Yumiko Inukai先生（University of Massachusetts Boston) の講演会のお知らせです。

日時：２０１５年７月３１日（金）　１６：３０～１８：００

場所：京都大学文学部校舎１F会議室

Title: James (and Hume) on Radical Empiricism and Object

Abstract: James presents his version of empiricism as *Radical* empiricism, distinguishing it from “ordinary” empiricism. He emphasizes the experiential reality of relations, especially conjunctive ones, and uses them ingeniously to account for Subject/Object distinction without postulating anything unobserved. I will discuss James’ Radical Empiricism contrasting it with Hume’s empiricism, and his account of the subject/object distinction for which he introduces the notion of “pure experience.” Although my focus for this talk will be on James’ accounts, I hope to show at the end that there is an interesting parallel between James’ explanation of subject/object and Hume’s.

嘉指先生による後期の特殊講義の講義日程をお知らせします。

金曜４、５限（隔週）で、以下の通りになります。

１）10月2日　２）10月16日　３）11月13日　４）12月11日　５）12月25日　６）1月8日

７）1月25日

１０月３０日は休講、１１月２７日は火曜の授業（哲学講義）を行います。

火曜５限（哲学講義）の補講授業を、７月３０日（木）の３限、４限、５限で行います。

場所は通常通り、第２講義室です。

７月１０日（金）に開催される「Workshop on Philosophical Semantics」の時間変更をお知らせします。

１６時半〜１８時半　→　１５時〜１７時（延長の可能性あり）

７月２日（木）に開催されるワークショップのお知らせです。

日時：２０１５年７月２日（木） １８：００〜１９：３０

講演者：Kevin T. Kelly (Professor and Director of the Center for Formal Epistemology, Carnegie Mellon University)

場所：文学部校舎１F会議室

使用言語：英語

Title : Rhetoric, Reliability, and Inductive Inference

Absutract : Socrates argued to persuade. He also sought the truth. In deductive reasoning, the two go together—valid argumentation le ads from true information to true conclusions, and that fact supports or may even boost the rhetorical force of valid deduct ive arguments. Inductive reasoning, by definition, generates conclusions that go beyond the information provided. Such rea soning can be very persuasive, as when scientists prefer simple, unified, sharply tested explanations over complex, diffuse explanations that rely on multiple coincidences—a bias known popularly as Ockham’s razor. But it is harder to say how suc h a bias conduces to true belief. It is tempting to try to make induction look deductive, by adding metaphysical assumption s, such as Leibniz’ view that God is an engineer who likes elegant universes. But that strategy is both rhetorically and e pistemically self-defeating, since the added assumptions are not subject to scientific investigation at all. Instead, we wi ll present a mathematical argument, based on ideas from learning theory, to the effect that Ockham’s is necessary for stayi ng on the straightest path to the truth, even if that path cannot be perfectly straight. Our argument singles out Ockham’s razor as the right rhetorical principle for inductive inference, but optimal, inductive truth-conduciveness is so weak that the argument may actually undermine our native credence in simple, unified theories. Inductive skeptics assume that weaker standards of truth conduciveness should be paired with weaker credence in the conclusions. We respond that standards are c ontextually relative to ambitions. High or even full belief is justified by weak standards as long as they are the best sta ndards achievable in the problem at hand.

７月１０日に開催されるワークショップのお知らせです。

日時：２０１５年７月１０日（金） １６：３０〜１８：３０

講演者：Masahiro Yamada (Claremont Graduate University),

Byeong-uk Yi (University of Toront)

場所：文学部校舎１F会議室

使用言語：英語

Masahiro Yamada

Title : Laying Sleeping Beauty to Rest

Abstract

Elga and others have argued that the so-called Sleeping Beauty Problem poses a challenge to Van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle. The argument rests on the assumption that conditionalization is the correct updating procedure to be used in the case: if one insists on conditionalization and the Reflection Principle, the consequence of that is less attractive than that of rejecting the Reflection Principle. I argue that general considerations of when conditionalization is appropriate show that conditionalization cannot be used in the case of Sleeping Beauty. Thus, the case does not pose a challenge to the Reflection Principle.

