CAPEレクチャー(Profs. Tanaka, Finnigan)のお知らせ

Date: Thursday, 11th October, 2018
Time: 15:00-18:00
Venue: Yoshida-Izumidono (No.76 of this map https://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/en/access/main-campus-map.html)
Speakers: Koji Tanaka (ANU) (15:00-16:25) and Bronwyn Finnigan (ANU) (16:35-18:00)
Title and Abstract:
Koji Tanaka: The Logic of Emptiness

An error theorist about morality holds that it is an error to think that there are facts we can appeal to in making moral judgements and also it is an error to think that moral claims can be true. A global error theorist holds that it is an error to think that there are facts of any kind and no statement of any kind is true. The Buddhist philosophers, Mādhyamikas, can be described as global error theorists. What, then, are we to make of their position that there are no facts or that there are no true statements? It seems to be self-refuting to say that it is a fact that there are no facts or that it is true that there are no truths. Even if one can make such claims coherent as Mādhyamikas seem to think they can, how can anyone come to claim that there are no facts or truths to begin with? In this paper, I will investigate the possibility of a method that can establish global error theory. I will show that a global error theorist can have a coherent view about logic and reasoning that can show that there are, ultimately, no facts or truths of any kind.

Bronwyn Finnigan: Conceptuality and Mathematical Thinking in Aristotle: an Ancient Intervention into the McDowell-Dreyfus Debate

John McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus argue that human beings have a capacity for ‘situation-specific skilful coping’. Both claim that they are articulating Aristotle’s notion of phronēsis or practical wisdom. And both insist that it is best understood as a kind of perceptual capacity. They disagree, however, about whether it is a form of conceptual rationality. I argue that neither provides an accurate analysis of Aristotle, but I consider whether there are textual grounds for extending Aristotle’s position to include McDowell’s idea that conceptuality is a rational capacity that informs perceptual experience. I derive an account from Aristotle’s debate with Plato on the nature and presuppositions of counting. This debate fundamentally concerns the boundary conditions for rationality. I argue that their differences imply distinct models of perceptual activity and I give reasons to think that Aristotle’s position corresponds broadly to that of McDowell. It has a problem, however. It implies that animals cannot perceive, or not in the same way as human beings, and there is reason to think that Aristotle thinks their perceptual capacities are structurally similar. I conclude by proposing a (partial) solution that is inspired by Plato’s views about the role of calculation in resolving inconsistencies in perception.

Contact: Shinya Aoyama tipsypixy@gmail.com

CAPEレクチャー(Prof. Phenpinant)のお知らせ


Date: Tuesday, 31st July, 2018
Time: 14:45-16:15
Venue: Meeting room on the 1st floor of Faculty of Letters main building, Kyoto University (No.8 of this map https://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/en/access/main-campus-map.html)
Speaker: Asst. Prof. Kasem Phenpinant (Chulalongkom University)
Title: Hospitality as the Acceptance of the Others: Recasting the Ethics of Deconstruction

Jacques Derrida provides a novel notion of hospitality as an ethics of deconstruction. This emerges from his textual reading of Emmanuel Lévinas’ works. For Derrida, hospitality consists of the acceptance of the other, while addressing the hospitable welcome. It is a necessary relation to the other with an absolute hospitality as the obligation to welcome the other without conditions. Although this absolute hospitality is unconditional, but hospitality must be conditioned by a responsible response to all condition upon it. This makes the ethics of hospitality possible, when it entails the acceptance of the other.

A. Moore教授のワークショップとセミナー


Making Sense Of: A Workshop with and about Adrian Moore
Date: 29th July 2018
Time: 9:00-19:00
Venue: Yoshida-Izumidono No.76 of this map https://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/en/access/main-campus-map.html)
Speakers: Adrian Moore, Hitoshi Omori, Ryo Ito, Chi-Yen Liu, Shinichi Takagi, Naoya Fujikawa

CAPE Seminar: Prof. Moore “The Bounds of Nonsense”
Date: 31st July 2018
Time: 16:30-18:00
Venue: Meeting room on the 1st floor of Faculty of Letters main building, Kyoto University (No.8 of this map https://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/en/access/main-campus-map.html)

Contact: Takuro Onishi takuro.onishi@gmail.com , Filippo Casati filippo.g.e.casati@gmail.com



日時: 2018年9月22日(土)13:00~16:00
場所: 京都大学東京オフィス(大会議室) http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/tokyo-office/

CAPEレクチャー(Prof. Tagore)のお知らせ


Speaker: Prof. S.Tagore (NUS)
Date and Time: Thursday, July 5, 2018; 17:30-19:00
Venue : Seminar room no. 8; (Research Bldg No 2)
Title: Husserl, Lebenswelt, Culture

This paper concerns the rather difficult concept of the life-world (lebensewelt) that Husserl developed in some length in the Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. I wish to understand in these remarks the cultural world in terms of the life-world. Husserl primarily develops the life world concept in relation to a science-world and a mathematics-world. His main point in this regard indicates that the scientific-mathematical process is a regional vocation that works itself out against a pre-given world-structure wherein common-life is lived out:

Science is a human spiritual accomplishment which presupposes as its point of departure, both historically and for each new student, the intuitive surrounding world of life, pre-given as existing for all in common.

