonian Interpretation of the Logics of Catuskoṭi II: Comparing Nāgārjunian Prasāṅga with Hegel's Dialectics

Kajiyama Yuich understands the logics of catuskoṭi in terms of Hegelian Dialectics, while interpreting the negation formula of 4th koṭi in tetralemma as the religious truth of Madhyamika, which cannot be negated as an ultimate truth. And Richard Robinson also posits this proposition as dissolving the entire dṛṣṭi.

Examining these approaches, this paper argues against the dialectical interpretation of catuskoṭi with reference to its logical structure. For this, reference will also be made to Piṅgala and Candrakīrti's commentary comparing them to Robinson's and Kajiyama's. Here, focus will be put on the aspect of 'perspectives.'

Upon further examination, it was determined that a Hegelian dialectical approach is not plausible for interpreting Nāgārjuna's logic, which is purely negative and skeptical in its character. And through reformulating the structure of catuskoṭi in terms of prasāṅga, this paper compares it with a dialectical formula to more clearly evaluate the implications of negative logic for catuskoṭi.

Thereby, it was seen that Nāgārjuna has neither equated propositions on the basis of identity, nor postulated any hierarchy through classifying the grade of these koṭis. Accordingly, on the strength of various perspectives, any proposition in the catuskoṭi can be understood with logical clarity, without positing any metaphysical or dialectical interpretation.

Further, the possible reconstruction of Nāgārjuna's understanding of the tetralemma supports a semantic approach to truth, while revealing the absurdity of perceiving identity or causal relations as possessing intrinsic substance.

Ryosuke Igarashi
Kyoto University

An anti-realistic interpretation of catuskoṭi

This paper will be centred primarily on limning a reading of the catuskoṭi as an illocutionary device, and thereby presenting Nagarjunian thought as an anti-realist enterprise. That is to say, that we will attempt to establish that the koṭis themselves are concerned with speech-acts rather than truth-tracking propositions, and that the perlocutionary effect of uttering or engaging with the koṭis is the soteriological function of metaphysical quietism.

Abstract

Sunday, April 30th

Lin, Fang-Min
Master's Student in Philosophy,
National Chengchi University

Consciousness, Qualia, and the Awakened Beings

Griffiths (1994), on the ground of his research on the trikāya doctrine, argues that the Buddha has no conscious mental states; Gennaro (2008), with his version of the higher-order thought theory of consciousness, also mention the possibility of a non-conscious awakened being; Siderits (2011), from the point of view of the irreflexive theory of consciousness, suggests that the Buddha might just be a robot. They all start from different theories and premises, but arrive at the same conclusion. Is this just a coincident? Or there is an actual reason behind it?

From my Investigation of the three papers mention above, I would like to argue that they all have the following argument in common:

- P1. The mental states of an awakened being have no qualia;
- P2. Any mental state which has no qualia is not conscious;
- C. Thus, The mental states of an awakened being are not conscious.

They took P2 for granted and mainly argued for P1 from different perspectives. Naturally, the next question will be: What do the three papers have in common in their way to P1?

From my closer examination on the resources used in the papers, I would like to argue that the common ground they stand on is the universal strategy which the Buddhists used to separate an awakened being's experience and its teaching. Most Buddhists would agree that the mental states of an awakened being is non-conceptual, inexpressible and lack of pretty much any mental states which we think it have qualia. Nonetheless, in order to teach the ordinary people the truths, the awakened being needs to put their mental contents into actual teachings. It is at this moment the awakened beings show the sign of being conscious. The ability to "switch their mind" is the key feature of an awakened being. Although the approaches of the three papers are different, they all came across the distinction of an awakened being's experience and its teaching at some point. I will show in this paper that even with different interpretations, this distinction can easily lead to the conclusion of P1.

Keywords: Consciousness, Qualia, the Awakened Beings

Takuro Onishi
Kyoto University

A non-many-valued approach to the sevenfold predication in Jainism

Saptabhangi, the sevenfold predication, is the canonical list of seven ways of correct predication upheld in Jainism, compared to Catuskoti (tetralemma, four corners), an important principle of Buddhist logic. The list consists of three basic types of predication, that is, affirmation, denial and indescribable (simultaneous affirmation and denial), and their successive combinations. While many of modern scholars and philosophers interpret and formalize the sevenfold predication as a seven-valued (or many-valued) logic, Balcerowicz (2015) presents a different type of formalization using the device of parametrization. In this paper I examine his non-many-valued formalization and modify it so that the logical relations among the seven figures are made explicit.

