以下の要領で論理学上級の番外編が行われます。ぜひご参加下さい。
論理学上級番外編：完全性定理と不完全性定理
講師：矢田部俊介
日時：2017年3月25日（土）10：30 ～ 17：30
テーマ：
（10:30-12:00）古典述語論理の完全性定理
（13:00-15:00）モデルの中でモデルをつくる
（15:30-17:30）不完全性定理のモデル論的証明
場所:
京都大学文学部第11演習室（総合研究2号館1F南側）
キャンパスマップの34番のたてものです。
http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/
土曜は建物の西側の入り口のみあいていますのでご注意ください。
本年度も研究科横断型授業Ｂタイプ「論理学上級I」「論理学上級II」を、矢田部俊介先生、村上祐子先生をゲスト講師にお招きして開講いたします。
シラバスは以下のページよりダウンロードできます。
http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/education-campus/cross/2016/b.html
日時
論理学上級Ｉ（矢田部先生）
2017年 2月4日、5日（10時30分～17時00分）
論理学上級ＩI（村上先生）
2017年 2月6日（13時00分～17時00分）2月7日（10時00分～17時00分）2月8日（10時00分～15時00分）
場所
京都大学文学部第９講義室（総合研究2号館 南側地下1階）
キャンパスマップの34番のたてものです。
http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/campus/yoshida/map6r_y/
土日は建物の西側の入り口のみあいていますのでご注意ください。
以下のようにCAPEワークショップが開催されます。
————–
「非古典メレオロジー研究会」
日時：12月20日（火）14:45-16:15
場所：京都大学文学部校舎1階会議室
発表者：藤川直也（首都大学東京 准教授）
発表タイトル：Plurality in Fictional Discourses
言語：英語
要旨：
A fiction may describe a plurality without specifying the `dossier’ of each of its individual (atomic) constituents enough to distinguish them from each other. In particular, it may be the case that a fiction gives the exactly same characterization to each of the constituents of a plurality, as is described in Everett (2013). For example, `we are told in Tess of the d’Urbervilles that 16 policemen came to arrest Tess but we are not given any more specific descriptions of any of these policemen’ (Everett, 2013, p. 191). Let us call a plural fictional character without specification of each of its constituents a plurality with indiscernible constituents. In this paper, I develop a theory of pluralities with indiscernible constituents, based on nuclear Meinongianism (cf. Parsons, 1980) and non-idempotent mereology (cf. Cotnoir, 2015). Nuclear Meinongianism of fictional characters claims that a fictional character in a fictional story S is a nonexistent object x which has all nuclear properties x is characterized as having by S. According to non-idempotent mereology, a mereological sum can have one and the same object as its two or more different parts. Combining these two theories, I propose that `16 policemen’ in Tess of d’Urbervilles refers to a mereological sum which has one and the same nonexistent policeman as its 16 different parts.
以下の要領でCAPEレクチャーが開かれます。皆様の参加をお待ちしております。
日時：2016年11月11日(金) 18:00–19:30
場所：京都大学 文学部校舎１階 会議室
話者：Syraya Chin-Mu Yang(国立台湾大学)
言語：英語
題目：
Semantic Considerations on Contingentist Quantified Modal Logic
概要：
Timothy Williamson has defended necessitism, the thesis that necessarily
everything is necessarily something: ‘(NE) － □∀x□∃y x = y’. By contrast,
contingentism, a negation of necessitism, accepts the contingency of being
－ there are things which exist contingently. Williamson rightly remarks
that ‘common sense has no authority to decide between necessitism and
contingentism; it is a more theoretical dispute’. And so, he claims that
necessitism can be justified in a framework for quantificational, or
higher-order, modal logic, which originated from the proof theoretic work
of Ruth Barcan Marcus. Typically, the well-known Barcan Formula (BF) －
∀x□φ(x)→□∀x φ(x), and its converse (CBF) － □∀xφ(x) →∀x□φ(x), have been
taken as the characteristic formulas for the necessitist quantified modal
logic. In contrast, the contingentist’s quantified modal logics by and
large repudiate BF and CBF.
I will examine some intrinsic semantic problems with the contingentist’s
treatments in the framework of possible worlds semantics. Special attention
will be paid to the difficulties with variable domains. I show that
sticking to the legitimacy of the Being Constraints, the use of names as
rigid designators in modal contexts will render truth value gaps in
variable domains and by the same reasoning we may not have appropriate
assignments of free variables in de re modal contexts. However, I show that
this can be solved if we opt for a mid-way, i.e. equinumerous domains. We
will not appeal to constant domains, nor will we accept variable domains,
but simply assume that all domains have the same cardinality, though not
the same set of objects. A semantic treatment will be proposed so that both
BF and CBF can be validated, but the thesis of necessitism will no longer
hold.
A genuine threat will be noted, that is, the intended interpretation of de
re sentences may not express the imposed de re modality. Two options to
deal with this problem will be suggested. (i) The appeal to the rigidity of
names based on a substitutional interpretation of quantifiers in
alphabetical-expansion models However, when modal contexts are involved, we
may be forced to rephrase universal sentences in terms of a conjunction
with an infinite number of conjuncts and to re-interpret a formula with an
existence quantifier in terms of an infinitary conjunction. We then need an
infinitary language and take as the required underlying system a certain
version of infinitary logic. Alternatively, we may suspense with names and
put forth some special semantic treatment to express the rigidity of
variables. We would have a much more complicated, or even ad hoc,
semantics, and the price could be too high to pay.
