Category: お知らせ

以下の要領でCAPEレクチャーが開催されます。奮ってご参加ください。

Speaker: Prof. Hanti Lin (UC Davis)

Date: September 20th 2017
Time: 16:30-18:00
Venue: Seminar room No.9, 1st floor of Research Building No.2

Title: Hume’s Dilemma and the Normative Turn—Or How It Is Possible to Justify at Least Some Kind of Induction

Abstract: 
Is it possible to justify at least some kind of induction? Hume’s dilemma tries to answer in the negative; a simple version goes like this: “To justify an arbitrary kind of induction, the *empirical* thesis that it will (always or often) lead to a true conclusion has to be argued for, either demonstratively or inductively; the demonstrative route is impossible, while the inductive route is circular.” I want to resolve this dilemma by defending a quite general escape route. Here is the idea: (i) to justify induction of a certain kind, we can argue for a non-empirical, *normative* thesis instead, a norm that guides some inductive practices; (ii) unlike empirical theses, normative theses might be justified a priori and demonstratively, without relying on empirical studies or inductive inferences. Call this the normative turn, which has been implemented in various ways by some (formal) epistemologists, such as Bayesians, learning theorists, and Reichenbach (who is probably the earliest pioneer of the normative turn). Unfortunately, those people tend to set aside Hume’s dilemma quickly and rush to develop their own implementations of the normative turn. In their hands, the normative turn is mostly practiced but not really defended. So I want to defend the normative turn—to consider possible ways Hume’s dilemma might be thought to strike back, and to address those worries by reference to the general features of the normative turn, without commitment to any particular implementation.

A note on the mathematical prerequisite: I will keep it to a minimum. You only need to have propositional logic in mind, and I will prepare all the others for you, pictorially.

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Two talks by Julianne Chung (Assistant Professor, University of Louisville)

Date: August 1st 2017
Time: 15:00-18:00
Venue: Seminar room No.10, 1st floor of Research Building No.2

Title: Taking Skepticism Seriously: How the Zhuangzi can Inform Contemporary Epistemology
Abstract: This paper explores a few of the ways that the Zhuangzi can inform contemporary analytic epistemology. However, to accomplish this, I must first give some account of what the Zhuangzi does. Because it is controversial as to how to interpret the positive philosophical project proposed in the Zhuangzi, I begin by briefly outlining and summarizing the case for my fictionalist interpretation of the text. Then I use this interpretation as a springboard for discussing how the Zhuangzi can be brought into productive dialogue with a perennial philosophical question: namely, the question of how we should respond to skeptical arguments (and similar). Specifically, I argue that the Zhuangzi can be reasonably interpreted as exemplifying an approach that is different from dominant contemporary responses to skeptical arguments in at least three significant ways: i) It is fictionalist, ii) It motivates a skeptical perspective rather than a claim, and iii) It accomplishes its aims in a stylistically and substantively atypical, but nonetheless contextually savvy way. However, there are also at least three significant ways in which it is relevant to contemporary debates about skeptical arguments: i) It can be used to respond to the same sorts of skeptical arguments that occupy contemporary commentators, ii) It can be used to address a number of questions, influential in contemporary epistemology, that arise in connection with such arguments, and iii) It can be used to suggest important new questions for epistemologists to pursue going forward―questions that promise to considerably advance epistemology (and philosophy more broadly).

Title: Skepticism, Metaphor, and Epistemic Feelings
Abstract: One feature of debates about skeptical arguments that has largely been overlooked by contemporary analytic philosophers is that disputes about them are pervasive across a number of philosophical traditions. Some of the most general and powerful skeptical arguments—arguments from regress, arguments from circularity, and arguments from skeptical hypotheses—have been defended, and attacked, by Euroamerican, Indian, and Chinese philosophers alike. In other words, skepticism—as well as resistance to it—is in some sense a cross-cultural phenomenon. Because of this, it cries out for a cross-cultural explanation: that is, an account of why this is so. In this paper, I argue that the view that believing is knowing is a primary conceptual metaphor (which I characterize as a form of epistemic fictionalism) promises to provide at least the beginnings of such an explanation. I proceed by first briefly explaining what primary conceptual metaphors are before going on to explain why believing is knowing is plausibly among them, drawing on recent literature on epistemic feelings. Following that, I show how this account can be used to offer a unified (if partial) response to these three particularly pressing philosophical questions: i) Why are skeptical arguments appealing? ii) Why are skeptical arguments difficult to accept? and iii) Why are these features of skeptical arguments widespread? In other words, why is skepticism—as well as resistance to it—in some sense a cross-cultural phenomenon?

