Author: kyotophil

以下の要領でCAPEレクチャーが開催されます。奮ってご参加ください。

Speaker: Ching Hui Su
Date and Time: Thursday, June 21, 2018: 16:30-18:00
Venue : 京都大学文学部地下1階大会議室（Faculty Meeting Room in the Building No. 8）
Title: Vagueness in the Frankfurt’s Cases

Abstract: In his 1969 paper, by the so-called “Frankfurt’s Cases,” Harry Frankfurt argues against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, which states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. However, it is still controversial whether the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is invalidated by those Frankfurt-style cases, for some philosophers have some doubts about the plausibility of Frankfurt-style cases. In the present paper, I will argue that, firstly, while generalizing Frankfurt-style cases, it will be clear that we can easily generate a Frankfurt-style case by satisfying two conditions, i.e. the moral responsibility condition and no alternative possibility condition. Secondly, I will argue that, if one could argue plausibly that there be some substantial connection between the responsibility condition and the failure of no alternative possibility condition, then the Principle of Alternative Possibilities would be invalidated. In the end, I will argue that the real task for us is not to generate (or disarm) new Frankfurt-style cases but to accept the vagueness of the concept of alternative possibility and/or that of moral responsibility.

「自己の哲学」に関する講義が行われますので、学部生・院生問わず奮ってご参加ください。
この講義はシラバス上の規定の授業ではありませんので、単位は取得できません。
なお、日程に変更がありますので、ご注意ください。

講師　 Siderits先生・犬飼先生
日時　 火曜・木曜３限（6/12,14,19,21,26,28 7/3,5　13:00-14:30）
場所 火曜：第7演習室(文学部新館2階) 木曜:第8演習室(総合研究2号館1階東側)
　

以下の要領で6月5日にワークショップが開催されます。奮ってご参加ください。

第2回アジア人文学ワークショップ
日時　2018年6月5日
場所　京都大学百周年時計台記念館2階・会議室IV

プログラム
12:40-13:00 開会挨拶
13:00-14:00 小島毅(東京大学)
14:00-15:00 金泰昌(東洋フォーラム主幹)
15:00-16:10 休憩
16:10-17:10 中島隆博(東京大学)
17:10-18:10 片岡龍(東北大学)
18:10-18:20 閉会挨拶

オーガナイザー
出口康夫(京都大学)、佐藤将之(国立台湾大学)、大⻄琢朗(京都大学)

以下の要領でレクチャーが開催されます。奮ってご参加ください。

Siderits先生・犬飼先生によって「自己の哲学」に関する講義が行われますので、学部生・院生問わず奮ってご参加ください。
この講義はシラバス上の規定の授業ではありませんので、単位は取得できません。
内容の詳細や教室等については後日追ってお知らせします。

講師： Siderits先生・犬飼先生
授業時間：月曜・木曜３限（6/14, 21,25,28 7/2,5）

イリノイ州立大学名誉教授Mark Siderits先生をお招きして講演会を開催いたしますので、どうぞお越しください。事前登録などは不要です。

日時：5月16日(水) 18:00-19:30
場所：京都大学文学部本館1階会議室(https://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/en/access/main-campus-map.html のNo.8の建物)

タイトル：Vagueness and Emptiness
アブストラクト：Buddhists agree that the ordinary objects of our folk ontology are empty or devoid of intrinsic nature, and so not strictly speaking real. One possible way of supporting this claim is by appealing to phenomena connected to vagueness, such as sorites difficulties. I explore several different approaches to solving sorites difficulties, and propose an epistemic approach as the best way to support Buddhist ontological scruples.