Byeong-uk Yi

Title : Semantic Relationism and Relational Propositions

Abstract

In Semantic Relationism, Kit Fine proposes semantic relationism, the view that semantic relationship among linguistic expressions is not reducible to their intrinsic semantic features, and combines this view with referentialism, the view that intrinsic semantic features of linguistic expressions are exhausted by their referents. In this talk, I will point out some difficulties with his account, and explore a way to overcome them by taking a radical version of semantic relationism.

７月８日、９日に開催されるワークショップのお知らせです。

日時：２０１５年７月８日(水)、７月９日(木) 　各日１８：００〜１９：３０

講演者 : Bongrae Soek (Alvernia University)

場所：京都大学文学部文学部東館２F KUASU 多目的室

言語：英語

July 8 (Wed)

Title : Empathy and Nociceptive Mirror Emotion in Embodied Moral Psychology

Abstract : In recent studies of moral judgments, psychologists analyze the moral mind from the perspectives of Kantian reasoning, Humea n emotion, or Rawlsian principle and identify diverse processes of moral cognition. But the body (i.e., the physical sense a nd activity) of a moral agent are not fully and seriously considered in their analyses. In this presentation, I will develop a moral psychology of the body, i.e., a moral psychology of embodied and other-regarding emotion. How does the body initiat e, influence, and sustain moral judgments and decisions? How does it motivate compassionate actions and other-regarding behaviors? I will explore this relatively uncharted territory of embodied moral psychology by focusing two psychological phenomena. First, I will focus on empathy (particularly its affective resonance and embodied response to others’ pain and suffering). I will argue that our embodied nociceptive mirror emotion is the foundation of our empathic concern towards other suffering. At a basic level of moral cognition, our empathy to others’ pain is processed by affective resonance and motivational prep aredness that are supported by brain regions (such as the anterior insula) that sense and react to bodily change. As we obse rve others’ pain, we not only think to relieve their suffering but we also sweat profusely and breathe abruptly. The embodi ed process is a critical element of empathy’s prosocial and moral orientation.   Second, I will discuss psychopathy and its lack of full embodiment in moral cognition. Typically psychopathic (dispositional or behavioral) orientations are associated with a deficit in affective processing that integrates specific types of stimuli with visceral and autonomic reactions. It seems that psychopaths suffer from disrupted emotional processes that motivate pr osocial behaviors via embodied reactions. They know and recognize others’ pain and suffering but do not react (in their phys iological and behavioral reactions) to them appropriately. Once again the body plays important roles in some aspects of mora l cognition where affective social perception gives rise to prosocial helping behaviors.

Outline

(1)Recent Studies in Moral Psychology (Kantian, Humean, Rawlsian Approaches etc.)

(2)Embodied Approaches to Cognition

(3)Embodied Approaches to Social Psychology

(4)My Approach – Embodied Approach to Moral Psychology -Empathy (Nociceptive Mirror Emotion) -Psychopathy (absence of empathic concern due to insufficient bodily response)

July 9 (Thu)

Title : Embodied Space in Psychopathology and Art

Abstract : In this presentation, I will analyze the experience of seemingly non-sensuous or non-sensible things, such as empty spaces ( space gaps, space islands, wide open space, the absence of presence, or the presence of absence). I will argue, quite parado xically, that to experience such non-sensuous things, sensual imagination (tactile, visceral, motor, and holistic somatic se nse) is necessary. Our basic sensory encounter with the world, according to many philosophers such as Merleau Ponty and psyc hologist such as J. J. Gibson, is embodied; it is guided by our tactile and kinetic interaction with the object in the world . That is, we perceive and understand the presence of physical entities and their relations to our bodily interaction with t hem. What about empty space? Do we experience empty space in this embodied and sensual way? In this presentation, I will foc us on embodied metaphors (embodied spatial distinctions) and psychopathologies (agoraphobia, acrophobia etc.) of space and u se them as examples to support my embodied interpretation of spatial perception. I will argue that embodied perception is im portant and perhaps necessary in the full experience of space. The body is required for us to experience, understand, and ap preciate the bodiless openness.

６月１２日の第３演習は１２：００〜１５：００までとなります１３：００〜１４：４５の時間帯で行います。