掲載が遅くなってしまい申し訳ありません。
以下の要領でワークショップが開催されましたので報告させていただきます。
A Workshop on Humanities in Asia
【日時】2018年2月20日, 21日
【場所】京都大学 吉田泉殿
【プログラム】
2月20日:
13:00 – 14:00 出口康夫 (京都大学)
14:00 – 15:00 佐藤将之 (台湾大学)
15:00 – 15:10 休憩
15:10 – 16:10 小山哲 (京都大学)
16:10 – 16:20 休憩
16:20 – 17:20 望月太郎 (大阪大学)
17:20 – 18:20 小倉紀蔵 (京都大学)
2月21日:
12:00 – 13:00 荒木勝 (岡山大学)
13:00 – 14:00 王小林 (香港城市大学)
14:00 – 14:15 休憩
14:15 – 15:15 落合恵美子 (京都大学)
15:15 – 15:30 休憩
15:30 – 16:30 荒木浩 (日文研)
16:30 – 17:30 小島毅 (東京大学)
以下の要領で、講演会が開催されます。みなさま奮ってご参加ください。
近刊『科学とモデル』（名古屋大学出版会）の著者である、ペンシルバニア大学教授のMichael Weisberg博士をお迎えして、以下のような講演会を行います。Weisberg博士はBiology & Philosophy誌の編集長でもあり、当日は午前中より、同誌への投稿を含めた国際論文投稿How-toに関するワークショップを行います。奮ってご参加下さい。
Speaker: Prof. Michael Weisberg (University of Pennsylvania)
Date: October 21st 2017
Time: 16:30-18:00
Venue: Large conference room in the basement, Faculty of Letters MainBuilding, Yoshida Campus, Kyoto University.
Title: Confirmation Theory for Idealized Models
Abstract:
When a flu pandemic strikes, who should get vaccinated first? What’s our best strategy for minimizing the damage of global climate change? Why is Philadelphia racially segregated? Why do most sexually reproducing species have only two sexes, in roughly even proportions? These and many other scientific and practical problems are studied with highly idealized mathematical and computational models. When should we believe these models and follow the advice they suggest? Philosophy of science tells us that we should believe models when they are well-confirmed, but this simple answer isn’t very helpful here. Traditional confirmation theory explains how empirical evidence bears on the truth of hypotheses and theories, but the highly idealized models at the heart of the life and social sciences are known to be false from the outset. Moreover, classical ideas about confirmation have been developed for relatively simple hypotheses, while many contemporary models have thousands of variables.
Despite these challenges, it is possible to develop an account of model confirmation that can speak to the reliability of models and their results. I will sketch a theory that has two parts: First, theorists validate models, confirming hypotheses about model/target system relations. Second, they employ robustness analysis to investigate the stability of model results. Taken together, validation and robustness tell us when models are reliable and help us understand the appropriate domain of their application. Not only does this theory better align our accounts of scientific method with modern theoretical practice, it also helps us understand when to believe the results of models.
以下のようにインフォーマルワークショップが開催されます。
皆様のお越しをお待ちしております。
道元の「自己」についての学際ラウンドテーブルトーク
An Interdisciplinary Round Talk Discussion on Dogen’s Self
以下のようにワークショップを開催いたします。是非ご参加下さい。
概要などの詳細はウェブサイトをご覧下さい。
Kyoto Philosophical Logic Workshop III
【日時】2017年9月7日, 8日, 9日
【場所】京都大学 吉田泉殿(7日、9日)、芝蘭会館別館(8日)
【ウェブサイト】https://sites.google.com/site/hitoshiomori/home/workshops/kplw-3
【プログラム】
September 7:
The third workshop on connexive logic, co-organized by Heinrich Wansing and Hitoshi Omori
11:00–12:00 Norihiro Kamide “Bi-classical connexive logic and its modal extension: Cut-elimination, completeness and duality”
12:00–13:00 Tomasz Jarmużek “Connexive logics defined by relating semantics and tableau approach”
13:00–14:30 Lunch
14:30–15:00 Sara Ipakchi “A justification for Aristotle Thesis AT on the basis of LNC”
15:00–16:00 Wolfgang Lenzen “Is connexive logic based on a gross misunderstanding? A Leibnitian approach”
16:00–16:15 Coffee break
16:15–17:15 Heinrich Wansing “Connexive Logic and Chellas-Segerberg Semantics”
17:15–18:15 Andreas Kapsner “What is Connexivity? Lessons from Constructive and Conditional Logics”
19:00– Dinner
September 8:
09:15–10:15 Yasuo Deguchi “Analytic Nishida: Metaphysics of Self and Non-classial Logic”
10:15–11:15 Rafał Urbaniak “Paradoxes of informal provability and many-valued indeterministic provability logic”
11:15–12:15 Toshiharu Waragai “Lesniewski’s Ontology from a Syllogistic Point of View”
12:15–13:30 Lunch
Special session on Leibniz’s logic
13:30–14:30 Ryosuke Igarashi “A Comparison of the Logical Systems of Leibniz and Kant”
14:30–15:30 Hiroyuki Inaoka “Mathematics as make-believe: Infinite diagram in Leibniz’s mathematical study”
15:30–15:45 Coffee break
15:45–16:45 Shinji Ikeda “Extension and Space in Leibniz’s Theory of Abstraction”
16:45–17:45 Wolfgang Lenzen “The evolution of the system of Leibniz’s logic”
