12:00–13:30: Lunch break

Session 2: Theories based on LP
13:30–14:30: Timo Weiss: Inconsistent Math Foundations — Cantor and Beyond
14:30–15:30: Daniel Skurt: Some remarks on identity in 1st and 2nd order minimal LP

15:30-15:50: Coffee break

Session 3: Philosophical issues related to Paraconsistency
15:50–16:50: Ryosuke Igarashi: An anti-Realistic interpretation of catuskoti
16:50–17:50: Colin Caret: No Cause for Alarm

18:30- Dinner
***
Oct. 10
Session 4: Ineffability and Being: topics in Dialetheism
10:00–11:00: Maiko Yamamori: Inclosure, Curry and Ineffability
11:00–12:00: Filippo Casati: Seyn, Grund and der Letzte Gott.

12:00-13:30: Lunch break

Session 5: Extensions and expansions of FDE
13:30–14:30: Adam Přenosil: Super-Belnap logics: charting the terra incognita
14:30–15:30: Takuro Onishi: A four-valued frame semantics for the relevant logic R.

15:30–15:50: Coffee break

Session 6: Meinongians discuss Paraconsistency (and not?!)
15:50–16:50: Naoya Fujikawa: Possible and Impossible Objects in Modal Meinongianism
16:50–17:50: Franz Berto: As Good As It Gets: Modal-Epistemic Logic for Inconsistent Agents, Without Paraconsistency, or Impossible Worlds

18:30– Dinner

題目：
Dialetheism and the Exclusion-Expressing Device
概要：
Dialetheism is the view that, against the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC),
some A’s are true together with their negation, not-A. Hence a famous
anti-dialetheic objection, which I will cal the “Exclusion Problem”:
dialetheists cannot rule out anything, or express disagreement, for their
dialetheic negation of A is compatible with A.
In this talk I propose a strategy to address the problem, which starts by
assuming a primitive notion of exclusion and defines via it a notion of
contradiction, rhetorically called *absolute*, such that no contradiction
of this kind is acceptable for a dialetheist. Via such a notion we can
express in a non-question-begging way what the opposition between
dialetheists and non-dialetheists consists in, and we can give to the
dialetheist a non-pragmatic exclusion-expressing device. The big issue is
whether such a device is free from dialetheically intractable revenge
paradoxes. I have no answer to this, but I’m curious to hear what my
audience thinks!

題目：
How to Be a Semantic Holist?
概要：
The view that meaning is holistic is highly controversial and is usually
not treated as an independent thesis but rather appears as a vital drawback
of a theory of meaning in the literature for its not being able to deliver
a notion of shared meaning. Such attitude is so prevalent that oftentimes
people simply take semantic holism as a reason for the rejection of a
theory without further argument. As is often the case, however, there is no
agreement among those engaged in the debate what semantic holism is. With
the varied definitions of the doctrine, commentators disagree on not only
its truth but also its content and intelligibility.

In this paper, I suggest understanding semantic holism as characterizing
the determination relation between the meaning of an expression and its
determinants and argue that we can best capture the features maintained by
the holist by construing semantic holism as the view that the meaning of an
expression E is determined by E’s relations to every other expression in
the language of individual competent users. It follows from my definition
that, firstly, the often alleged worry that if meaning is holistic, any
change in one’s language will change the meanings of all the expressions in
the very language does not follow. Secondly, it is an inevitable outcome
that there is no guaranteed meaning sharing available for semantic holism
so understood. This latter fact, however, does not commit us to the
rejection of semantic holism. For holistic meanings, like their
non-holistic counterparts, are sharable either across individuals or time
slices, or so I shall argue.