講演者：Prof. Stephen Jenkins (Humboldt State University)
題目：Once the Buddha was a Warrior: Compassionate Killing, Torture and Warfare in Indian Buddhist Scriptures and Commentaries
要旨：Buddhist traditions offer a richly nuanced ethic for compassionate warfare and punishment that supported regimes of vast geographical and cultural diversity for millennia. The Euro-American concept of Buddhist pacifism undermines the ability of cultures to engage their own ethical resources in times of crisis and to understand their history. Mainstream, Madhyamaka, Yogācāra and tantric traditions validate harsh use of force to rehabilitate criminals, overthrow tyrants, kill enemies of the Dharma, recover what is wrongly taken, or prevent greater harm etc. The theory of compassionate killing is rooted in hypothetical situations presented through narrative tales, which allows attention to the complex ambiguity of lived reality. A complex array of concerns is evident that resist the constraints of Western ethical categories. For instance, to kill one’s own mother leads straight to hell, but killing someone else’s mother does not. Historiography and narrative offer many examples of kings waging war for Buddhist motivations or committing mass violence against religious “outsiders.” Buddha’s past lives include snipers, war ministers, martial artists, soldiers, warhorses, war elephants, kings etc., who often heroically die in battle. The touchstone commentarial example of Buddha killing in a past life, deployed in many cultures and times, parallels modern terrorist situations. There is also concern for avoiding armed conflict [including maintaining an intimidating and well paid military], humane treatment of prisoners, limits to punishment and torture, minimizing enemy casualties, spiritual harm to warriors, economic exploitation, ending multigenerational cycles of violence, damage to infrastructure and natural environment, and postwar reconciliation. Warfare should only be pursued when all alternatives have failed; compassion is a state’s first defense [and literally makes an individual arrow-proof]; kings must question their own culpability for exploitation that creates enemies; physical punishment, even torture and killing, must benefit the recipient; the destruction of infrastructure and the natural environment is forbidden. Superficially selfish policies of economic exploitation and conquest undermine national security. A nation will thrive or fail based on its capacity for compassion, rather than on the ethics of self or national interest. A broad range of past research will be summarized and issues from Aśokan edicts to tantric sādhanas for killing may be addressed.
日時：2017年3月25日（土）10：30 ～ 17：30
発表タイトル：Plurality in Fictional Discourses
A fiction may describe a plurality without specifying the `dossier’ of each of its individual (atomic) constituents enough to distinguish them from each other. In particular, it may be the case that a fiction gives the exactly same characterization to each of the constituents of a plurality, as is described in Everett (2013). For example, `we are told in Tess of the d’Urbervilles that 16 policemen came to arrest Tess but we are not given any more specific descriptions of any of these policemen’ (Everett, 2013, p. 191). Let us call a plural fictional character without specification of each of its constituents a plurality with indiscernible constituents. In this paper, I develop a theory of pluralities with indiscernible constituents, based on nuclear Meinongianism (cf. Parsons, 1980) and non-idempotent mereology (cf. Cotnoir, 2015). Nuclear Meinongianism of fictional characters claims that a fictional character in a fictional story S is a nonexistent object x which has all nuclear properties x is characterized as having by S. According to non-idempotent mereology, a mereological sum can have one and the same object as its two or more different parts. Combining these two theories, I propose that `16 policemen’ in Tess of d’Urbervilles refers to a mereological sum which has one and the same nonexistent policeman as its 16 different parts.
場所：京都大学 文学部校舎１階 会議室
話者：Prof. Zach Weber (University of Otago)
Paraconsistent set theory and inconsistent mathematics
Paraconsistent set theory takes as axiomatic the `naive’ comprehension principle that every collection forms a set. The infamous paradoxes are then just theorems. The background logic that makes this coherently possible is substantially weaker than classical logic; but the expressive power of the theory is substantially stronger than classical set theory.
With these competing forces in the background, we will look at two interrelated goals:
Recapture — reassurance that nothing too important mathematically is lost
Expansion — where new insights and results are gained, studying novel
mathematical objects not visible with any other theory
I will survey the development of paraconsistent set theory, showing how the basic properties of ordinal and cardinal numbers can be established, along with new perspectives on `proper classes’, the axiom of choice, and the continuum hypothesis. With this foundation, I will mention some further work in inconsistent mathematics: from computability theory, arithmetic, analysis, and topology. Throughout I will call attention to the challenges that this research program faces.
講師：Dr.Yuri Cath (La Trobe University)
場所：京都大学 文学部校舎地下１階 大会議室
Knowing What It Is Like, Choice, and Consent
Can I know what it is like to deliver a stand-up comedy routine, give birth to a child, or go to war, without having had those experiences myself? Is it possible to gain this ‘what it is like’ (WIL)-knowledge by reading stories or talking with the experienced? Philosophers often hold a pessimistic attitude towards this possibility on the grounds that one can only know what it is like to have an experience if one has had an experience of that same type oneself (Lewis 1998, Paul 2014). And endorsements of this pessimistic attitude can also be found in novels, films, and pop music. But, I shall argue, a puzzle now arises because there are also countless examples of everyday practices and judgments that testify to our holding an optimistic attitude towards this same possibility. In this paper I discuss how this puzzle can be illuminated and potentially dissolved by appealing to recent work in epistemology on knowledge-wh and in the philosophy of mind on empathy. I also show how my solution to this puzzle can help us to evaluate recent arguments by Paul (2014, 2015) concerning WIL-knowledge and transformative choices, and discussions in applied ethics concerning WIL-knowledge and informed consent (Bayne and Levy 2005, Dodds and Jones 1989, Oakley 1992).