John R. Williams
President's Graduate Fellow,
National University of Singapore

Neither Far-Reaching Nor Unfettered: A Message to English-Language Zhuangzi Scholars

English-Language scholars of the Zhuangzi text are fortunate to live in a time with many strange and interesting interpretations of the text being offered from many different directions. A person newly approaching the text, however, is likely to be stultified by the contrariness of these interpretations. The stultifying experience is only amplified when one begins approaching Chinese-language scholarship and the brilliant yet conflicting traditional commentaries. The present essay attempts to diagnose the primary weakness of contemporary English-language scholarship via a tripartite exegetical apparatus.

The present essay has three aims: (1) to bring forward three non-negotiable aspects of the core Zhuangzi text (see fig 1); (2) to show how deemphasizing certain of these three aspects while overemphasizing others leads to the radically distinct and often conflicting interpretations characteristic of the English-language scholarship; and (3), proffering a brief sketch of what a balanced interpretation including all three aspects might look like. The hope, thereby, is to provide an explanation for the radically divergent readings, while challenging seasoned interpreters to account for their various interpretive choices regarding the text vis-à-vis these three non-negotiable aspects.

Figure 1.

Aspect	Theme Clusters	Class	Over-emphasizers
Diachronic pluralism	“The transformation of one thing into another” 物化 (Z 21), “the transformation of all things” 萬物之化 (Z 27), “Heavenly Transitions” 天倪 (Z 20), “the Heavenly Potter’s wheel” 天鈞 (Z 14n.16), “the Dangle and Release” 縣解 (Z 45), “the Process of Creation-Transformation” 造物 (Z 45-46), and so on.	Descriptive	Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall (the process cosmological reading)
Synchronic pluralism	“The simultaneous generation of “this” and “that”” 彼是, 方生之說也 (Z 12), “the Course as Axis” 道樞 (Z 12), “Walking Two Roads” 兩行 (Z 14), “Illumination of the Obvious” 以明 (Z 12), and so on.	Descriptive	Chad Hansen and Chris Fraser (the skeptic-relativist reading)
Mind-Roaming/Fasting	“Fasting of the mind” 心齋 (Z 26), “the Radiance of Drift and Doubt” 滑疑之耀 (Z 15), “Liberation from the Lord’s Dangle” 帝之縣解 (Z 24), “the Tranquillity of Turmoil” 撓寧 (Z 45, see 14n.16), “not allowing likes and dislikes to damage you internally” 不以好惡內傷其身 (Z 38), “the Consummate Person uses his mind like a mirror, rejecting nothing, welcoming nothing: responding but not storing” 至人之用心若鏡, 不將不迎, 應而不藏 (Z 54, see 34), “drift uncommitted beyond the dust and grime, far-flung and unfettered in the great work of doing nothing in particular” 芒然彷徨乎塵垢之外, 逍遙乎無為之業 (Z 47), “waiting for the next transformation into the unknown” 以待其所不知之化已乎 (Z 47), and so on.	Normative	Livia Kohn and Harold Roth (the mystic reading)

Laughing at One's Own Moral Failure with the Zhuangzi

Numerous scholars such as Franklin Perkins and Hans-Georg Moeller have observed that the Zhuangzi is replete with narratives featuring cases of moral failures (e.g. Hundun in Chapter 7 and the praying mantis of Chapter 4). However, these failures are presented in a comic or playful tone, which, as they note, contrast the more anthropocentric modern European and Confucian traditions. In this paper, I wish to follow such scholars in their insights on the role of humour in the Zhuangzi, by examining the text in light of contemporary philosophical (largely anglophone) discussions cases of moral failure. Following Lisa Tessman, I distinguish between two kinds of moral failure in such discussions and note that they have isomorphic forms in the Zhuangzi: dilemmatic morality and absent morality. In the former, one fails as an agent, due to a necessary violation of a moral requirement; in the latter, one fails to be an agent, due to the absence of the possibility of making sense of one's agency. I will suggest that the Zhuangzi offers a better alternative to the two recommended attitudes to moral failure that dominate these discussions—that is, broadly construed, resignation and defiance. Where these attitudes to moral failure are mired in their holding firm to an individual's practical identities and suffering their conflict, they are unable to address the failure of absent morality. Against tragically suffering one's own moral failures, the Zhuangzi's recommendation is laughing at them. That is, the comic attitude goes beyond holding firm to given practical identities to embracing their flux.