Acknowledgement:
This workshop is supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B), JSPS: Dialetheism and Asian Philosophy: Construction of international research basis for Analytic Asian Philosophy (16H03344).

以下のようにワークショップが開催されます。皆様のお越しをお待ちしております。

Potentiality of Southeast Asian Philosophy II

Date: 26th July 2017
Time: 16:20 — 18:30
Venue: Seminar room D on the 2nd floor of Student Commons, Centre for Education in Liberal Arts, Toyonaka Campus, Osaka University [ http://www.celas.osaka-u.ac.jp/facilities/ ]

Program:
16:20-16:25 Introduction Prof. Taro Mochizuki (Osaka University)
16:25-16:40 Talk 1 Prof. Taro Mochizuki “The Japan-ASEAN Global Philosophical Research Exchange Laboratory”
16:40-17:10 Talk 2 Asst.Prof. Kasem Phenpinant (Chulalongkorn University) “The (De-) Construction of Southeast Asian Mind”
17:20-17:50 Talk 3 Prof. Srinivas Kunchapudi (Pondicherry University) “The Structural Depths of Indian Philosophy”
17:50-18:30 Round table discussion
Chair: Prof. Taro Mochizuki
Discussants: Profs. Yasuo Deguchi, Kasem Phenpinant, and Srinivas Kunchapudi.

以下の要領でCAPEレクチャーが開催されます。奮ってご参加ください。

Speaker: Mr. Kai Tanter (University of Melbourne)

Date: July 21 (Friday) 2017
Time: 15:30–17:00
Venue: Small meeting room in the basement, Faculty of Letters Main Building, Yoshida Campus, Kyoto University.

Title:Inferentialist Semantics for Atomics, Predicates, and Names

Abstract:
Inferentialism is a theory in the philosophy of language which claims that the meaning of expressions ought to be understood in terms of their inferential roles or relations, rather than truth and reference. It naturally lends itself to a proof-theoretic semantics, where meaning is understood in terms of inference rules applied within proofs, instead of more traditional model-theoretic semantics. Most work in proof theory has been focused on logical constants, with relatively little work on the semantics of atomic sentences and subatomic terms. Drawing on Robert Brandom’s idea of material inference and Greg Restall’s bilateralist interpretation of the multiple conclusion sequent calculus, I present a compositional proof-theoretic semantics for atomic sentences and their component names and predicates. Brandom’s notion of material inference applies to those inference which are good in virtue of their non-logical vocabulary. For example, from ‘Paula is a platypus’ to ‘Paula is a monotreme’. Applied to “parts” of sentences, Brandom’s claim is that predicates are governed by asymmetric and names by symmetric inferences rules. Based on Brandom’s ideas I set out general rule forms for atomic sentences, predicates, and names within the multiple conclusion sequent calculus. This system has several interesting features: (1) the rules for atomic sentences are determined by those for their component predicates names; (2) cut elimination for the system can be proved; (3) model theoretic extensions can be interpreted as idealisations derived from the more fundamental inference rules.

