Category Archives: セミナー





日時: 2015年8月4日(火) 午後2時〜5時

場所: 総合研究2号館第8講義室



  •  発表者

三木那由他  語用論と意図基盤意味論

西村 洋平  魂の本質と物体との関係をめぐるプロティノスの思想の独自性



  • 発表要旨

三木那由他 語用論と意図基盤意味論

かつてグライスは、話者意味(speaker meaning)という概念を話者の意図という心理的概念によって分析しようと試みた。意図基盤意味論と呼ばれるこの試みは、さまざまな問題を含みつつも、近年でもなお幾人かの論者によって受け継がれている。他方でこの話者意味という概念は、推意(implicature)という現象を理解するための基礎とされていた。現在、グライスによる推意の分析をモデルとした理論的研究は、語用論と呼ばれる分野で中心的な位置を占めている。それ自体が哲学的探求の対象でありながら、さらに語用論の基礎概念でもあるという話者意味の二面性は、あまり強く意識されないままに、漠然と受け入れられてきている。実際、意図基盤意味論者たちは自身の分析が語用論の営みと調和的であることを疑わず、また語用論者たちは話者意味と話者の意図とを言い換え可能なものとして使っているように見える。だが、意図基盤意味論と語用論という営みは本当にそれほど調和的なのだろうか? 本発表では、意図基盤意味論的に理解される話者意味の概念と語用論にとって必要な話者意味の概念とが、実際には一致していないという可能性を、具体例をもとに示し、意図基盤意味論よりも望ましい話者意味の理解の仕方を素描する。


西村洋平 魂の本質と物体との関係をめぐるプロティノスの思想の独自性




テクストとしては、主に第2論考「魂の不死について」(IV, 7)の、魂の本質をめぐる他学派への批判的な議論と、第27論考「魂の諸問題について 第1篇」(IV, 3)の第20章における、魂と身体の関係を論じた箇所を中心に取り上げる。


Yumiko Inukai先生 講演会

Yumiko Inukai先生(University of Massachusetts Boston) の講演会のお知らせです。

日時:2015年7月31日(金) 16:30~18:00


Title: James (and Hume) on Radical Empiricism and Object

Abstract: James presents his version of empiricism as *Radical* empiricism, distinguishing it from “ordinary” empiricism. He emphasizes the experiential reality of relations, especially conjunctive ones, and uses them ingeniously to account for Subject/Object distinction without postulating anything unobserved. I will discuss James’ Radical Empiricism contrasting it with Hume’s empiricism, and his account of the subject/object distinction for which he introduces the notion of “pure experience.” Although my focus for this talk will be on James’ accounts, I hope to show at the end that there is an interesting parallel between James’ explanation of subject/object and Hume’s.

Workshop on Philosophical Semantics


日時:2015年7月10日(金) 16:30〜18:30

講演者:Masahiro Yamada (Claremont Graduate University),

Byeong-uk Yi (University of Toront)




Masahiro Yamada

Title : Laying Sleeping Beauty to Rest


Elga and others have argued that the so-called Sleeping Beauty Problem poses a challenge to Van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle. The argument rests on the assumption that conditionalization is the correct updating procedure to be used in the case: if one insists on conditionalization and the Reflection Principle, the consequence of that is less attractive than that of rejecting the Reflection Principle. I argue that general considerations of when conditionalization is appropriate show that conditionalization cannot be used in the case of Sleeping Beauty. Thus, the case does not pose a challenge to the Reflection Principle.


Byeong-uk Yi

Title : Semantic Relationism and Relational Propositions


In Semantic Relationism, Kit Fine proposes semantic relationism, the view that semantic relationship among linguistic expressions is not reducible to their intrinsic semantic features, and combines this view with referentialism, the view that intrinsic semantic features of linguistic expressions are exhausted by their referents. In this talk, I will point out some difficulties with his account, and explore a way to overcome them by taking a radical version of semantic relationism.