But this is not to say that the comic attitude is entirely absent from contemporary philosophical discussions of moral failure. What I simply hope to achieve from this paper is a clearer grasp of how exactly the Zhuangzi may contribute to these discussions, even if only as an instantiation of a type of response to it.

Yang, Keng
National Chengchi University

The Contrast of Late Ming Weishi Commentaries and Edo Weishi Commentaries on Xuanzang's Guan suoyuanyuan lun.

In the late Ming (1572-1662) there was a renaissance of weishi(唯識, consciousness-only) in which at least thirty-five weishicommentaries were produced in China without access to the key weishi commentaries authored by Kuiji 窺基(632-682), Huizhao 慧沼(650-714), and Zhizhou 智周(668-723). On the other hand, the weishilineage of Faxiang Zong (法相宗) in Japan together with those keyweishicommentaries have never been interrupted since Tang dynasty (618-907). Due to the lostweishilineage and texts, those late Ming made weishi commentaries have been in doubt and challenged. Especially some weishiexperts in Japan in the Edo period criticized some late-Ming authors for producing valueless and incorrect weishi commentaries. This article attempts to investigate if such challenges and criticisms are fair enough and if the differences between the late Ming commentators and the Edo commentaries in terms of the access to the key Tangweishi commentaries shape how these two groups understood and interpreted the same weishi text. Thus, this study selects Xuanzang's 玄奘(602-664) Guan suoyuanyuan lun 《觀所緣緣論》 which is Xuanzang's translation

of Dignāga's *Ālambana-parīkṣā* as a base text and compares two late Ming commentaries that were written by Mingyu 明昱(1527-1616) and Zhixu 智旭(1599-1655) with two Edo commentaries that were authored by Kiben 基辨(1722-1792) and Kaidou 快道(1751-1810). The analysis is done in two levels: the high-level analysis and the deeper dive analysis. In the high-level analysis, several interesting areas are identified including: 1) the Edo commentators had much longer commentator's introduction. ; 2) Kiben, Kaidou and Mingyu spent most effort in commenting on the 2nd verse & the 2nd prose. 3) The quotation accounts for approximately 40% of the Edo commentaries. On the contrary, in the late Ming group Mingyu quoted about 10% and Zhixu quoted less than 1%. In the deeper dive analysis of the sources and frequencies of quotations, of the longer Edo commentator's introduction, of the controversial about the 2nd moon as "Udāharana"(example), of what making the appearance of the collection, and of what making the sense faculties, it is found that the access to the key Tang weishi commentaries does significantly impact the commentators' capacity to identify controversial issues, to distinguish different realists' views, and to address the weishi internal arguments. However, there are some occasions that commentators seemed choosing not to use all the sources that available to them. In addition, the commentators' different agendas, sense of subjectivity, and personal expertise also play important roles in determining whether and/or how they comments on what.

Keywords: Washi(Conscious-only), Late Ming Buddhism, Edo Buddhism, Guan suoyuanyuan lun

Wang, Shang

Graduate student, Department of philosophy,
National Chengchi University

On Mencius' View of Friendship

In this paper I illustrate Mencius' view of 'friendship' by examining systematically Mencius' original text and other ones in Confucianism. I argue that the idea of friendship plays an important role in Mencius' practical philosophy.

Mencius developed a practical philosophy that emphasizes the moral significance of 'ethical life'(倫理), which is the form of intersubjective relationship and the subjective role in society. The aim of his practical philosophy is to teach us that we can 'become the saint'(成聖) through the excellent moral practices in and within ethical life. Mencius argue that the core idea of our moral practice is 'ren'(仁), which dwells in and is displayed by the realization of virtuous personhood and authentic ethical life. The friendship is considered one of the most important intersubjective relationships of our life. Many western philosophers, like Aristotle and Hegel, had given friendship a special status in their theories of ethical life. In Chinese philosophy, however, though the idea of friendship and ethical life are also important in both cultural and philosophical perspectives, the significance of friendship in Mencius' practical philosophy has not yet been analyzed in past studies.

