Kyoto Nonclassical Logic Workshopのお知らせ

哲学的論理学に関するワークショップが開催されましたので、ご案内いたします。

 

【日時】2017年2月28日

【場所】京都大学 楽友会館 1階会議室

【ウェブサイト】https://sites.google.com/site/hitoshiomori/home/workshops/kplw2017

【プログラム】

Session 1: Conditionals

09:30–11:00: Andreas Kapsner “Plausible World Semantics”

11:00–11:15: Coffee break

11:15–12:00: Ryo Ito “Bradley, the unity of the proposition and material implication”

12:00–12:45: Chi-Yen Liu “Conditional Probability, Conjunctive Probability, and defective truth table”

12:45–14:00 Lunch

Session 2: Modal and intuitionistic logics

14:00–14:45 Ryosuke Igarashi “The Law of Explosion and Intuitionistic Logic”

14:45–15:30 Wei Zhu “A contribution to ranking theory concerning belief revision”

15:30–15:45 Coffee break

Session 3: Paraconsistency and dialetheism

15:45–16:30 Timo Weiss “Some Notes on Inconsistent Arithmetic”

16:30–17:15 Maiko Yamamori “Paradoxes of Self-Reference and Contraction”

17:15–17:30 Coffee break

17:30–19:00 Massimilliano Carrara “Rejecting and Assuming (with a sketch of DLEAC, a Dialetheic Logic of Exclusive Assumptions and Conclusions)”

19:30– Workshop dinner

CAPEレクチャー（Dr. Damian Szmuc）のお知らせ

以下の要領でCAPEレクチャーが開催されます。皆様の参加をお待ちしております。

 

日時：2017年4月4日(火), 16:30–18:00
場所：京都大学 文学部校舎１階 会議室
話者：Damian Szmuc (University of Buenos Aires, CONICET)
言語：英語

題目：
Infectious Logics and Their Philosophy
概要：
Infectious logics are a family of peculiar non-classical logics which count
with a truth-value that acts infectiously. By this, it is understood that
every compound sentence which receives this value, has a component that is
assigned this very same value. Thus, these values behave according to the
motto “one bad apple spoils the whole barrel”. But infectiousness not
necessarily has to be a bad feature. In fact, in this talk I present a
plethora of philosophical motivations for embracing infectious logics,
going from Buddhist philosophy to computational errors, and from
meaninglessness to analytic logical relations of various kinds.

 

CAPEワークショップ（Dr. Kasaki & Dr. Szmuc）のお知らせ

以下の要領でCAPEワークショップが開かれます。みなさまの参加をお待ちしております。

日時：2017年3月24日(金), 16:00–19:30
場所：京都大学 文学部校舎１階 会議室
話者：
Masashi Kasaki (Nagoya University, Osaka University)
Damian Szmuc (University of Buenos Aires, CONICET)
言語：英語
プログラム：
16:00–17:30: Damian Szmuc “Paraconsistent logics, Meta-paraconsistent logics and beyond”
17:30–17:45: Break
17:45–19:15: Masashi Kasaki “How Many Cartesian Skepticisms?“

概要：
Szmuc:

This paper discusses paraconsistent logics, paracomplete logics, connexive logics and logics of formal inconsistency which deserve to be called that way not because of the properties they exhibit at the inferential level, but at the meta-inferential level. To achieve this goal, we use the framework of abstract consequence relations, due to Blok and Jonson. In doing so, we draw some connections between many-valued non-classical logics (as conceived by Bochvar, Hallden, Da Costa, Priest, Kleene, Dunn and Belnap), on the one hand, and q-matrices and p-matrices (as conceived by Malinowski and Frankowski), on the other. This brings the opportunity to talk about what relates logical many-valuedness and inferential many-valuedness (as conceived by Wansing and Shramko). Finally, it also suggests the reasonability of asking, yet again, what exactly a logical system is.
—
Kasaki:
Cartesian skepticism appeals to a skeptical hypothesis and makes a case for the claim that S does not know that the skeptical hypothesis is false. The claim, then, constitutes an important premise of the argument for the skeptical conclusion that S does not know most, if not all, of ordinary empirical propositions. Some argues that there are two radically different versions of Cartesian skepticism, depending on what skeptical hypothesis is at stake. One version of Cartesian skepticism invokes the brain in a vat hypothesis or the evil genius hypothesis, and the other version does the dreaming hypothesis. There are several ways of demarcating these two kinds of skeptical hypotheses. First, unlike the brain in a vat hypothesis and the evil genius hypothesis, the dreaming hypothesis is compatible with the truth of ordinary empirical propositions. Second, while the possibilities envisioned in the brain in a vat hypothesis and the evil genius hypothesis are esoteric and far-fetched, those in the dreaming hypothesis are not. Third, it is even easier to establish as a genuine metaphysical possibility the dreaming hypothesis than the brain in a vat hypothesis or the evil genius hypothesis. 
 

