京都大学文学研究科 哲学研究室

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  • Dr. Chun-Ping Yen レクチャーのお知らせ

    以下のようにCAPEレクチャーが開催されます。皆さまのお越しをお待ちしております。
     
    日時：2016年10月11日(火) 18:15-19:45
    場所：京都大学 文学部校舎１階 会議室
    話者：Dr. Chun-Ping Yen (CUNY)
    言語：英語

    題目：
    How to Be a Semantic Holist?
    概要：
    The view that meaning is holistic is highly controversial and is usually
    not treated as an independent thesis but rather appears as a vital drawback
    of a theory of meaning in the literature for its not being able to deliver
    a notion of shared meaning. Such attitude is so prevalent that oftentimes
    people simply take semantic holism as a reason for the rejection of a
    theory without further argument. As is often the case, however, there is no
    agreement among those engaged in the debate what semantic holism is. With
    the varied definitions of the doctrine, commentators disagree on not only
    its truth but also its content and intelligibility.

    In this paper, I suggest understanding semantic holism as characterizing
    the determination relation between the meaning of an expression and its
    determinants and argue that we can best capture the features maintained by
    the holist by construing semantic holism as the view that the meaning of an
    expression E is determined by E’s relations to every other expression in
    the language of individual competent users. It follows from my definition
    that, firstly, the often alleged worry that if meaning is holistic, any
    change in one’s language will change the meanings of all the expressions in
    the very language does not follow. Secondly, it is an inevitable outcome
    that there is no guaranteed meaning sharing available for semantic holism
    so understood. This latter fact, however, does not commit us to the
    rejection of semantic holism. For holistic meanings, like their
    non-holistic counterparts, are sharable either across individuals or time
    slices, or so I shall argue.

  • 牧野英二教授のレクチャーのお知らせ

    以下の要領でCAPEワークショップが開催されます。皆さまのご参加をお待ちしております。
     
    日時：2016年10月5日（水）14:00-16:00
    場所：京都大学文学部校舎地下1階大会議室
    講演者：牧野英二教授（法政大学）
    題目：ディルタイの「生の哲学」と「歴史的理性批判」の射程 ーカント、ハイデガー、アーレントを手掛かりにしてー
    要旨：
    敗戦直後の昭和21年（1946年）に生前の西田幾多郎博士等による推薦文付きで、『ディルタイ著作集』（創元社、全15巻+別巻1）が西田門下の多くが編集校閲・翻訳者として加わり刊行を開始した。だが、第四巻一冊を刊行しただけで、この企画は頓挫した。西田幾多郎、和辻哲郎、三木清等、当代の第一級の哲学者によって高く評価されたディルタイ哲学の意義は、その後の流行思想の陰に隠され、長い間忘却されてきた（ちなみに和辻哲郎は、ハイデガーよりもディルタイの解釈学を高く評価した）。ところが、ディルタイの主著『精神科学序説』第一巻（1883年）の遺稿（第二巻）が100年後の1983年に刊行され、それをきっかけにグローバルな規模で「ディルタイ・ルネサンス」が着実に進行してきた。
    報告者は、新たな構想の下で刊行を開始した日本語版『ディルタイ全集』（法政大学出版局、全11巻＋別巻1）の編集代表として企画・編集校閲・訳者を務めてきた経験に基づいて、ディルタイの生の概念と生の哲学、解釈学の意義とともに、彼の歴史的理性批判のプロジェクトの歴史的・今日的意義を論じる。
    特に近年、「生」をめぐる哲学的・倫理学的議論の必要性と深まりだけでなく、生政治学や精神病理学、生命科学や医学など諸学問の広範な展開のなかで、「善き生」と「剥き出しの生」の区別（アーレント、アガンベン等）に関する問題や「人工生命」の課題等に直面する今日、これまで多くの誤解に晒されてきたディルタイ哲学の正確な理解を深めることは、意義のある思想的営為であると思われる。今回の主要な報告内容は、以下の通りである。
    ①ディルタイ（Wilhelm Dilthey,1833-1911）の「生」（Leben）とは、どのような概念であったか。
    ②ディルタイの「生の哲学」（Lebensphilosophie）とは、どのような哲学であったか。
    ③「歴史的理性批判」（Kritik der historischen Vernunft）とは、どのような批判の試みであったか。
    ④ディルタイの歴史的理性批判によって提起された哲学の課題はなにか。
    ⑤現代哲学の立場から見て、ディルタイの「生」とその哲学的解釈学の意義はどこにあるか。
    上記の主要課題について、まずディルタイ自身の論述に即して、彼の哲学思想の内容理解に努める。次に論文の形式によって、新カント派、ハイデガー、アーレント、ハーバマース等によるディルタイ批判と評価を手掛かりにして、ディルタイの生の概念、歴史的生の解釈学、歴史的理性批判の試みの哲学史的及び今日的意義を論じる予定である。

