以下の要領でシンポジウムが開催されます。奮ってご参加ください。

タイトル：National Taiwan University ‒ Kyoto University Symposium on “Self”
日時：4月22, 23日
場所：百周年時計台記念館2階会議室III

4月22日
10:15 – 10:20 Opening Remark: 出口康夫(Yasuo Deguchi)
10:20 – 11:20
謝佩芬(Pei-Fen Hsieh) 「再現自我,抒懷傳史—宋代「自傳」之特色與價值研析」.
Commentator:緑川英樹(Hideki Midorikawa)
11:20 – 12:20
張文薰(Wen-Hsun Chang) Narratable Self: Taiwanese Literature and “Watakushi Novels.”
Commentator: 木津祐子(Yuko Kizu)
12:20 – 13:50 Lunch
13:50 – 14:50
林明照(Ming-Chao Lin) The Reflection of Self and It’s Ethical Implications in the Zhuangzi.
Commentator: 古勝隆一(Ryuichi Kogachi)
14:50 – 15:05 Break
15:05 – 16:05
呂佳蓉(Chia-Rung Lu) When “others” become oneself: pragmatic strategy of addressing self in Mandarin and Japanese.
Commentator: 平田昌司(Shoji Hirata)
16:05 – 16:20 Break
16:20 – 17:20
邱錦榮(Chin-Jung Chiu) The Aging and Divided Self: Shakespeare’sKing Learand Akira Kurosawa’s Ran.
Commentator: 桒山智成 (Tomonari Kuwayama)
18:00 – Dinner

4月23日
9:15 – 9:20 Welcoming Remark: 南川高志(Takashi Minamikawa, Dean of Graduate School of Letters)
9:20 – 10:20
林于湘(Ivy Yu-Shian Lin) The Matrix of the Idea of Self, Its Polyphony, (Trans-) Contextualization, and Authenticity in Xingjian Gao’s Agenda (自我概念的矩陣：高行健美學中的複調、（跨）脈絡化與實相).
Commentator: TBA
10:20 – 11:20 梁益堉(Caleb Liang) Key Note Speech: Body-as-Subject in the Four-hand Illusion.
Commentator: 大塚淳(Jun Otsuka)
11:20 – 12:20 楊明蒼(Ming-Tsang Yang) Shielding the Self, Bordering the Liminal: Reimagining Heroic Identity in Beowulf.
Commentator: 廣田篤彦(Atsuhiko Hirota)
12:20 – 12:30 Concluding Remark: 梁益堉(Caleb Liang)

NTU-Kyoto program0422,23

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Speaker: Chien-hsing Ho (Academia Sinica, Taiwan)
Date and Time: Wednesday, April 18, 2018: 18:00-19:30
Venue: 京都大学文学部地下1階小会議室（the Building No. 8 of this map）

Title: Ontic Indeterminacy: Reconstructing Chinese Madhyamaka Thought

Abstract
According to Indian Madhyamaka, all things originate dependently and have no independent, invariable nature or existence. Consequently, things are said to be empty. In Chinese Buddhism, this doctrine of emptiness was ardently expounded by Sengzhao僧肇(374?−414 CE) and Jizang吉藏(549−623 CE), two leading exponents of Chinese Madhyamaka. On their view, things are empty mainly because they are devoid of determinate nature and form (無定性、無定相). For exegetical reasons, this lack of determinate nature and form may best be explicated in terms of conceptual and linguistic indeterminability.
In my talk, I intend, based on Sengzhao’s and Jizang’s works, to reconstruct an ontological notion of indeterminacy, termed ontic indeterminacy (OI), which involves the thesis that all things are indeterminate with respect to the ways they are (their existence, nature, property, form, etc.). This notion bears some resemblance to the analytic-philosophical notion of metaphysical indeterminacy (MI) and for my reconstruction I make use the determinable-based account of MI presented by Jessica Wilson. The crucial task here is to explore how the notion of OI would tackle a few issues that (may) concern advocates of MI, namely, the issues of indeterminate existence and identity as well as an issue pertaining to the problem of change.

来る4月2日に数学者・数学史家のJeremy Gray教授を京都大学にお迎えして、ヘルマン・ワイルの哲学についてのご講演をいただきます。
参加費、申し込み等必要ございませんので、どうぞ奮ってご参加ください。

また同教授は、3月28日に慶応大学、4月7日に名古屋大学(応用哲学会年次大会シンポジウムとして)でも講演なさいます。そちらもぜひご参加ください。一連の講演の情報は、名古屋大学科学哲学研究室のサイトにまとめていただいていますので、ご参照ください。

日時: 4月2日(月) 16:30-18:00
場所: 京都大学文学部地下1階大会議室(地図8番の建物)

題目: The philosophy of Hermann Weyl
Jeremy Gray教授 (The Open University, University of Warwick)
アブストラクト:
By 1910, the year he turned 25, Weyl was developing a finitist philosophy of mathematics, based on a logical theory of relations. He also believed that the human mind can understand ideas only sequentially. He developed this approach on his book The Continuum (1918), and for a time came close to agreeing with Brouwer’s intuitionism, but he abandoned them in the mid-1920s when he became involved in exploring the theory of Lie groups. He then had to turn back towards Hilbert’s ideas about mathematics and physics, and developed his own theory of what he called the symbolic universe in which mathematics and physics supported each other in complementary ways. Weyl sought a unified philosophy that would govern not only his scientific practice but be rooted in a theory of knowledge and an understanding of how it is acquired.