ウェブサイト：http://www.aap.bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp/cat_event/666/
…

以下の要領で5月14日に”Self”についてのワークショップを開催いたしますので、どうぞお越しください。事前登録などは不要です。

日時：5月14日(月)15:00−18:00
場所：京都大学文学部本館1階会議室(https://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/en/access/main-campus-map.html のNo.8の建物)

プログラム:

14:00-15:00 San Tun (Dagon University) “The Concept of Self in Myanmar Philosophical Thought”
15:00-16:00 小松原織香(同志社大学)「環境問題と紛争解決 –〈ディープ・エコロジー〉から〈修復的正義〉へ」
16:00-17:00 Yumiko Inukai(University of Massachusetts Boston) “The Minimal Self in Early Modern Philosophers”
17:00-18:00 Takashi Yagisawa(California State University, Northridge) “A Deflationary Conception of the Self”

ウェブサイト：http://www.aap.bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp/cat_event/661/

以下の要領でシンポジウムが開催されます。奮ってご参加ください。

タイトル：National Taiwan University ‒ Kyoto University Symposium on “Self”
日時：4月22, 23日
場所：百周年時計台記念館2階会議室III

4月22日
10:15 – 10:20 Opening Remark: 出口康夫(Yasuo Deguchi)
10:20 – 11:20
謝佩芬(Pei-Fen Hsieh) 「再現自我,抒懷傳史—宋代「自傳」之特色與價值研析」.
Commentator:緑川英樹(Hideki Midorikawa)
11:20 – 12:20
張文薰(Wen-Hsun Chang) Narratable Self: Taiwanese Literature and “Watakushi Novels.”
Commentator: 木津祐子(Yuko Kizu)
12:20 – 13:50 Lunch
13:50 – 14:50
林明照(Ming-Chao Lin) The Reflection of Self and It’s Ethical Implications in the Zhuangzi.
Commentator: 古勝隆一(Ryuichi Kogachi)
14:50 – 15:05 Break
15:05 – 16:05
呂佳蓉(Chia-Rung Lu) When “others” become oneself: pragmatic strategy of addressing self in Mandarin and Japanese.
Commentator: 平田昌司(Shoji Hirata)
16:05 – 16:20 Break
16:20 – 17:20
邱錦榮(Chin-Jung Chiu) The Aging and Divided Self: Shakespeare’sKing Learand Akira Kurosawa’s Ran.
Commentator: 桒山智成 (Tomonari Kuwayama)
18:00 – Dinner

4月23日
9:15 – 9:20 Welcoming Remark: 南川高志(Takashi Minamikawa, Dean of Graduate School of Letters)
9:20 – 10:20
林于湘(Ivy Yu-Shian Lin) The Matrix of the Idea of Self, Its Polyphony, (Trans-) Contextualization, and Authenticity in Xingjian Gao’s Agenda (自我概念的矩陣：高行健美學中的複調、（跨）脈絡化與實相).
Commentator: TBA
10:20 – 11:20 梁益堉(Caleb Liang) Key Note Speech: Body-as-Subject in the Four-hand Illusion.
Commentator: 大塚淳(Jun Otsuka)
11:20 – 12:20 楊明蒼(Ming-Tsang Yang) Shielding the Self, Bordering the Liminal: Reimagining Heroic Identity in Beowulf.
Commentator: 廣田篤彦(Atsuhiko Hirota)
12:20 – 12:30 Concluding Remark: 梁益堉(Caleb Liang)

NTU-Kyoto program0422,23

以下の要領でCAPEレクチャーが開催されます。奮ってご参加ください。

Speaker: Chien-hsing Ho (Academia Sinica, Taiwan)
Date and Time: Wednesday, April 18, 2018: 18:00-19:30
Venue: 京都大学文学部地下1階小会議室（the Building No. 8 of this map）

Title: Ontic Indeterminacy: Reconstructing Chinese Madhyamaka Thought

Abstract
According to Indian Madhyamaka, all things originate dependently and have no independent, invariable nature or existence. Consequently, things are said to be empty. In Chinese Buddhism, this doctrine of emptiness was ardently expounded by Sengzhao僧肇(374?−414 CE) and Jizang吉藏(549−623 CE), two leading exponents of Chinese Madhyamaka. On their view, things are empty mainly because they are devoid of determinate nature and form (無定性、無定相). For exegetical reasons, this lack of determinate nature and form may best be explicated in terms of conceptual and linguistic indeterminability.
In my talk, I intend, based on Sengzhao’s and Jizang’s works, to reconstruct an ontological notion of indeterminacy, termed ontic indeterminacy (OI), which involves the thesis that all things are indeterminate with respect to the ways they are (their existence, nature, property, form, etc.). This notion bears some resemblance to the analytic-philosophical notion of metaphysical indeterminacy (MI) and for my reconstruction I make use the determinable-based account of MI presented by Jessica Wilson. The crucial task here is to explore how the notion of OI would tackle a few issues that (may) concern advocates of MI, namely, the issues of indeterminate existence and identity as well as an issue pertaining to the problem of change.

