講演者：Prof. Christian Coseru (Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston)
タイトル：Through the Looking-Glass: Phenomenal Content Without Concepts
Are there conscious mental states that can make present features of experience, such as subjectivity and the sense of self even though the bearer of those states lacks the concepts necessary for specifying their content? And if there are such states how are their experiential features presented, and what kind of content do those presentations deliver? These questions inform contemporary debates in phenomenology and philosophy of mind about the character of consciousness, the role of conceptual knowledge and narrative competence, and the difference between conceptual and nonconceptual content. They also have been explored at length by Buddhist philosophers (specifically those in the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition) concerned with the epistemological implications of certain liminal states of mind associated with various contemplative practices. Drawing on these two research programs, I put forward an acquaintance model of nonconceptual content according to which we are directly aware of our own mental states as they occur even though we can only articulate their content conceptually. Against externalist account of mental content. I argue that although the complexity of human thought is only conceptually articulable, it is a further epistemic fact that such articulation only becomes known in conscious thought.
講演者：Prof. Sheridan Hough (Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston)
タイトル：The Kierkegaardian Self, and How Nietzsche and Sartre Attend to the ‘Unselving’
Kierkegaard’s powerful analysis of the self—the Kierkegaardian individual, forged by an infinite commitment to a finite task— is a valuable benchmark for evaluating later accounts of what a ‘self’ is, and cannot be. Nietzsche’s ‘person as cultural artifact’ provides an antidote to those who would privilege our rational, conscious lives over the habits and practices of which we are made; on the other hand, Sartre’s ‘no self’ view (as first described in La transcendence de l’égo) argues that Husserl’s account of consciousness is not radical enough: the ‘I’ or ego is a pseudo-source of activity (and Sartre thus draws very close to a particularly Buddhist account of personal identity). Sartre’s ontology is unabashedly Kierkegaardian—the ‘self’ is always under construction, and the mechanism is choice—but is Sartre the true descendant of Kierkegaard? I will argue that Nietzsche and Kierkegaard have more in common in their understanding of our intersubjective condition that you might initially suspect.