講師：Dr. Sara M Langston (Senmurv Consulting LLC)
場所：京都大学 文学部校舎１階 会議室
Reimagining Icarus: Defining the Ethical and Legal Parameters for Human Space Exploration
Space exploration and human spaceflight inherently raise numerous practical, ethical and legal issues for consideration, to include medical, scientific and technological implications. In some instances, ethics and law may overlap, this is particularly evident in the area of bioethics. Whereas, in other areas such as risk, ethics and law can be more visibly distinct. This talk will highlight some of the significant and pressing issues facing the space industry today with regard to developing practical ethical and legal frameworks for human space exploration. Topical parameters here can be broadly categorized as: 1) Medical – this includes bioethics, medical uncertainty, spaceflight selection and medical monitoring, and informed consent; 2) Environmental – human implications and planetary protection, and space as the ‘province of all mankind’; 3) Risk Management – appropriately evaluating the risks inherent to human spaceflight is one of the more demanding yet currently underdeveloped areas of moral decision-making frameworks, this includes comprehending the relevant risk culture and geopolitical climate; and 4) Societal conceptions and perceptions on what it means to be an ‘astronaut,’ and the accompanying rights and duties of spacefarers. These overarching topics present a big picture perspective on some of the pertinent interconnected physical, legal and ethical parameters for individuals engaged in human space activities. Yet the global nature of space exploration activities also calls for a wider discussion on appropriate ethical approaches to developing practice and norms, particularly on the questions of risk, uncertainty and understanding in what ways human spaceflight and exploration impact and inform our societal and moral frameworks on Earth.
Kyoto Workshop on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency
Session 1: True Dialetheists discuss Dialetheism
10:00–11:00: Zach Weber: On what is possible, what is not, and what is both
11:00–12:00: Yasuo Deguchi: Non-dialetheic Dialetheism
12:00–13:30: Lunch break
Session 2: Theories based on LP
13:30–14:30: Timo Weiss: Inconsistent Math Foundations — Cantor and Beyond
14:30–15:30: Daniel Skurt: Some remarks on identity in 1st and 2nd order minimal LP
15:30-15:50: Coffee break
Session 3: Philosophical issues related to Paraconsistency
15:50–16:50: Ryosuke Igarashi: An anti-Realistic interpretation of catuskoti
16:50–17:50: Colin Caret: No Cause for Alarm
Session 4: Ineffability and Being: topics in Dialetheism
10:00–11:00: Maiko Yamamori: Inclosure, Curry and Ineffability
11:00–12:00: Filippo Casati: Seyn, Grund and der Letzte Gott.
12:00-13:30: Lunch break
Session 5: Extensions and expansions of FDE
13:30–14:30: Adam Přenosil: Super-Belnap logics: charting the terra incognita
14:30–15:30: Takuro Onishi: A four-valued frame semantics for the relevant logic R.
15:30–15:50: Coffee break
Session 6: Meinongians discuss Paraconsistency (and not?!)
15:50–16:50: Naoya Fujikawa: Possible and Impossible Objects in Modal Meinongianism
16:50–17:50: Franz Berto: As Good As It Gets: Modal-Epistemic Logic for Inconsistent Agents, Without Paraconsistency, or Impossible Worlds
場所：京都大学 文学部校舎地下１階 大会議室
話者：Prof. Franz Berto (University of Amsterdam)
Dialetheism and the Exclusion-Expressing Device
Dialetheism is the view that, against the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC),
some A’s are true together with their negation, not-A. Hence a famous
anti-dialetheic objection, which I will cal the “Exclusion Problem”:
dialetheists cannot rule out anything, or express disagreement, for their
dialetheic negation of A is compatible with A.
In this talk I propose a strategy to address the problem, which starts by
assuming a primitive notion of exclusion and defines via it a notion of
contradiction, rhetorically called *absolute*, such that no contradiction
of this kind is acceptable for a dialetheist. Via such a notion we can
express in a non-question-begging way what the opposition between
dialetheists and non-dialetheists consists in, and we can give to the
dialetheist a non-pragmatic exclusion-expressing device. The big issue is
whether such a device is free from dialetheically intractable revenge
paradoxes. I have no answer to this, but I’m curious to hear what my
場所：京都大学 文学部校舎１階 会議室
話者：Dr. Chun-Ping Yen (CUNY)
How to Be a Semantic Holist?
The view that meaning is holistic is highly controversial and is usually
not treated as an independent thesis but rather appears as a vital drawback
of a theory of meaning in the literature for its not being able to deliver
a notion of shared meaning. Such attitude is so prevalent that oftentimes
people simply take semantic holism as a reason for the rejection of a
theory without further argument. As is often the case, however, there is no
agreement among those engaged in the debate what semantic holism is. With
the varied definitions of the doctrine, commentators disagree on not only
its truth but also its content and intelligibility.
In this paper, I suggest understanding semantic holism as characterizing
the determination relation between the meaning of an expression and its
determinants and argue that we can best capture the features maintained by
the holist by construing semantic holism as the view that the meaning of an
expression E is determined by E’s relations to every other expression in
the language of individual competent users. It follows from my definition
that, firstly, the often alleged worry that if meaning is holistic, any
change in one’s language will change the meanings of all the expressions in
the very language does not follow. Secondly, it is an inevitable outcome
that there is no guaranteed meaning sharing available for semantic holism
so understood. This latter fact, however, does not commit us to the
rejection of semantic holism. For holistic meanings, like their
non-holistic counterparts, are sharable either across individuals or time
slices, or so I shall argue.