Prof. Bongrae Soek WS


日時:2015年7月8日(水)、7月9日(木)  各日18:00〜19:30

講演者 : Bongrae Soek (Alvernia University)

場所:京都大学文学部文学部東館2F KUASU 多目的室


July 8 (Wed)

Title : Empathy and Nociceptive Mirror Emotion in Embodied Moral Psychology

Abstract : In recent studies of moral judgments, psychologists analyze the moral mind from the perspectives of Kantian reasoning, Humea n emotion, or Rawlsian principle and identify diverse processes of moral cognition. But the body (i.e., the physical sense a nd activity) of a moral agent are not fully and seriously considered in their analyses. In this presentation, I will develop a moral psychology of the body, i.e., a moral psychology of embodied and other-regarding emotion. How does the body initiat e, influence, and sustain moral judgments and decisions? How does it motivate compassionate actions and other-regarding behaviors? I will explore this relatively uncharted territory of embodied moral psychology by focusing two psychological phenomena. First, I will focus on empathy (particularly its affective resonance and embodied response to others’ pain and suffering). I will argue that our embodied nociceptive mirror emotion is the foundation of our empathic concern towards other suffering. At a basic level of moral cognition, our empathy to others’ pain is processed by affective resonance and motivational prep aredness that are supported by brain regions (such as the anterior insula) that sense and react to bodily change. As we obse rve others’ pain, we not only think to relieve their suffering but we also sweat profusely and breathe abruptly. The embodi ed process is a critical element of empathy’s prosocial and moral orientation.   Second, I will discuss psychopathy and its lack of full embodiment in moral cognition. Typically psychopathic (dispositional or behavioral) orientations are associated with a deficit in affective processing that integrates specific types of stimuli with visceral and autonomic reactions. It seems that psychopaths suffer from disrupted emotional processes that motivate pr osocial behaviors via embodied reactions. They know and recognize others’ pain and suffering but do not react (in their phys iological and behavioral reactions) to them appropriately. Once again the body plays important roles in some aspects of mora l cognition where affective social perception gives rise to prosocial helping behaviors.


(1)Recent Studies in Moral Psychology (Kantian, Humean, Rawlsian Approaches etc.)

(2)Embodied Approaches to Cognition

(3)Embodied Approaches to Social Psychology

(4)My Approach – Embodied Approach to Moral Psychology -Empathy (Nociceptive Mirror Emotion) -Psychopathy (absence of empathic concern due to insufficient bodily response)


July 9 (Thu)

Title : Embodied Space in Psychopathology and Art

Abstract : In this presentation, I will analyze the experience of seemingly non-sensuous or non-sensible things, such as empty spaces ( space gaps, space islands, wide open space, the absence of presence, or the presence of absence). I will argue, quite parado xically, that to experience such non-sensuous things, sensual imagination (tactile, visceral, motor, and holistic somatic se nse) is necessary. Our basic sensory encounter with the world, according to many philosophers such as Merleau Ponty and psyc hologist such as J. J. Gibson, is embodied; it is guided by our tactile and kinetic interaction with the object in the world . That is, we perceive and understand the presence of physical entities and their relations to our bodily interaction with t hem. What about empty space? Do we experience empty space in this embodied and sensual way? In this presentation, I will foc us on embodied metaphors (embodied spatial distinctions) and psychopathologies (agoraphobia, acrophobia etc.) of space and u se them as examples to support my embodied interpretation of spatial perception. I will argue that embodied perception is im portant and perhaps necessary in the full experience of space. The body is required for us to experience, understand, and ap preciate the bodiless openness.


Kyoto-Soochow Joint Workshop on“Virtue Epistemology : East & West”


6月3日(水) 16:30~19:30 場所:文学部東館2F KUASU多目的室
Kyoto-Soochow Joint Workshop on“Virtue Epistemology : East & West”
発表者:CHIENKUO MI (Michael), Hsiang-min Shen, Wan-Chuan Fang, Shane Ryan (東呉大学, 台湾)

Abstract_Kyoto-Soochow Joint WS

Workshop: Profs. G. Strawson & M. Montague on Philosophy of Mind

Profs. Galen Strawson & Michelle Montague (University of Texas at Austin)講演会のお知らせです。

日時:2015 年 5 月 15 日(金) 16:30〜19:30

場所:京都大学文学部総合研究棟 2 号館第6演習室

タイトル:The primacy of panpsychism (G. Strawson)

Consciousness and cognitive phenomenology (M. Montague)