Jeremy Gray教授・略歴
Jeremy Gray is an Emeritus Professor of The Open University and an Honorary Professor in the Mathematics Department at the University of Warwick. His research interests are in the history of mathematics, specifically the history of algebra, analysis, and geometry, and mathematical modernism in the 19th and early 20th Centuries. The work on mathematical modernism links the history of mathematics with the history of science and issues in mathematical logic and the philosophy of mathematics.

He was awarded the Otto Neugebauer Prize of the European Mathematical Society in 2016 for his work in the history of mathematics, and the Albert Leon Whiteman Memorial Prize of the American Mathematical Society in 2009 for his contributions to the study of the history of modern mathematics internationally. In 2012 he was elected an Inaugural Fellow of the American Mathematical Society. In 2010 he was one of the nine founder members of the Association for the Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (APMP).

He is the author of eleven books, of which among the most recent are Plato’s Ghost: The Modernist Transformation of Mathematics (Princeton U.P. 2008), Henri Poincaré: a scientific biography (Princeton 2012), and The Real and the Complex (Springer 2015). Two more books are to be published in 2018: Under the Banner of Number: A History of Abstract Algebra, by Springer, and Simply Riemann in the Simply Charly series of e-books.

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Speaker: Prof. Leon Horsten (University of Bristol, Kyoto University)
Date and Time: Saturday, March 17, 2018: 15:00-17:00
Venue: 京都大学文学部第２講義室（Lecture room No. 2, 1F of the Building No. 8 of this map）

Title: Naive Metaphysics
Abstract:
In recent publications, Kit Fine proposed a new methodology for metaphysics. According to the traditional way of doing metaphysics in analytical philosophy, one must first sort out ontological questions (“do entities of kind F exist?”). If the answer to such questions is affirmative, then one may proceed to metaphysics proper (“what is the nature of the entities of kind F?”). Fine’s proposal involves an inversion of this order. On his proposed methodology, we must already in a first stage enquire into the nature of the entities that we want to investigate. This stage of the investigation is called *naive metaphysics*. Only in a subsequent, critical stage, should we investigate whether such entities really exist, and whether such entities can ontologically be reduced to other kinds of entities. In my lecture, I will go even further than Fine’s proposal. I will argue that there are sound methodological reasons to concentrate all our efforts on the first stage (naive metaphysics), and to abandon the second, critical, stage altogether.

以下のようにインフォーマルワークショップが開催されます。
皆様のお越しをお待ちしております。

A Workshop on Dogen

Date and Time: March 7, 2018 11:00-18:15
Venue: 京都大学吉田泉殿 Yoshida Izumidono, Kyoto University

Program:
11:00 – 12:00 Yasuo Deguchi (Kyoto) : Self as Anyone
12:00 – 13:00 Lunch
13:00 – 14:00 Shigeru Taguchi (Hokkaido) : Selves in Superposition: Husserl, Tanabe, and Dogen
14:00 – 15:00 Naozumi Mitani (Shinshu) : Trailblazing with Dōgen
15:00 – 15:15 Break
15:15 – 16:15 Hayato Saigo (Nagahama Institute of Bio-Science and Technology) : Without Problem, No Solution:
Toward category-theoretic elucidation of the logic of Buddha, Nāgārjuna and Dōgen
16:15 – 17:15 Naoya Fujikawa (Tokyo Metropolitan) : Eloquence of Silence
17:15 – 18:15 Takeshi Sakon (Osaka City) : TBA (joint work with Shinya Moriyama)

Abstract and more details:
Please visit here (Network for Analytic Asian Philosophy).

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以下の要領でワークショップが開催されましたので報告させていただきます。

A Workshop on Humanities in Asia

【日時】2018年2月20日, 21日

【場所】京都大学 吉田泉殿

【プログラム】
2月20日:
13:00 – 14:00 出口康夫 (京都大学)
14:00 – 15:00 佐藤将之 (台湾大学)
15:00 – 15:10 休憩
15:10 – 16:10 小山哲 (京都大学)
16:10 – 16:20 休憩
16:20 – 17:20 望月太郎 (大阪大学)
17:20 – 18:20 小倉紀蔵 (京都大学)

2月21日:
12:00 – 13:00 荒木勝 (岡山大学)
13:00 – 14:00 王小林 (香港城市大学)
14:00 – 14:15 休憩
14:15 – 15:15 落合恵美子 (京都大学)
15:15 – 15:30 休憩
15:30 – 16:30 荒木浩 (日文研)
16:30 – 17:30 小島毅 (東京大学)

