Prof. Yumiko Inukai Workshopのお知らせ

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講演者:Yumiko Inukai




Title: Self-reflection in Hume and Locke

Locke maintains that the self is a thinking thing who is always aware of
itself as a subject of thinking or perceiving; thus he says, “it being
impossible for anyone to perceive, without perceiving, that he does
perceive” (Locke 1975: 138).   He grants reflexive consciousness as an
integral aspect of the self as a subject.  Hume, on the other hand, does
not seem to be able to allow the self to have such self-reflexivity that
Locke does, given his official view of the self merely as a bundle of
perceptions, nothing more, nothing less.  This difference is clearly
reflected in their accounts of personal identity.   However, Hume still
argues that personal identity arises from consciousness that Hume considers
as “a reflected thought” (T App. 20).  What sort of reflection does Hume
have in mind?  How could Hume explain the mind’s act of reflection without
introducing a mind as a distinct actor?  Is Hume’s “reflected thought”
different from Locke’s self-reflexivity in their explanations of personal
identity?   I will attempt to answer these questions by first considering
Locke’s self-consciousness that appears in his account of personal
identity, and then discussing Hume’s possible explanation of reflection.