  • Dr. Liu Chi Yen Lectureのお知らせ

    以下の要領でCAPEレクチャーが開催されます。皆さまのご参加をお待ちしております。
     
    日時：2016年9月21日（水）16:30-18:00
    場所：京都大学文学部校舎1階会議室
    講演者：Dr. Liu Chi Yen
    言語：英語
    題目：How to escape triviality results?
    概要：
    “Adams’ thesis” is often interpreted as the claim that the subjective probability of an indicative conditional A→B equals the corresponding conditional probability P(B|A). Many scholars show that this interpretation will be attacked by triviality results, so they reject Adams’ thesis. I will show what triviality results are and what they have in common. Then I try to give another interpretation of Adams’s thesis to escape triviality results. First, I propose a 3-valued semantics for indicative conditionals and claim that the probability of A→B is equal to probability of A∧B. Second, from the way we bet on indicative conditionals, I distinguish the probability of an indicative conditional from the assertability of an indicative conditional, and interpreted Adams’ thesis as: 
    The assertability of a simple indicative conditional p→q equals the corresponding conditional probability P(q|p), provided P (p) > 0. 
    Finally, I will argue that this interpretation can escape all triviality results on the market.

  • Dr. Paolo Bonardi Workshopのお知らせ

    講演者：Dr. Paolo Bonardi (UCLA)

    日時：2016年7月25日(月), 16:30–18:00

    場所：京都大学 文学部校舎１階 会議室

    言語：英語

     

    Title：The Semantic Content of Empty Names and the Logic of Nonexistent Objects

    Abstract：Millianism is the doctrine according to which the semantic content of a proper name is exhausted by its referent. My talk will be about the so-called empty (proper) names, more specifically: names that belong to fiction/pretense (e.g. “Sherlock Holmes”); and names that are empty because of an error (e.g. “Vulcan”). It will be my goal to outline a Millian account of empty names according to which: names from fiction and error refer to actual and necessarily nonexistent objects; these objects cannot have ordinary properties (e.g. being a detective), whereas they can have – and in fact have some – non-ordinary properties (e.g. being something such that fictionally, it is a detective). I will argue that the logic of such objects is not positive free logic but a version of classical logic.

  • Prof. Yumiko Inukai Workshopのお知らせ

    講演者：Yumiko Inukai

    日時：2016年7月29日（金）16:30~18:00

    場所：未定

    使用言語：英語

    詳細については追ってご連絡いたします。

  • Mr. Kyle Shuttleworth Workshopのお知らせ

    講演者：Mr. Kyle Michael James Shuttleworth (Queen’s University Belfast)

    日時：2016年7月1日（金） 18:00～19:30

    場所：京都大学文学部校舎１F会議室

    使用言語：英語

    Title: Authenticity: An Intercultural Ethic?

    Abstract: In the English translation of Watsuji Tetsuro’s 倫理学, the concept of ‘本来性’ is translated as ‘authenticity’. In Western philosophical thought, however, authenticity is intricately bound to the historical context from which it emerged. One thus ought to question whether authenticity can be abstracted from its historical context, and imported into a foreign culture. In light of this, the primary aim of this investigation will be to explicate precisely that which Watsuji’s concept of ‘authenticity’ entails. This will then enable one to determine whether that which Watsuji advocates is akin to the concept of authenticity as espoused in the West. That which is stake is not merely a linguistic quibble, but rather the search for an intercultural, conceptual ground upon which to conduct ethical discourse between East and West. The thesis which will be posited in this enquiry then, is whether the ethic of authenticity can provide a conceptual bridge between Eastern and Western philosophical traditions.

  • Dr. Malcolm Keating Workshopのお知らせ

    講演者：Malcolm Keating
 (Yale-NUS College, Singapore)

    日時：2016年6月10日（金） 18:00〜19:30

    場所：文学部校舎１F会議室

     

    Title: Is Ellipsis Completion Knowledge? Linguistic Interpretation in Classical Indian Philosophy

    Abstract:

    Natural languages vary in how much information they encode into lexemes. Yet speakers can utter subsentential units which are syntactically or otherwise incomplete and still communi- cate successfully. Linguists and philosophers, in analyzing this widespread interpretive prac- tice of completing ellipsis, differ over whether such utterances constitute genuine speech acts, are disguised but complete syntactic/semantic units, as well as how the ellipsis is completed– syntactically, semantically, or pragmatically. The answers to these questions are significant since, for instance, they may challenge the thesis that languages are compositional, that is, with expressions being semantically determined by their syntax and lexical semantics.
    Classical Indian philosophers, although committed to the compositionality thesis, gave vary- ing accounts of how interpretive practices allowed for ellipsis completion. The philosophers known as the Bhatta Mimamsa argued that an interpretive process, which they called arthapatti or “postulation,” could yield certain knowledge of what is elided. For instance, since the San- skrit language is highly inflected, someone who hears a speaker say “the door, the door!” can rely on syntactically-encoded information to help them recover a complete sentence, “Close the door, close the door!” In the 16th century, Narayana Bhatta discusses this process in the Manameyodaya, arguing that postulation requires the positing of words in order for there to be anvaya or “connection” within the expression. This argument is posed in response to opponents who argue that only the word meanings, and not the words themselves, must be posited.
    I then draw connections between Narayanabhatta and contemporary Anglophone literature on the topic. In particular, I argue that the position of Narayana’s opponent (who is identified as belonging to another school of Mimamsa, the Prabhakara) is roughly analogous to that of pragmatic contextualists. In contrast, the Bhatta view could fruitfully be reconstructed as an abductive completion of lexical underspecification, along the lines of James Pustejovsky’s pro- posal. However, due to the ambiguity in the notion of connection, these reconstructions must be tentative, as Indian proposals maybe consistent with multiple formal analyses. The cru- cial implication to draw from their dialectic is the claim that ellipsis completion rises to the level of knowledge, and that it does so through a rational process grounded in the principle of compositionality.