The first part of my paper focuses on the basic idea and structure of Mencius' practical philosophy; in other words, to explain the idea of ren and ethical life and their relation. The second part elaborates on the significance of friendship in Mencius' view by examining the original text of Mencius and some other

Confucians; I will try to justify that friendship is an indispensable part of our ethical life toward the becoming of the Saint in the view of Mencius. The third part reconstructs the system of ethical life with the new understanding of friendship. The last part concludes with the reflection on Mencius' view of friendship in contemporary perspective.

Han-na Kim
MA candidate, Department of philosophy,
Seoul National University

Dai Zhen's View on Three Universal Virtues of Zhongyong

There exist diverse interpretations on Zhongyong (the Doctrine of Mean 中庸). Some interpretations focus on the whole meaning of the text while other interpretations focus on the specific words such as Nature (xing 性), Way (dao 道), Equilibrium (zhong 中), Harmony (he 和). For example, Zhu Xi who made Zhongyong independent book from Liji (禮記) wrote its commentary and regarded it as one of the four classics (Sishu 四書). At the same time, Zhu Xi borrowed some words (e.g. Weifa 未發 and Yifa 已發) from Zhongyong to develop his own philosophy. Likewise, Dai Zhen who was famous for a harsh critic of Zhu Xi also wrote commentary of Zhongyong (the supplementary commentary of Zhongyong 中庸補注). Dai Zhen's commentary, however, is relatively brief and includes the commentary of Zheng Xuan (鄭玄) who was a great commentator in the Han dynasty. Instead, Dai Zhen frequently quoted Zhongyong in his major philosophical works and offered his own interpretations different from Zhu Xi's interpretations.

It is notable that Dai Zhen's understanding of three universal virtues (dade 達德) in Zhongyong have both common and different point with that of Zhu Xi. It seems like that Dai Zhen agreed with Zhu Xi on the meaning of de which is a kind of innate human power whereas he had different opinion on specific content of three universal virtues. Wisdom (zhi 智), humanity (ren 仁), bravery (yong 勇) are three universal virtues in chapter 20 of Zhongyong. Dai Zhen described that wisdom is the ethical perfection of the intelligent mind; humanity is what is ultimately pure and clear; bravery is the endeavor to act ethically. What is most compelling is the description of humanity seeing that humanity is the core notion of Confucianism since Confucius and its definition varied from scholar to scholar. I suggest that Dai Zhen's understanding of humanity refers to mirror-like clearness which signifies impartiality. This suggestion would reveal the difference between Dai Zhen and Zhu Xi and the self-cultivation theory of Dai Zhen.

An Interpretation of Yi Hwang and Ki Tae-seung' s Four-Seven Debate through examining the different usages of Jian (兼) by the two thinkers

Four-Seven Debate in Korea is an argument about Four Beginnings (四端) and Seven Emotions (七情). In the 16th Chosun Period, Yi Hwang (李滉, 1501-1570) and Ki Tae-seung (奇大升, 1527-1572) were the key persons engaged in the debate. Four-Seven Debate first started by Ki Tae-seung's letter to Yi Hwang in 1559. It then followed by Yi's reply and a rebuttal again by Ki. Each of them sent out four letters of argument to the other from 1559 to 1566. During the 8-year debate, Ki Tae-seung insisted that Four Beginnings are parts of and are included in Seven Emotions. In contrast, Yi Hwang asserted that it is possible to see the Four and the Seven as a whole concept of emotion, but at the same time separate them. Eventually, as revealed by most researches, the two thinkers ended their debate without any compromise.

This paper aims at showing that the way Yi Hwang and Ki Tae-seung dealt with the word Jian (兼) provided a factor which made the two sides remain far apart in the end. After examining Yi and Ki' s usage of Jian in the first four letters (two by Ki and two by Yi), I found that in Ki's case, Jian functioned as an implication of treating Four Beginnings and Seven Emotions under one whole concept of emotion. On the other hand, the Jian used by Yi implied the possibility of separating Four Beginnings and Seven Emotions. In other words, although both Yi Hwang and Ki Tae-seung used exactly the same Chinese character Jian, the implications were totally different and were closely related to the thinkers' tactics. I believe this was a reason why the two thinkers did not reach a compromise.

In addition, I found that Yi Hwang's attitude to using Jian changed during the debate. In his first reply to Ki Tae-seung, he claimed that Jian is not a perfect word to use. However, immediately in his second reply to Ki, he accepted the use of Jian and began to put the word together with Zhu (主). This change of attitude seems to indicate some changes which happened in Yi Hwang' s thought during the argument process.