18:30– Dinner
September 9:
10:00–11:00 Vít Punčochář “Between material and strict implication”
11:00–12:00 Igor Sedlár “Term negation in first-order logic”
12:00–13:30 Lunch
13:30–14:30 Yasuo Nakayama “Philosophical Basis for Dynamic Belief-Desire-Obligation Logic”
14:30–15:30 Shunsuke Yatabe “TBA”
15:30–15:45 Coffee break
15:45–16:45 Makoto Kanazawa “Lambek Calculus and Context-Free Grammars: Some Unresolved Issues”
16:45–17:45 Heinrich Wansing “Disentangling FDE-based Paraconsistent Modal Logics”
18:30– Dinner
以下の要領でCAPEレクチャーが開催されます。奮ってご参加ください。
Speaker: Prof. Hanti Lin (UC Davis)
Date: September 20th 2017
Time: 16:30-18:00
Venue: Seminar room No.9, 1st floor of Research Building No.2
Title: Hume’s Dilemma and the Normative Turn—Or How It Is Possible to Justify at Least Some Kind of Induction
Abstract:
Is it possible to justify at least some kind of induction? Hume’s dilemma tries to answer in the negative; a simple version goes like this: “To justify an arbitrary kind of induction, the *empirical* thesis that it will (always or often) lead to a true conclusion has to be argued for, either demonstratively or inductively; the demonstrative route is impossible, while the inductive route is circular.” I want to resolve this dilemma by defending a quite general escape route. Here is the idea: (i) to justify induction of a certain kind, we can argue for a non-empirical, *normative* thesis instead, a norm that guides some inductive practices; (ii) unlike empirical theses, normative theses might be justified a priori and demonstratively, without relying on empirical studies or inductive inferences. Call this the normative turn, which has been implemented in various ways by some (formal) epistemologists, such as Bayesians, learning theorists, and Reichenbach (who is probably the earliest pioneer of the normative turn). Unfortunately, those people tend to set aside Hume’s dilemma quickly and rush to develop their own implementations of the normative turn. In their hands, the normative turn is mostly practiced but not really defended. So I want to defend the normative turn—to consider possible ways Hume’s dilemma might be thought to strike back, and to address those worries by reference to the general features of the normative turn, without commitment to any particular implementation.
A note on the mathematical prerequisite: I will keep it to a minimum. You only need to have propositional logic in mind, and I will prepare all the others for you, pictorially.
以下のようにCAPEレクチャーが開催されます。是非御参加ください。
Two talks by Julianne Chung (Assistant Professor, University of Louisville)
Date: August 1st 2017
Time: 15:00-18:00
Venue: Seminar room No.10, 1st floor of Research Building No.2
Title: Taking Skepticism Seriously: How the Zhuangzi can Inform Contemporary Epistemology
Abstract: This paper explores a few of the ways that the Zhuangzi can inform contemporary analytic epistemology. However, to accomplish this, I must first give some account of what the Zhuangzi does. Because it is controversial as to how to interpret the positive philosophical project proposed in the Zhuangzi, I begin by briefly outlining and summarizing the case for my fictionalist interpretation of the text. Then I use this interpretation as a springboard for discussing how the Zhuangzi can be brought into productive dialogue with a perennial philosophical question: namely, the question of how we should respond to skeptical arguments (and similar). Specifically, I argue that the Zhuangzi can be reasonably interpreted as exemplifying an approach that is different from dominant contemporary responses to skeptical arguments in at least three significant ways: i) It is fictionalist, ii) It motivates a skeptical perspective rather than a claim, and iii) It accomplishes its aims in a stylistically and substantively atypical, but nonetheless contextually savvy way. However, there are also at least three significant ways in which it is relevant to contemporary debates about skeptical arguments: i) It can be used to respond to the same sorts of skeptical arguments that occupy contemporary commentators, ii) It can be used to address a number of questions, influential in contemporary epistemology, that arise in connection with such arguments, and iii) It can be used to suggest important new questions for epistemologists to pursue going forward―questions that promise to considerably advance epistemology (and philosophy more broadly).