The stress is on singularity positing a unitary life-world shared by all in common. Under the sign of singularity, worlds are not yet emergent in multiples wherein cultures are situated. Values in general, motivated by cultural forms, inclusive but not exhausted by science-mathematics, are enabled by the life-world against which their structures are constituted. The argument here is this: as a matter of fact, cultures are plural, thus if life-world is conceived under the sign of singularity, it must be pre-given to values as such and not just to scientific value alone, assuming that values are taken to be co-extensive with culture. World-regions—one Galilean another Mahlerian (as examples)—are governed by their own teleologies and are framed against the original structure of the unitary life-world. Just as the life-world (in David Carr’s translation) is the “meaning-fundament” of the natural science so is it of musical expressions, indeed any cultural expression whatsoever. According to this construal, plurality of worlds presupposes the pre-given (vorgegeben) structure of the singular lifeworld. Running against such a construal Føllesdal observes that in the earlier lectures on Phänomenologische Psychologie (1925), Husserl appears to endorse the plurality of life-worlds:

We do not share the same life-world with all people, not all people “in the world” have in common with us all objects which make up our life-world and which determine our personal activity and striving even when they come into actual association with us, as they always can (to the extent that, if they are not present, we come to them and they to us).

Thus the question: are there many life worlds, each naming a particular cultural horizon, or is the life-world singular? I wish to address this question first and then proceed to deploy the obtained result to provide the grounding for an ethics of cosmopolitanism.



講師  Tagore先生 (シンガポール国立大学)
日時  月曜・木曜2限(7/9,12 10:30-12:00)
場所  第8演習室(総合研究2号館1階東側)


Teaching Seminar 1 (9th July 10:30-12:00):

I propose to show how Husserl worked out the implications of the philosophies of Descartes, Hume, and Kant to work out his phenomenologically motivated transcendental account of self.

Teaching Seminar 2 (12th July 10:30-12:00):

I propose to show how Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty used Husserl as the background to their effort at dismantling transcendental phenomenology to assemble an phenomenological-existential account of self.

In both these teaching seminars the effort will be to disclose varied phenomenological conceptions of self/subjectivity.

CAPEレクチャー(Prof.Ching Hui Su)のお知らせ


Speaker: Ching Hui Su
Date and Time: Thursday, June 21, 2018: 16:30-18:00
Venue : 京都大学文学部地下1階大会議室(Faculty Meeting Room in the Building No. 8
Title: Vagueness in the Frankfurt’s Cases

Abstract: In his 1969 paper, by the so-called “Frankfurt’s Cases,” Harry Frankfurt argues against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, which states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. However, it is still controversial whether the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is invalidated by those Frankfurt-style cases, for some philosophers have some doubts about the plausibility of Frankfurt-style cases. In the present paper, I will argue that, firstly, while generalizing Frankfurt-style cases, it will be clear that we can easily generate a Frankfurt-style case by satisfying two conditions, i.e. the moral responsibility condition and no alternative possibility condition. Secondly, I will argue that, if one could argue plausibly that there be some substantial connection between the responsibility condition and the failure of no alternative possibility condition, then the Principle of Alternative Possibilities would be invalidated. In the end, I will argue that the real task for us is not to generate (or disarm) new Frankfurt-style cases but to accept the vagueness of the concept of alternative possibility and/or that of moral responsibility.

【追記】Philosophy of Self 講義のお知らせ


講師  Siderits先生・犬飼先生
日時  火曜・木曜3限(6/12,14,19,21,26,28 7/3,5 13:00-14:30)
場所 火曜:第7演習室(文学部新館2階) 木曜:第8演習室(総合研究2号館1階東側)



日時 2018年6月5日
場所 京都大学百周年時計台記念館2階・会議室IV

12:40-13:00 開会挨拶
13:00-14:00 小島毅(東京大学)
14:00-15:00 金泰昌(東洋フォーラム主幹)
15:00-16:10 休憩
16:10-17:10 中島隆博(東京大学)
17:10-18:10 片岡龍(東北大学)
18:10-18:20 閉会挨拶


Philosophy of Self 講義のお知らせ



講師: Siderits先生・犬飼先生
授業時間:月曜・木曜3限(6/14, 21,25,28 7/2,5)