来る4月2日に数学者・数学史家のJeremy Gray教授を京都大学にお迎えして、ヘルマン・ワイルの哲学についてのご講演をいただきます。
参加費、申し込み等必要ございませんので、どうぞ奮ってご参加ください。

また同教授は、3月28日に慶応大学、4月7日に名古屋大学(応用哲学会年次大会シンポジウムとして)でも講演なさいます。そちらもぜひご参加ください。一連の講演の情報は、名古屋大学科学哲学研究室のサイトにまとめていただいていますので、ご参照ください。

日時: 4月2日(月) 16:30-18:00
場所: 京都大学文学部地下1階大会議室(地図8番の建物)

題目: The philosophy of Hermann Weyl
Jeremy Gray教授 (The Open University, University of Warwick)
アブストラクト:
By 1910, the year he turned 25, Weyl was developing a finitist philosophy of mathematics, based on a logical theory of relations. He also believed that the human mind can understand ideas only sequentially. He developed this approach on his book The Continuum (1918), and for a time came close to agreeing with Brouwer’s intuitionism, but he abandoned them in the mid-1920s when he became involved in exploring the theory of Lie groups. He then had to turn back towards Hilbert’s ideas about mathematics and physics, and developed his own theory of what he called the symbolic universe in which mathematics and physics supported each other in complementary ways. Weyl sought a unified philosophy that would govern not only his scientific practice but be rooted in a theory of knowledge and an understanding of how it is acquired.

Jeremy Gray教授・略歴
Jeremy Gray is an Emeritus Professor of The Open University and an Honorary Professor in the Mathematics Department at the University of Warwick. His research interests are in the history of mathematics, specifically the history of algebra, analysis, and geometry, and mathematical modernism in the 19th and early 20th Centuries. The work on mathematical modernism links the history of mathematics with the history of science and issues in mathematical logic and the philosophy of mathematics.

He was awarded the Otto Neugebauer Prize of the European Mathematical Society in 2016 for his work in the history of mathematics, and the Albert Leon Whiteman Memorial Prize of the American Mathematical Society in 2009 for his contributions to the study of the history of modern mathematics internationally. In 2012 he was elected an Inaugural Fellow of the American Mathematical Society. In 2010 he was one of the nine founder members of the Association for the Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (APMP).

He is the author of eleven books, of which among the most recent are Plato’s Ghost: The Modernist Transformation of Mathematics (Princeton U.P. 2008), Henri Poincaré: a scientific biography (Princeton 2012), and The Real and the Complex (Springer 2015). Two more books are to be published in 2018: Under the Banner of Number: A History of Abstract Algebra, by Springer, and Simply Riemann in the Simply Charly series of e-books.

以下の要領でCAPEレクチャーが開催されます。奮ってご参加ください。

Speaker: Prof. Leon Horsten (University of Bristol, Kyoto University)
Date and Time: Saturday, March 17, 2018: 15:00-17:00
Venue: 京都大学文学部第２講義室（Lecture room No. 2, 1F of the Building No. 8 of this map）

Title: Naive Metaphysics
Abstract:
In recent publications, Kit Fine proposed a new methodology for metaphysics. According to the traditional way of doing metaphysics in analytical philosophy, one must first sort out ontological questions (“do entities of kind F exist?”). If the answer to such questions is affirmative, then one may proceed to metaphysics proper (“what is the nature of the entities of kind F?”). Fine’s proposal involves an inversion of this order. On his proposed methodology, we must already in a first stage enquire into the nature of the entities that we want to investigate. This stage of the investigation is called *naive metaphysics*. Only in a subsequent, critical stage, should we investigate whether such entities really exist, and whether such entities can ontologically be reduced to other kinds of entities. In my lecture, I will go even further than Fine’s proposal. I will argue that there are sound methodological reasons to concentrate all our efforts on the first stage (naive metaphysics), and to abandon the second, critical, stage altogether.