Speaker: Ching Hui Su
Date and Time: Thursday, June 21, 2018: 16:30-18:00
Venue : 京都大学文学部地下1階大会議室（Faculty Meeting Room in the Building No. 8）
Title: Vagueness in the Frankfurt’s Cases
Abstract: In his 1969 paper, by the so-called “Frankfurt’s Cases,” Harry Frankfurt argues against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, which states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. However, it is still controversial whether the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is invalidated by those Frankfurt-style cases, for some philosophers have some doubts about the plausibility of Frankfurt-style cases. In the present paper, I will argue that, firstly, while generalizing Frankfurt-style cases, it will be clear that we can easily generate a Frankfurt-style case by satisfying two conditions, i.e. the moral responsibility condition and no alternative possibility condition. Secondly, I will argue that, if one could argue plausibly that there be some substantial connection between the responsibility condition and the failure of no alternative possibility condition, then the Principle of Alternative Possibilities would be invalidated. In the end, I will argue that the real task for us is not to generate (or disarm) new Frankfurt-style cases but to accept the vagueness of the concept of alternative possibility and/or that of moral responsibility.