The analysis of the last four letters left is currently in progress. The result of this analysis is expected to make a contribution to a better understanding of Yi Hwang and Ki Tae-seung's flow of thought throughout the whole argument, and thus give a clearer interpretation of their Four-Seven Debate.


General information

Location

The conference is held in Bainian Building, located uphill. You can take campus shuttle to Bainian Building station directly.

(All shuttle buses can arrive Bainian Building)

From main gate to shuttle stop



Bainian Building



Transportation

Choice no.1: Taoyuan Int'l Airport MRT Line

1. Please take Taoyuan Int'l Airport MRT Line to Taipei Main Station.
2. Then, take Taipei MRT Blue Line from “Taipei Main Station” to “Zhongxiao Fuxing”.
3. Later, transfer to Taipei MRT Brown Line from “Zhongxiao Fuxing” to “Taipei Zoo Station”
4. Cross the street for MRT shuttle bus Br3, Gr1, 236 and 237 to National Chengchi University (NCCU).

Choice no.2: By Bus

Buses information

1. Where to buy bus tickets: Ticket counters are located in the Arrival Passenger Reception Areas of both Terminals, T1 & T2.
2. Terminal 1 Bus Platform: On the south side of the B1 floor.
3. Terminal 2 Bus Platform: On the north side of the First floor.
4. One-way fare varies from NTD110-140 per adult.

Link: <http://www.taoyuan-airport.com/english/Buses/>

Which bus to take

Routes	Which stop to get off	Service Hour	Driving Dist(min)
1. Kuo-Kuang Line 1819	Taipei Main Station	Taoyuan Airport 05:40am-01:30am	55 minutes
2. Evergreen Bus 5201	MRT Nanjing E. Rd. Station	Taoyuan Airport 06:00-00:30	60 minutes

If you choose route no.1, take Taipei MRT Red Line from “Taipei Main Station” to “GongGuan Station” Take exit 1 Shuiyuan Market. And then take Bus no. 236 (toward Tungnan University) and get off at National Chengchi University (NCCU).

If you choose route no.2, take Taipei MRT Brown Line from “Nanjing E. Rd Station” to “Taipei Zoo Station.” Take exit 1 Taipei Zoo. And then take Bus no. 236 (toward Taipei Main Station) and get off at National Chengchi University.

Choice no.3: Taxi service

Taxis operating by shifts are located at the west side of the Terminal 1's and Terminal 2's Arrivals Lobby at the Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport.

Service number

Terminal 1 Taxi service center: +886-3-3982832

Terminal 2 Taxi service center +886-3-3983599

Complaints: +886-3-3834499

Useful information & links

Airport Transportation (English Version):

<http://www.taoyuan-airport.com/english/transportation>

Taipei Metro (English Version):

<http://english.trtc.com.tw/>

Taipei Bus (English Version):

<http://www.5284.com.tw/Dybus.aspx?Lang=En>

Accommodation

The I-House is located in the center of a residential area. 10 minutes by foot from the NCCU Campus.

Address: No.17, Ln. 112, Sec. 2, Xiuming Rd., Wenshan Dist., Taipei City 116, Taiwan



Room information

	Seoul University		
NAME	Prof. Ahn, Sung-doo	Kim, Taesoo, Lee, Gil-san	Kim, Hanna, Luk, Yee-chun
ROOM TYPE	Single	Triple	Twin beds
CHECK-IN	April 28 th	April 28th	April 28th
CHECK-OUT	May 1 st	May 1st	May 1st

	Kyoto University		
NAME	Prof. Deguchi, Yasuo	Takuro Onishi, Ryo Ito	Ryosuke Igarashi, Masahuyu Ichiki
ROOM TYPE	Single	Two beds	Twin beds
CHECK-IN	April 28 th	April 28th	April 28th
CHECK-OUT	May 1 st	May 1st	May 1st

	NUS	
NAME	Prof. Keating Malcolm	Lee, Wilson, John R. Williams, Huang, Jeremy
ROOM TYPE	Single	Triple
CHECK-IN	April 28 th	April 28th
CHECK-OUT	May 1 st	May 1st

For more info:

TEL: +886-2-2936-8869

Email: ihouse@nccu.edu.tw