Clearly, for the contingentist, the moral is: there is no loyal road to the
theorization of metaphysical modality in terms of quantified modal logic.
Perhaps, Williamson is right when he points out that the contingentist
‘must take a more instrumental attitude to the model theory’. (2014: 714).
Then why not accept the necessitist’s quantaified modal logic?
以下の要領でCAPEレクチャーが開催されます。皆様のご参加をお待ちしております。
日時：2016年11月14日(月) 16:30–18:00
講師：Dr.Yuri Cath (La Trobe University)
日時：2016年10月27日（木） 16:30-18:00
場所：京都大学 文学部校舎地下１階 大会議室
地図：http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/
言語：英語
題目：
Knowing What It Is Like, Choice, and Consent
要旨：
Can I know what it is like to deliver a stand-up comedy routine, give birth to a child, or go to war, without having had those experiences myself? Is it possible to gain this ‘what it is like’ (WIL)-knowledge by reading stories or talking with the experienced? Philosophers often hold a pessimistic attitude towards this possibility on the grounds that one can only know what it is like to have an experience if one has had an experience of that same type oneself (Lewis 1998, Paul 2014). And endorsements of this pessimistic attitude can also be found in novels, films, and pop music. But, I shall argue, a puzzle now arises because there are also countless examples of everyday practices and judgments that testify to our holding an optimistic attitude towards this same possibility. In this paper I discuss how this puzzle can be illuminated and potentially dissolved by appealing to recent work in epistemology on knowledge-wh and in the philosophy of mind on empathy. I also show how my solution to this puzzle can help us to evaluate recent arguments by Paul (2014, 2015) concerning WIL-knowledge and transformative choices, and discussions in applied ethics concerning WIL-knowledge and informed consent (Bayne and Levy 2005, Dodds and Jones 1989, Oakley 1992).
以下の要領でCAPEレクチャーが開かれます。みなさまぜひご参加下さい。
12:00–13:30: Lunch break
Session 2: Theories based on LP
13:30–14:30: Timo Weiss: Inconsistent Math Foundations — Cantor and Beyond
14:30–15:30: Daniel Skurt: Some remarks on identity in 1st and 2nd order minimal LP
15:30-15:50: Coffee break
Session 3: Philosophical issues related to Paraconsistency
15:50–16:50: Ryosuke Igarashi: An anti-Realistic interpretation of catuskoti
16:50–17:50: Colin Caret: No Cause for Alarm
18:30- Dinner
***
Oct. 10
Session 4: Ineffability and Being: topics in Dialetheism
10:00–11:00: Maiko Yamamori: Inclosure, Curry and Ineffability
11:00–12:00: Filippo Casati: Seyn, Grund and der Letzte Gott.
12:00-13:30: Lunch break
Session 5: Extensions and expansions of FDE
13:30–14:30: Adam Přenosil: Super-Belnap logics: charting the terra incognita
14:30–15:30: Takuro Onishi: A four-valued frame semantics for the relevant logic R.
15:30–15:50: Coffee break
Session 6: Meinongians discuss Paraconsistency (and not?!)
15:50–16:50: Naoya Fujikawa: Possible and Impossible Objects in Modal Meinongianism
16:50–17:50: Franz Berto: As Good As It Gets: Modal-Epistemic Logic for Inconsistent Agents, Without Paraconsistency, or Impossible Worlds
18:30– Dinner
題目：
Dialetheism and the Exclusion-Expressing Device
概要：
Dialetheism is the view that, against the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC),
some A’s are true together with their negation, not-A. Hence a famous
anti-dialetheic objection, which I will cal the “Exclusion Problem”:
dialetheists cannot rule out anything, or express disagreement, for their
dialetheic negation of A is compatible with A.
In this talk I propose a strategy to address the problem, which starts by
assuming a primitive notion of exclusion and defines via it a notion of
contradiction, rhetorically called *absolute*, such that no contradiction
of this kind is acceptable for a dialetheist. Via such a notion we can
express in a non-question-begging way what the opposition between
dialetheists and non-dialetheists consists in, and we can give to the
dialetheist a non-pragmatic exclusion-expressing device. The big issue is
whether such a device is free from dialetheically intractable revenge
paradoxes. I have no answer to this, but I’m curious to hear what my
audience thinks!
題目：
How to Be a Semantic Holist?
概要：
The view that meaning is holistic is highly controversial and is usually
not treated as an independent thesis but rather appears as a vital drawback
of a theory of meaning in the literature for its not being able to deliver
a notion of shared meaning. Such attitude is so prevalent that oftentimes
people simply take semantic holism as a reason for the rejection of a
theory without further argument. As is often the case, however, there is no
agreement among those engaged in the debate what semantic holism is. With
the varied definitions of the doctrine, commentators disagree on not only
its truth but also its content and intelligibility.
In this paper, I suggest understanding semantic holism as characterizing
the determination relation between the meaning of an expression and its
determinants and argue that we can best capture the features maintained by
the holist by construing semantic holism as the view that the meaning of an
expression E is determined by E’s relations to every other expression in
the language of individual competent users. It follows from my definition
that, firstly, the often alleged worry that if meaning is holistic, any
change in one’s language will change the meanings of all the expressions in
the very language does not follow. Secondly, it is an inevitable outcome
that there is no guaranteed meaning sharing available for semantic holism
so understood. This latter fact, however, does not commit us to the
rejection of semantic holism. For holistic meanings, like their
non-holistic counterparts, are sharable either across individuals or time
slices, or so I shall argue.