以下のようにワークショップが開催されます。皆様のお越しをお待ちしております。

Title: Potentiality of Southeast Asian Philosophy I

Date: 25th July 2017
Time: 15:00 — 17:30
Venue: Meeting room on the 1st floor of Rakuyu Kaikan, Kyoto University

Program:
15:00-15:05 Introduction: Prof. Taro Mochizuki (Osaka University)
15:05-15:25 Talk 1: Prof. Yasuo Deguchi (Kyoto University) “Potentiality of Southeast Asian philosophy”
15:25-15:55 Talk 2: Prof. Sun Tan  (Yangon University) “Myanmar Philosophy and the Kyoto School”
16:05-16:25 Talk ３: Prof. Shimizu Hiromu (Kyoto University) “East Meets West at a Peripheral Contact Zone: Kidlat Tahimik, a film director and art activist’s deconstruction of self through association with indio-genius Ifugao /guru/ (sage)”
16:25-16:45 Talk 4: Prof. Jay Garfield “How to Fight Eurocentrism in Philosophy”
16:45-17:30 Round table discussion
Chair: Prof. Taro Mochizuki
Discussants: Profs. Yasuo Deguchi, Sun Tan, Hiromu Shimizu, and Jay Garfield.

Acknowledgement:
This workshop is supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B), JSPS: Dialetheism and Asian Philosophy: Construction of international research basis for Analytic Asian Philosophy (16H03344).

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Dr. Yoriyuki Yamagata (AIST)

Date: July 6 (Thursday) 2017
Time: 16:30 – 18:00
Venue: Large conference room in the basement, Faculty of Letters Main Building, Yoshida Campus, Kyoto University.

Title: Validity of bilateral classical logic and its application

Abstract:
In this talk, we report an ongoing work to define a notion of validity on Rumfitt’s bilateral classical logic. In particular, we define validity over the implicational fragment of the propositional bilateral classical logic, following Prawitz’s article “Ideas and Results in Proof Theory”. As an application, we prove strong normalization of such system under normalization rules, which reduce all introduction/elimination, reductio-ad-absurdum/elimination and reduction-ad-absurdum/contradiction-rules pairs on main branches of derivations. Further, we discuss the relation of our notion of validity and Dummett’s verificationist semantics. Although our definition of validity is hopelessly non-constructive, we argue that there is a way in which verificationists accept our notion of validity, by showing that the notion of decidability can be multiply interpreted.

以下の要領でCAPEレクチャーが開催されます。奮ってご参加ください。

Date: June 29 (Thursday) 2017
Time: 16:30-18:30
Venue: Large conference room in the basement, Faculty of Letters Main Building, Yoshida Campus, Kyoto University.

Prof. Piet Hut (Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton)

Title:
YHouse: a research and outreach center in Manhattan for the study of consciousness.

Abstract:
I will give a brief review of our plans to establish a new center in Manhattan, which will combine academic studies broady with philosophy, art, design and technology. The main focus is on consciousness, in all its forms, from intelligence to self-awareness to cognition in general. To capture all of those we like to use the umbrella term “awareness”.

In the next ten years we will learn more about the mind-body problem, on a factual technical level, than humanity has learned ever since we developed language and rational thought. This poses two urgent problems: first, to synthesize all this new knowledge, and second, to let that integrated knowledge ripen into new forms of wisdom, sorely needed for our survival.

Our solution to the first problem is to take a long view, in three parts: past, present and future. We will trace awareness from its biological roots, four billion years ago; through its cultural roots, the origins of human civilization and its ongoing transformations; to its technological roots, in AI and robots, that are being developed right now, in the present and near future.

Our solution to the second problem is to reflect on this long view, using philosophy, in a broad sense of the word. Our aim is to reconceptualize the whole field of awareness or cognition, by reflecting on its various manifestations in nature, culture, and technology.

Dr. Yuko Ishihara (Tokyo Institute of Technology, Earth-Life Science Institute)

Title:
Consciousness is absolutely no-thing: On Nishida’s transformation of transcendental philosophy

Abstract:
Consciousness or awareness is a subject that is studied in various disciplines today including psychology, neuroscience and cognitive science. What all these empirical studies have in common is that it takes consciousness to be another thing in the world that can be observed and measured objectively. While such approach undoubtedly sheds light on certain aspects of consciousness, it cannot provide the whole picture. This is because consciousness is not just an object in the world but a subject for the world. One of the philosophical traditions that takes this idea seriously is called transcendental philosophy. Put in the language of transcendental philosophy, consciousness is the ultimate condition of possibility for our experience of the world. In this talk, I want to explore what the nature of such consciousness might look like by drawing on the philosophy of Nishida Kitaro. I will first present my interpretation of Nishida as a transcendental philosopher and then expand on the ways in which Nishida’s philosophy transforms certain aspects of traditional transcendental philosophy since Kant. In particular, I will focus on how Nishida’s notion of “the place of absolute nothingness” provides an understanding of consciousness neither as an object nor a subject, but rather, as absolutely no-thing.