Each of the three ways of demarcating the two kings of skeptical hypotheses entails that certain solutions to the skepticism with the brain in a vat hypothesis or the evil genius hypothesis won’t
work for the skepticism with the dreaming hypothesis. If the first way is correct, the denial of closure cannot be marshalled against the skepticism with the dreaming hypothesis. If the second way is correct, the safety-based response to the skepticism with the brain in a vat hypothesis or the evil genius hypothesis does not fare well with the skepticism with the dreaming hypothesis. And yet, if the third way is correct, it is difficult to dispel the dreaming hypothesis as metaphysically impossible.


In this paper, I will argue that the three ways of differentiating between the two kinds of skeptical hypotheses are not well-grounded. Notice that even the brain in a vat hypothesis is compatible with, or even strongly, cannot contradict certain ordinary empirical propositions, such as there are computers, there are scientists, there are brains, and so on. On the other hand, the dreaming hypothesis includes some true ordinary empirical propositions. Once the brain in a vat hypothesis is set up so as to include little true ordinary propositions, there is no reason to differentiate between the brain in a vat hypothesis and the dreaming hypothesis, and hence the first way fails. The same can be said of the relationship between the evil genius hypothesis and the dreaming
hypothesis. Indeed, if the dreaming hypothesis includes less true ordinary propositions, then the possible worlds in which it is true are more distant from the actual world. Thus, the second way also fails. The same consideration is advanced against the third way. If my arguments are correct, one needs no distinct response to the skepticism with the dreaming hypothesis. Good news!

Prof. Stephen Jenkinsセミナーのお知らせ

以下の要領でCAPEセミナーが開催されます。みなさまの参加をお待ちしております。

 

日時：3月17日（金）16:30-18:00

場所：文学部1階会議室

講演者：Prof. Stephen Jenkins (Humboldt State University)

言語：英語

題目：Once the Buddha was a Warrior: Compassionate Killing, Torture and Warfare in Indian Buddhist Scriptures and Commentaries

要旨：Buddhist traditions offer a richly nuanced ethic for compassionate warfare and punishment that supported regimes of vast geographical and cultural diversity for millennia. The Euro-American concept of Buddhist pacifism undermines the ability of cultures to engage their own ethical resources in times of crisis and to understand their history. Mainstream, Madhyamaka, Yogācāra and tantric traditions validate harsh use of force to rehabilitate criminals, overthrow tyrants, kill enemies of the Dharma, recover what is wrongly taken, or prevent greater harm etc. The theory of compassionate killing is rooted in hypothetical situations presented through narrative tales, which allows attention to the complex ambiguity of lived reality. A complex array of concerns is evident that resist the constraints of Western ethical categories. For instance, to kill one’s own mother leads straight to hell, but killing someone else’s mother does not. Historiography and narrative offer many examples of kings waging war for Buddhist motivations or committing mass violence against religious “outsiders.” Buddha’s past lives include snipers, war ministers, martial artists, soldiers, warhorses, war elephants, kings etc., who often heroically die in battle. The touchstone commentarial example of Buddha killing in a past life, deployed in many cultures and times, parallels modern terrorist situations. There is also concern for avoiding armed conflict [including maintaining an intimidating and well paid military], humane treatment of prisoners, limits to punishment and torture, minimizing enemy casualties, spiritual harm to warriors, economic exploitation, ending multigenerational cycles of violence, damage to infrastructure and natural environment, and postwar reconciliation. Warfare should only be pursued when all alternatives have failed; compassion is a state’s first defense [and literally makes an individual arrow-proof]; kings must question their own culpability for exploitation that creates enemies; physical punishment, even torture and killing, must benefit the recipient; the destruction of infrastructure and the natural environment is forbidden. Superficially selfish policies of economic exploitation and conquest undermine national security. A nation will thrive or fail based on its capacity for compassion, rather than on the ethics of self or national interest. A broad range of past research will be summarized and issues from Aśokan edicts to tantric sādhanas for killing may be addressed. 

