Author Archives: kyotophil
鬼界先生の集中講義の日程について:Schedule of Seminar by Prof. Kikai
鬼界彰夫先生の前期集中講義の詳細は以下のようになっております。
【日程】
9月5日(月)3限〜5限(13:00-18:00)
9月6日(火)2限〜5限(10:30-18:00)
9月7日(水)2限〜5限(10:30-18:00)
9月8日(木)2限〜5限(10:30-18:00)
【場所】
第5講義室
The details about the seminar by Prof. Akio Kikai is as below.
[Date/Time]September 5th (Mon.) 3rd – 5th periods (1:00 pm – 6:00 pm)
September 6th (Tues.) 2nd – 5th periods (10:30 am – 6:00 pm)
September 7th (Wed.) 2nd – 5th periods (10:30 am – 6:00 pm)
September 8th (Thur.) 2nd – 5th periods (10:30 am – 6:00 pm)
[Place]The 5th lecture room
前期授業最終日のお知らせ
Prof. Yumiko Inukai Workshopのお知らせ
先にお伝えしておりました、Prof. Yumiko Inukai の講演の詳細が決定しましたのでお伝えいたします。ご確認ください。
講演者:Yumiko Inukai
日時:2016年7月29日(金)16:30~18:00
場所:文学部新館1F会議室
使用言語:英語
Locke maintains that the self is a thinking thing who is always aware of
itself as a subject of thinking or perceiving; thus he says, “it being
impossible for anyone to perceive, without perceiving, that he does
perceive” (Locke 1975: 138). He grants reflexive consciousness as an
integral aspect of the self as a subject. Hume, on the other hand, does
not seem to be able to allow the self to have such self-reflexivity that
Locke does, given his official view of the self merely as a bundle of
perceptions, nothing more, nothing less. This difference is clearly
reflected in their accounts of personal identity. However, Hume still
argues that personal identity arises from consciousness that Hume considers
as “a reflected thought” (T App. 20). What sort of reflection does Hume
have in mind? How could Hume explain the mind’s act of reflection without
introducing a mind as a distinct actor? Is Hume’s “reflected thought”
different from Locke’s self-reflexivity in their explanations of personal
identity? I will attempt to answer these questions by first considering
Locke’s self-consciousness that appears in his account of personal
identity, and then discussing Hume’s possible explanation of reflection.
Dr. Paolo Bonardi Workshopのお知らせ
講演者:Dr. Paolo Bonardi (UCLA)
日時:2016年7月25日(月), 16:30–18:00
場所:京都大学 文学部校舎1階 会議室
言語:英語
Title:The Semantic Content of Empty Names and the Logic of Nonexistent Objects
Abstract:Millianism is the doctrine according to which the semantic content of a proper name is exhausted by its referent. My talk will be about the so-called empty (proper) names, more specifically: names that belong to fiction/pretense (e.g. “Sherlock Holmes”); and names that are empty because of an error (e.g. “Vulcan”). It will be my goal to outline a Millian account of empty names according to which: names from fiction and error refer to actual and necessarily nonexistent objects; these objects cannot have ordinary properties (e.g. being a detective), whereas they can have – and in fact have some – non-ordinary properties (e.g. being something such that fictionally, it is a detective). I will argue that the logic of such objects is not positive free logic but a version of classical logic.
Prof. Yumiko Inukai Workshopのお知らせ
講演者:Yumiko Inukai
日時:2016年7月29日(金)16:30~18:00
場所:未定
使用言語:英語
詳細については追ってご連絡いたします。
Mr. Kyle Shuttleworth Workshopのお知らせ
講演者:Mr. Kyle Michael James Shuttleworth (Queen’s University Belfast)
日時:2016年7月1日(金) 18:00~19:30
場所:京都大学文学部校舎1F会議室
使用言語:英語
Abstract: In the English translation of Watsuji Tetsuro’s 倫理学, the concept of ‘本来性’ is translated as ‘authenticity’. In Western philosophical thought, however, authenticity is intricately bound to the historical context from which it emerged. One thus ought to question whether authenticity can be abstracted from its historical context, and imported into a foreign culture. In light of this, the primary aim of this investigation will be to explicate precisely that which Watsuji’s concept of ‘authenticity’ entails. This will then enable one to determine whether that which Watsuji advocates is akin to the concept of authenticity as espoused in the West. That which is stake is not merely a linguistic quibble, but rather the search for an intercultural, conceptual ground upon which to conduct ethical discourse between East and West. The thesis which will be posited in this enquiry then, is whether the ethic of authenticity can provide a conceptual bridge between Eastern and Western philosophical traditions.
哲学・西哲史合同研究会のお知らせ
Dr. Malcolm Keating Workshopのお知らせ
講演者:Malcolm Keating (Yale-NUS College, Singapore)
日時:2016年6月10日(金) 18:00〜19:30
場所:文学部校舎1F会議室
Title: Is Ellipsis Completion Knowledge? Linguistic Interpretation in Classical Indian Philosophy
Abstract:
Natural languages vary in how much information they encode into lexemes. Yet speakers can utter subsentential units which are syntactically or otherwise incomplete and still communi- cate successfully. Linguists and philosophers, in analyzing this widespread interpretive prac- tice of completing ellipsis, differ over whether such utterances constitute genuine speech acts, are disguised but complete syntactic/semantic units, as well as how the ellipsis is completed– syntactically, semantically, or pragmatically. The answers to these questions are significant since, for instance, they may challenge the thesis that languages are compositional, that is, with expressions being semantically determined by their syntax and lexical semantics.
Classical Indian philosophers, although committed to the compositionality thesis, gave vary- ing accounts of how interpretive practices allowed for ellipsis completion. The philosophers known as the Bhatta Mimamsa argued that an interpretive process, which they called arthapatti or “postulation,” could yield certain knowledge of what is elided. For instance, since the San- skrit language is highly inflected, someone who hears a speaker say “the door, the door!” can rely on syntactically-encoded information to help them recover a complete sentence, “Close the door, close the door!” In the 16th century, Narayana Bhatta discusses this process in the Manameyodaya, arguing that postulation requires the positing of words in order for there to be anvaya or “connection” within the expression. This argument is posed in response to opponents who argue that only the word meanings, and not the words themselves, must be posited.
I then draw connections between Narayanabhatta and contemporary Anglophone literature on the topic. In particular, I argue that the position of Narayana’s opponent (who is identified as belonging to another school of Mimamsa, the Prabhakara) is roughly analogous to that of pragmatic contextualists. In contrast, the Bhatta view could fruitfully be reconstructed as an abductive completion of lexical underspecification, along the lines of James Pustejovsky’s pro- posal. However, due to the ambiguity in the notion of connection, these reconstructions must be tentative, as Indian proposals maybe consistent with multiple formal analyses. The cru- cial implication to draw from their dialectic is the claim that ellipsis completion rises to the level of knowledge, and that it does so through a rational process grounded in the principle of compositionality.
Siderits先生の授業について
Siderits先生の授業にご出席される方は「kyoto.phil[at]gmail.com」までご連絡ください。授業資料をお渡しいたします。
If you’d like to attend the lecture by Prof. Siderits, please send email to ‘kyoto.phil[at]gmail.com’ . I’ll send you documents about the lecture.