以下の要領で、講演会が開催されます。みなさま奮ってご参加ください。

以下のようにインフォーマルワークショップが開催されます。
皆様のお越しをお待ちしております。

道元の「自己」についての学際ラウンドテーブルトーク
An Interdisciplinary Round Talk Discussion on Dogen’s Self

以下のようにワークショップを開催いたします。是非ご参加下さい。
概要などの詳細はウェブサイトをご覧下さい。

Kyoto Philosophical Logic Workshop III

【日時】2017年9月7日, 8日, 9日

【場所】京都大学 吉田泉殿(7日、9日)、芝蘭会館別館(8日)

【ウェブサイト】https://sites.google.com/site/hitoshiomori/home/workshops/kplw-3

【プログラム】
September 7:
The third workshop on connexive logic, co-organized by Heinrich Wansing and Hitoshi Omori
11:00–12:00 Norihiro Kamide “Bi-classical connexive logic and its modal extension: Cut-elimination, completeness and duality”
12:00–13:00 Tomasz Jarmużek “Connexive logics defined by relating semantics and tableau approach”
13:00–14:30 Lunch
14:30–15:00 Sara Ipakchi “A justification for Aristotle Thesis AT on the basis of LNC”
15:00–16:00 Wolfgang Lenzen “Is connexive logic based on a gross misunderstanding? A Leibnitian approach”
16:00–16:15 Coffee break
16:15–17:15 Heinrich Wansing “Connexive Logic and Chellas-Segerberg Semantics”
17:15–18:15 Andreas Kapsner “What is Connexivity? Lessons from Constructive and Conditional Logics”
19:00– Dinner

September 8:
09:15–10:15 Yasuo Deguchi “Analytic Nishida: Metaphysics of Self and Non-classial Logic”
10:15–11:15 Rafał Urbaniak “Paradoxes of informal provability and many-valued indeterministic provability logic”
11:15–12:15 Toshiharu Waragai “Lesniewski’s Ontology from a Syllogistic Point of View”
12:15–13:30 Lunch
Special session on Leibniz’s logic
13:30–14:30 Ryosuke Igarashi “A Comparison of the Logical Systems of Leibniz and Kant”
14:30–15:30 Hiroyuki Inaoka “Mathematics as make-believe: Infinite diagram in Leibniz’s mathematical study”
15:30–15:45 Coffee break
15:45–16:45 Shinji Ikeda “Extension and Space in Leibniz’s Theory of Abstraction”
16:45–17:45 Wolfgang Lenzen “The evolution of the system of Leibniz’s logic”
18:30– Dinner

September 9:
10:00–11:00 Vít Punčochář “Between material and strict implication”
11:00–12:00 Igor Sedlár “Term negation in first-order logic”
12:00–13:30 Lunch
13:30–14:30 Yasuo Nakayama “Philosophical Basis for Dynamic Belief-Desire-Obligation Logic”
14:30–15:30 Shunsuke Yatabe “TBA”
15:30–15:45 Coffee break
15:45–16:45 Makoto Kanazawa “Lambek Calculus and Context-Free Grammars: Some Unresolved Issues”
16:45–17:45 Heinrich Wansing “Disentangling FDE-based Paraconsistent Modal Logics”
18:30– Dinner

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Speaker: Prof. Hanti Lin (UC Davis)

Date: September 20th 2017
Time: 16:30-18:00
Venue: Seminar room No.9, 1st floor of Research Building No.2

Title: Hume’s Dilemma and the Normative Turn—Or How It Is Possible to Justify at Least Some Kind of Induction

Abstract: 
Is it possible to justify at least some kind of induction? Hume’s dilemma tries to answer in the negative; a simple version goes like this: “To justify an arbitrary kind of induction, the *empirical* thesis that it will (always or often) lead to a true conclusion has to be argued for, either demonstratively or inductively; the demonstrative route is impossible, while the inductive route is circular.” I want to resolve this dilemma by defending a quite general escape route. Here is the idea: (i) to justify induction of a certain kind, we can argue for a non-empirical, *normative* thesis instead, a norm that guides some inductive practices; (ii) unlike empirical theses, normative theses might be justified a priori and demonstratively, without relying on empirical studies or inductive inferences. Call this the normative turn, which has been implemented in various ways by some (formal) epistemologists, such as Bayesians, learning theorists, and Reichenbach (who is probably the earliest pioneer of the normative turn). Unfortunately, those people tend to set aside Hume’s dilemma quickly and rush to develop their own implementations of the normative turn. In their hands, the normative turn is mostly practiced but not really defended. So I want to defend the normative turn—to consider possible ways Hume’s dilemma might be thought to strike back, and to address those worries by reference to the general features of the normative turn, without commitment to any particular implementation.

A note on the mathematical prerequisite: I will keep it to a minimum. You only need to have propositional logic in mind, and I will prepare all the others for you, pictorially.