 

なお、本CAPEレクチャーは、グローバル展開プログラム（グローバル人文学：日本文学・芸術・思想の普遍性の探求；道元の思想圏：分析アジア哲学的アプローチ（研究代表者：出口康夫・京都大学））との共催によって行われます。

論理学上級番外編のお知らせ

以下の要領で論理学上級の番外編が行われます。ぜひご参加下さい。

 

論理学上級番外編：完全性定理と不完全性定理
講師：矢田部俊介
日時：2017年3月25日（土）10：30 ～ 17：30
テーマ：
（10:30-12:00）古典述語論理の完全性定理
（13:00-15:00）モデルの中でモデルをつくる
（15:30-17:30）不完全性定理のモデル論的証明

場所:
京都大学文学部第11演習室（総合研究2号館1F南側）
キャンパスマップの34番のたてものです。
http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/campus/yoshida/map6r_y/
土曜は建物の西側の入り口のみあいていますのでご注意ください。

研究科横断型授業Ｂタイプ「論理学上級」の開講のお知らせ

本年度も研究科横断型授業Ｂタイプ「論理学上級I」「論理学上級II」を、矢田部俊介先生、村上祐子先生をゲスト講師にお招きして開講いたします。

シラバスは以下のページよりダウンロードできます。

http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/education-campus/cross/2016/b.html

日時

論理学上級Ｉ（矢田部先生）

2017年  2月4日、5日（10時30分～17時00分）

論理学上級ＩI（村上先生）

2017年  2月6日（13時00分～17時00分）2月7日（10時00分～17時00分）2月8日（10時00分～15時00分）

場所

京都大学文学部第９講義室（総合研究2号館　南側地下1階）

キャンパスマップの34番のたてものです。

http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/campus/yoshida/map6r_y/

土日は建物の西側の入り口のみあいていますのでご注意ください。

非古典メレオロジー研究会のお知らせ

以下のようにCAPEワークショップが開催されます。奮ってご参加ください。
————–
「非古典メレオロジー研究会」
日時：12月20日（火）14:45-16:15
場所：京都大学文学部校舎1階会議室
発表者：藤川直也（首都大学東京 准教授）
発表タイトル：Plurality in Fictional Discourses
言語：英語
要旨：
A fiction may describe a plurality without specifying the `dossier’ of each of its individual (atomic) constituents enough to distinguish them from each other. In particular, it may be the case that a fiction gives the exactly same characterization to each of the constituents of a plurality, as is described in Everett (2013). For example, `we are told in Tess of the d’Urbervilles that 16 policemen came to arrest Tess but we are not given any more specific descriptions of any of these policemen’ (Everett, 2013, p. 191). Let us call a plural fictional character without specification of each of its constituents a plurality with indiscernible constituents. In this paper, I develop a theory of pluralities with indiscernible constituents, based on nuclear Meinongianism (cf. Parsons, 1980) and non-idempotent mereology (cf. Cotnoir, 2015). Nuclear Meinongianism of fictional characters claims that a fictional character in a fictional story S is a nonexistent object x which has all nuclear properties x is characterized as having by S. According to non-idempotent mereology, a mereological sum can have one and the same object as its two or more different parts.  Combining these two theories, I propose that `16 policemen’ in Tess of  d’Urbervilles refers to a mereological sum which has one and the same nonexistent policeman as its 16 different parts.

Prof. Syraya Chin-Mu Yangレクチャーのお知らせ

以下の要領でCAPEレクチャーが開かれます。皆様の参加をお待ちしております。

 

日時：2016年11月11日(金) 18:00–19:30
場所：京都大学 文学部校舎１階 会議室
話者：Syraya Chin-Mu Yang(国立台湾大学)
言語：英語

題目：
Semantic Considerations on Contingentist Quantified Modal Logic
概要：
Timothy Williamson has defended necessitism, the thesis that necessarily
everything is necessarily something: ‘(NE) － □∀x□∃y x = y’. By contrast,
contingentism, a negation of necessitism, accepts the contingency of being
－ there are things which exist contingently. Williamson rightly remarks
that ‘common sense has no authority to decide between necessitism and
contingentism; it is a more theoretical dispute’. And so, he claims that
necessitism can be justified in a framework for quantificational, or
higher-order, modal logic, which originated from the proof theoretic work
of Ruth Barcan Marcus. Typically, the well-known Barcan Formula (BF) －
∀x□φ(x)→□∀x φ(x), and its converse (CBF) － □∀xφ(x) →∀x□φ(x), have been
taken as the characteristic formulas for the necessitist quantified modal
logic. In contrast, the contingentist’s quantified modal logics by and
large repudiate BF and CBF.