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Dr. Itsuki Hayashi (East Asian Languages and Cultures Columbia University)

Date: June 29 (Thursday) 2017
Time: 15:00-16:30
Venue: Large conference room in the basement, Faculty of Letters Main Building, Yoshida Campus, Kyoto University.

Title: The Secret Lives of Evanescents: A Critical Analysis of the Buddhist Argument for Rebirth

Abstract:
In the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of Pramāṇavārttika, Dharmakīrti famously argues for the possibility of rebirth. By rebirth, however, Dharmakīrti does not mean transmigration of the soul, for the idea of enduring souls is rejected as an illusion; instead, he means evanescent minds make up a causal series (cittasantāna) that extends beyond the duration of a physical life. While contemporary physicalists might object to this view, John Taber (2003) argues that the Buddhist can advance an Occam’s Razor argument to show that rebirth is at least not impossible. In this presentation, I show that later Buddhists, particularly Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (8th century), develop the argument in such a way that Occam’s Razor is no longer applicable. What is more, the argument appeals to a criterion of ontological dependence that resembles supervenience to show that mind does not depend on body, which renders the Buddhist doctrine even more suspect vis-à-vis contemporary metaphysics. Having clarified the challenges, I will suggest that the Buddhist can evade the challenges if karma is real (or ideal) and if ‘mind’ is to be understood as a karmic rather than cognitive entity.
Key words: persistence, rebirth, supervenience, causation, physicalism

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Prof. Kevin Kelly, Carnegie Mellon University
(joint work with Konstantin Genin, Carnegie Mellon University)

Date: June 28 (Wednesday) 2017
Time: 18:15 – 19:45
Venue: Large conference room in the basement, Faculty of Letters Main Building, Yoshida Campus, Kyoto University.

Title: Deduction and Induction in Statistics

Abstract: The distinction between inductive and deductive reasoning is among the most basic in philosophy. But where, exactly, should one draw it? The logical positivists drew it in terms of logic—deductive inferences are those in which the conclusion follows by first-order logic from the premises. By that standard, all statistical inference is inductive, because the proposition that a sample was received never logically entails the intended conclusion. We propose, instead, to characterize deductive inference in terms of guaranteed, arbitrarily low chance of error. We present three arguments in favor of the proposal. (1) It reflects the situation of real, as opposed to mathematically formalized, deduction. (2) Unlike the received view, it allows one to transfer logical insights from epistemology and the philosophy of science to issues that arise in advanced statistical data analysis. (3) Finally, it rests on a deep, topological analogy between the logical and statistical cases. Time permitting, we illustrate the idea with a statistical application of tremendous practical and ethical consequence: the inference of causal connections from non-experimental data.

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Date and Time: From 18:15 to 19:45 on 13th June 2017
Place: the meeting room on the ground floor of the building of faculty of letters, Yoshida main campus, Kyoto University
Speaker: Prof. Wen-fang Wang (Yang-Ming University)
Language: English

Title: On Pritchard’s Solutions to Radical Skeptical Paradoxes

Abstract:
D. Pritchard (2016) has recently analyzed what he called “radical skeptical paradoxes” and offered his solutions to them. According to Pritchard, there are two kinds of skeptical paradoxes that ground on two intuitively plausible principles: one grounds on a version of epistemic closure principle, while the other grounds on what he calls ‘underdetermination principle’. Pritchard further argues that there is no unified undercutting solution to both paradoxes, so he appeals to two different ideas – Wittgenstein’s hinge commitment and McDowell’s disjunctivism – to solve these paradoxes. I argue in the talk that Pritchard’s solutions to radical skeptical paradoxes do not succeed. I explain in the first part what these radical skeptical paradoxes and their presuppositions are. In sections two and three, I explain Pritchard’s solutions to these paradoxes and argue that his solutions are not satisfactory.