Title: Skepticism, Metaphor, and Epistemic Feelings
Abstract: One feature of debates about skeptical arguments that has largely been overlooked by contemporary analytic philosophers is that disputes about them are pervasive across a number of philosophical traditions. Some of the most general and powerful skeptical arguments—arguments from regress, arguments from circularity, and arguments from skeptical hypotheses—have been defended, and attacked, by Euroamerican, Indian, and Chinese philosophers alike. In other words, skepticism—as well as resistance to it—is in some sense a cross-cultural phenomenon. Because of this, it cries out for a cross-cultural explanation: that is, an account of why this is so. In this paper, I argue that the view that believing is knowing is a primary conceptual metaphor (which I characterize as a form of epistemic fictionalism) promises to provide at least the beginnings of such an explanation. I proceed by first briefly explaining what primary conceptual metaphors are before going on to explain why believing is knowing is plausibly among them, drawing on recent literature on epistemic feelings. Following that, I show how this account can be used to offer a unified (if partial) response to these three particularly pressing philosophical questions: i) Why are skeptical arguments appealing? ii) Why are skeptical arguments difficult to accept? and iii) Why are these features of skeptical arguments widespread? In other words, why is skepticism—as well as resistance to it—in some sense a cross-cultural phenomenon?
Acknowledgement:
This workshop is supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B), JSPS: Dialetheism and Asian Philosophy: Construction of international research basis for Analytic Asian Philosophy (16H03344).
以下のようにワークショップが開催されます。皆様のお越しをお待ちしております。
Potentiality of Southeast Asian Philosophy II
Date: 26th July 2017
Time: 16:20 — 18:30
Venue: Seminar room D on the 2nd floor of Student Commons, Centre for Education in Liberal Arts, Toyonaka Campus, Osaka University [ http://www.celas.osaka-u.ac.
Program:
16:20-16:25 Introduction Prof. Taro Mochizuki (Osaka University)
16:25-16:40 Talk 1 Prof. Taro Mochizuki “The Japan-ASEAN Global Philosophical Research Exchange Laboratory”
16:40-17:10 Talk 2 Asst.Prof. Kasem Phenpinant (Chulalongkorn University) “The (De-) Construction of Southeast Asian Mind”
17:20-17:50 Talk 3 Prof. Srinivas Kunchapudi (Pondicherry University) “The Structural Depths of Indian Philosophy”
17:50-18:30 Round table discussion
Chair: Prof. Taro Mochizuki
Discussants: Profs. Yasuo Deguchi, Kasem Phenpinant, and Srinivas Kunchapudi.
以下の要領でCAPEレクチャーが開催されます。奮ってご参加ください。
Speaker: Mr. Kai Tanter (University of Melbourne)
Date: July 21 (Friday) 2017
Time: 15:30–17:00
Venue: Small meeting room in the basement, Faculty of Letters Main Building, Yoshida Campus, Kyoto University.
Title:Inferentialist Semantics for Atomics, Predicates, and Names
Abstract:
Inferentialism is a theory in the philosophy of language which claims that the meaning of expressions ought to be understood in terms of their inferential roles or relations, rather than truth and reference. It naturally lends itself to a proof-theoretic semantics, where meaning is understood in terms of inference rules applied within proofs, instead of more traditional model-theoretic semantics. Most work in proof theory has been focused on logical constants, with relatively little work on the semantics of atomic sentences and subatomic terms. Drawing on Robert Brandom’s idea of material inference and Greg Restall’s bilateralist interpretation of the multiple conclusion sequent calculus, I present a compositional proof-theoretic semantics for atomic sentences and their component names and predicates. Brandom’s notion of material inference applies to those inference which are good in virtue of their non-logical vocabulary. For example, from ‘Paula is a platypus’ to ‘Paula is a monotreme’. Applied to “parts” of sentences, Brandom’s claim is that predicates are governed by asymmetric and names by symmetric inferences rules. Based on Brandom’s ideas I set out general rule forms for atomic sentences, predicates, and names within the multiple conclusion sequent calculus. This system has several interesting features: (1) the rules for atomic sentences are determined by those for their component predicates names; (2) cut elimination for the system can be proved; (3) model theoretic extensions can be interpreted as idealisations derived from the more fundamental inference rules.
以下のようにワークショップが開催されます。皆様のお越しをお待ちしております。
Title: Potentiality of Southeast Asian Philosophy I
Date: 25th July 2017
Time: 15:00 — 17:30
Venue: Meeting room on the 1st floor of Rakuyu Kaikan, Kyoto University
Program:
15:00-15:05 Introduction: Prof. Taro Mochizuki (Osaka University)
15:05-15:25 Talk 1: Prof. Yasuo Deguchi (Kyoto University) “Potentiality of Southeast Asian philosophy”
15:25-15:55 Talk 2: Prof. Sun Tan (Yangon University) “Myanmar Philosophy and the Kyoto School”
16:05-16:25 Talk ３: Prof. Shimizu Hiromu (Kyoto University) “East Meets West at a Peripheral Contact Zone: Kidlat Tahimik, a film director and art activist’s deconstruction of self through association with indio-genius Ifugao /guru/ (sage)”
16:25-16:45 Talk 4: Prof. Jay Garfield “How to Fight Eurocentrism in Philosophy”
16:45-17:30 Round table discussion
Chair: Prof. Taro Mochizuki
Discussants: Profs. Yasuo Deguchi, Sun Tan, Hiromu Shimizu, and Jay Garfield.
Acknowledgement:
This workshop is supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B), JSPS: Dialetheism and Asian Philosophy: Construction of international research basis for Analytic Asian Philosophy (16H03344).