I will examine some intrinsic semantic problems with the contingentist’s
treatments in the framework of possible worlds semantics. Special attention
will be paid to the difficulties with variable domains. I show that
sticking to the legitimacy of the Being Constraints, the use of names as
rigid designators in modal contexts will render truth value gaps in
variable domains and by the same reasoning we may not have appropriate
assignments of free variables in de re modal contexts. However, I show that
this can be solved if we opt for a mid-way, i.e. equinumerous domains. We
will not appeal to constant domains, nor will we accept variable domains,
but simply assume that all domains have the same cardinality, though not
the same set of objects. A semantic treatment will be proposed so that both
BF and CBF can be validated, but the thesis of necessitism will no longer
hold.

A genuine threat will be noted, that is, the intended interpretation of de
re sentences may not express the imposed de re modality. Two options to
deal with this problem will be suggested. (i) The appeal to the rigidity of
names based on a substitutional interpretation of quantifiers in
alphabetical-expansion models However, when modal contexts are involved, we
may be forced to rephrase universal sentences in terms of a conjunction
with an infinite number of conjuncts and to re-interpret a formula with an
existence quantifier in terms of an infinitary conjunction. We then need an
infinitary language and take as the required underlying system a certain
version of infinitary logic. Alternatively, we may suspense with names and
put forth some special semantic treatment to express the rigidity of
variables. We would have a much more complicated, or even ad hoc,
semantics, and the price could be too high to pay.

Clearly, for the contingentist, the moral is: there is no loyal road to the
theorization of metaphysical modality in terms of quantified modal logic.
Perhaps, Williamson is right when he points out that the contingentist
‘must take a more instrumental attitude to the model theory’. (2014: 714).
Then why not accept the necessitist’s quantaified modal logic?

Prof. Zach Weberレクチャーのお知らせ

以下の要領でCAPEレクチャーが開催されます。皆様のご参加をお待ちしております。

日時：2016年11月14日(月) 16:30–18:00

場所：京都大学 文学部校舎１階 会議室
話者：Prof. Zach Weber (University of Otago)
言語：英語

題目：
Paraconsistent set theory and inconsistent mathematics

概要：
Paraconsistent set theory takes as axiomatic the `naive’ comprehension principle that every collection forms a set. The infamous paradoxes are then just theorems. The background logic that makes this coherently possible is substantially weaker than classical logic; but the expressive power of the theory is substantially stronger than classical set theory.
With these competing forces in the background, we will look at two interrelated goals:

Recapture — reassurance that nothing too important mathematically is lost
Expansion — where new insights and results are gained, studying novel
mathematical objects not visible with any other theory

I will survey the development of paraconsistent set theory, showing how the basic properties of ordinal and cardinal numbers can be established, along with new perspectives on `proper classes’, the axiom of choice, and the continuum hypothesis. With this foundation, I will mention some further work in inconsistent mathematics: from computability theory, arithmetic, analysis, and topology. Throughout I will call attention to the challenges that this research program faces.

Dr. Yuri Cath レクチャーのお知らせ

以下のようにCAPEレクチャーが開催されます。
 

講師：Dr.Yuri Cath (La Trobe University)
日時：2016年10月27日（木） 16:30-18:00
場所：京都大学 文学部校舎地下１階 大会議室
地図：http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/campus/yoshida/map6r_y/ (構内MAP8番の建物）
言語：英語

題目：
Knowing What It Is Like, Choice, and Consent

要旨：
Can I know what it is like to deliver a stand-up comedy routine, give birth to a child, or go to war, without having had those experiences myself? Is it possible to gain this ‘what it is like’ (WIL)-knowledge by reading stories or talking with the experienced? Philosophers often hold a pessimistic attitude towards this possibility on the grounds that one can only know what it is like to have an experience if one has had an experience of that same type oneself (Lewis 1998, Paul 2014). And endorsements of this pessimistic attitude can also be found in novels, films, and pop music. But, I shall argue, a puzzle now arises because there are also countless examples of everyday practices and judgments that testify to our holding an optimistic attitude towards this same possibility. In this paper I discuss how this puzzle can be illuminated and potentially dissolved by appealing to recent work in epistemology on knowledge-wh and in the philosophy of mind on empathy. I also show how my solution to this puzzle can help us to evaluate recent arguments by Paul (2014, 2015) concerning WIL-knowledge and transformative choices, and discussions in applied ethics concerning WIL-knowledge and informed consent (Bayne and Levy 2005, Dodds and Jones 1989, Oakley 1992).