  • 3rd Kyoto-Chengchi-Singapore Graduate Conferenceのお知らせ

    京都大学・国立政治大学（台湾）・Yale-NUS College（シンガポール）の３校による合同カンファレンスを開催します。

    日時：３月１８日（金）・１９日（土）１０：００〜１８：００

    場所：京都大学文学部校舎地下１F大会議室

    言語：英語

    Schedule

    18 Fri March 2016
    10:00 – 10:15 Opening Remark
    10:15 – 11:15 Prof. Yasuo Deguchi (Kyoto): The Late Sanlun and Dialetheism
    11:15 – 11:30 Break
    11:30 – 12:15 Ryosuke Igarashi & Maiko Yamamori (Kyoto): An Analysis of Ineffability Paradox
    12:15 – 1:00 Theresa Helke (NUS) : In Defense of the Suppositional View of Indicative Conditionals.
    1:00 to 3:30 Lunch
    3:30 – 4:15 Kazunori Sawada (Kyoto): TBA
    4:15 – 5:00 Jin Sasaki (Kyoto): “Alaya-vijnana” and “Power of Judgment”: A Kantian Reading of “Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana”
    5:00 – 5:15 Break
    5:15 – 6:15 Prof. Robert Sharf (UC Berkley) : Zen and Dialetheism

    19 Sat March 2016
    10:00 – 11:00 Jay Garfield (NUS) : Just Saying … Paradox in Zhuangzi 11:00 – 11:15 Break
    11:15 – 12:00 Miao Kun Tsai (NUS): Negative Normative Ethics in Zhuangzi
    12:00 – 12:45 Elena Gessler (Chengchi): TBA
    12:45 – 2:00 Lunch
    2:00 – 2:45 Leo Sing An (Chenguchi): Has Johnston’s Survival Theory Failed?
    2:45 – 3:30 Lee Pei Yu (Chenguchi): The Connection between Ancient Indian Logic and Non-monotonic Reasoning
    3:30 – 3:45 Break
    3:45 – 4:30 Masumi Aoki (Kyoto): A Tentative Assumption about Hume’s Definitions of Cause
    4:30 – 5:30 Prof. Naoya Fujikawa (Tokyo Metropolitan University): Nothingness in Meinongianism
    5:30 – 5:45 Closing Remark

  • Prof. Kristopher McDaniel Workshopのお知らせ

    講演者：Kristopher McDaniel (Syracuse University)

    日時：３月１７日（木）１８：００〜１９：３０

    場所：京都大学文学部校舎１F会議室

    言語：英語

     

    Title : Being and Essence

    Abstract : I explore three questions about being and essence. First, is there something whose strict essence is exhausted by its mode of being? Second, can the strict essence of a thing be reduced to or explained by its mode of being? Third, is it metaphysically possible for beings to change their mode of being?

  • Philip Gerrans Workshopのお知らせ

    講演者：Philip Gerrans（University of Adelaide）

    日時：１１月９日（月）１８：００〜１９：３０

    場所：京都大学文学部校舎１F会議室

    言語：英語

     

    Title : A PROCESSING ACCOUNT OF EMOTION

    Absutract : Planning and decision making, social and moral cognition, reasoning, cognitive development and self-representation depend on emotional processes. Psychologists and neuroscientists in these fields draw on philosophical theories of emotion to inter pret their results while, at the same time, the philosophy of emotion is now deeply intertwined with empirical work on emoti ons, ranging from molecular to psychological levels. Yet there is no established theoretical consensus about the nature of e motional processing and the relationship between emotions (and affective experience) and cognition.

    This paper attempts theoretical unification via a method advocated by Dominic Murphy “we arrive at a comprehensive set of positive facts about how the mind works, and then ask which of its products and breakdowns matter for our various projects” . The approach is similar to the way in which philosophical theories of human motivation and the cognitive science of reward processing have mutually informed each other. I explain some specific puzzles about the nature of emotional phenomena: Depe rsonalisation Disorder, delays in effects of anti-depressant treatment on mood, Social Anxiety Disorder. I also explain how the processing account deals with general questions about the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality of emot ional experience that motivate theoretical disagreement.

    The main competitors in the theory of emotion: Darwinian, Somatic, Feeling and Representational have all focused on a real and important aspect of emotion. Emotions are adaptations, they have bodily consequences and modes of expression, their fel t aspect is essential to their role in human life, and they depend essentially on representational processes. Precisely how these aspects interact and which are causally primary in episodes of emotion cannot be understood in the absence of a proces sing account. Or so I claim!

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