講演者：Dr. Paolo Bonardi (UCLA)
場所：京都大学 文学部校舎１階 会議室
Title：The Semantic Content of Empty Names and the Logic of Nonexistent Objects
Abstract：Millianism is the doctrine according to which the semantic content of a proper name is exhausted by its referent. My talk will be about the so-called empty (proper) names, more specifically: names that belong to fiction/pretense (e.g. “Sherlock Holmes”); and names that are empty because of an error (e.g. “Vulcan”). It will be my goal to outline a Millian account of empty names according to which: names from fiction and error refer to actual and necessarily nonexistent objects; these objects cannot have ordinary properties (e.g. being a detective), whereas they can have – and in fact have some – non-ordinary properties (e.g. being something such that fictionally, it is a detective). I will argue that the logic of such objects is not positive free logic but a version of classical logic.
講演者：Mr. Kyle Michael James Shuttleworth (Queen’s University Belfast)
Abstract: In the English translation of Watsuji Tetsuro’s 倫理学, the concept of ‘本来性’ is translated as ‘authenticity’. In Western philosophical thought, however, authenticity is intricately bound to the historical context from which it emerged. One thus ought to question whether authenticity can be abstracted from its historical context, and imported into a foreign culture. In light of this, the primary aim of this investigation will be to explicate precisely that which Watsuji’s concept of ‘authenticity’ entails. This will then enable one to determine whether that which Watsuji advocates is akin to the concept of authenticity as espoused in the West. That which is stake is not merely a linguistic quibble, but rather the search for an intercultural, conceptual ground upon which to conduct ethical discourse between East and West. The thesis which will be posited in this enquiry then, is whether the ethic of authenticity can provide a conceptual bridge between Eastern and Western philosophical traditions.
講演者：Malcolm Keating (Yale-NUS College, Singapore)
Title: Is Ellipsis Completion Knowledge? Linguistic Interpretation in Classical Indian Philosophy
Natural languages vary in how much information they encode into lexemes. Yet speakers can utter subsentential units which are syntactically or otherwise incomplete and still communi- cate successfully. Linguists and philosophers, in analyzing this widespread interpretive prac- tice of completing ellipsis, differ over whether such utterances constitute genuine speech acts, are disguised but complete syntactic/semantic units, as well as how the ellipsis is completed– syntactically, semantically, or pragmatically. The answers to these questions are significant since, for instance, they may challenge the thesis that languages are compositional, that is, with expressions being semantically determined by their syntax and lexical semantics.
Classical Indian philosophers, although committed to the compositionality thesis, gave vary- ing accounts of how interpretive practices allowed for ellipsis completion. The philosophers known as the Bhatta Mimamsa argued that an interpretive process, which they called arthapatti or “postulation,” could yield certain knowledge of what is elided. For instance, since the San- skrit language is highly inflected, someone who hears a speaker say “the door, the door!” can rely on syntactically-encoded information to help them recover a complete sentence, “Close the door, close the door!” In the 16th century, Narayana Bhatta discusses this process in the Manameyodaya, arguing that postulation requires the positing of words in order for there to be anvaya or “connection” within the expression. This argument is posed in response to opponents who argue that only the word meanings, and not the words themselves, must be posited.
I then draw connections between Narayanabhatta and contemporary Anglophone literature on the topic. In particular, I argue that the position of Narayana’s opponent (who is identified as belonging to another school of Mimamsa, the Prabhakara) is roughly analogous to that of pragmatic contextualists. In contrast, the Bhatta view could fruitfully be reconstructed as an abductive completion of lexical underspecification, along the lines of James Pustejovsky’s pro- posal. However, due to the ambiguity in the notion of connection, these reconstructions must be tentative, as Indian proposals maybe consistent with multiple formal analyses. The cru- cial implication to draw from their dialectic is the claim that ellipsis completion rises to the level of knowledge, and that it does so through a rational process grounded in the principle of compositionality.
18 Fri March 2016
10:00 – 10:15 Opening Remark
10:15 – 11:15 Prof. Yasuo Deguchi (Kyoto): The Late Sanlun and Dialetheism
11:15 – 11:30 Break
11:30 – 12:15 Ryosuke Igarashi & Maiko Yamamori (Kyoto): An Analysis of Ineffability Paradox
12:15 – 1:00 Theresa Helke (NUS) : In Defense of the Suppositional View of Indicative Conditionals.
1:00 to 3:30 Lunch
3:30 – 4:15 Kazunori Sawada (Kyoto): TBA
4:15 – 5:00 Jin Sasaki (Kyoto): “Alaya-vijnana” and “Power of Judgment”: A Kantian Reading of “Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana”
5:00 – 5:15 Break
5:15 – 6:15 Prof. Robert Sharf (UC Berkley) : Zen and Dialetheism
19 Sat March 2016
10:00 – 11:00 Jay Garfield (NUS) : Just Saying … Paradox in Zhuangzi 11:00 – 11:15 Break
11:15 – 12:00 Miao Kun Tsai (NUS): Negative Normative Ethics in Zhuangzi
12:00 – 12:45 Elena Gessler (Chengchi): TBA
12:45 – 2:00 Lunch
2:00 – 2:45 Leo Sing An (Chenguchi): Has Johnston’s Survival Theory Failed?
2:45 – 3:30 Lee Pei Yu (Chenguchi): The Connection between Ancient Indian Logic and Non-monotonic Reasoning
3:30 – 3:45 Break
3:45 – 4:30 Masumi Aoki (Kyoto): A Tentative Assumption about Hume’s Definitions of Cause
4:30 – 5:30 Prof. Naoya Fujikawa (Tokyo Metropolitan University): Nothingness in Meinongianism
5:30 – 5:45 Closing Remark
講演者：Kristopher McDaniel (Syracuse University)
Title : Being and Essence
Abstract : I explore three questions about being and essence. First, is there something whose strict essence is exhausted by its mode of being? Second, can the strict essence of a thing be reduced to or explained by its mode of being? Third, is it metaphysically possible for beings to change their mode of being?
講演者：Philip Gerrans（University of Adelaide）
Title : A PROCESSING ACCOUNT OF EMOTION
Absutract : Planning and decision making, social and moral cognition, reasoning, cognitive development and self-representation depend on emotional processes. Psychologists and neuroscientists in these fields draw on philosophical theories of emotion to inter pret their results while, at the same time, the philosophy of emotion is now deeply intertwined with empirical work on emoti ons, ranging from molecular to psychological levels. Yet there is no established theoretical consensus about the nature of e motional processing and the relationship between emotions (and affective experience) and cognition.
This paper attempts theoretical unification via a method advocated by Dominic Murphy “we arrive at a comprehensive set of positive facts about how the mind works, and then ask which of its products and breakdowns matter for our various projects” . The approach is similar to the way in which philosophical theories of human motivation and the cognitive science of reward processing have mutually informed each other. I explain some specific puzzles about the nature of emotional phenomena: Depe rsonalisation Disorder, delays in effects of anti-depressant treatment on mood, Social Anxiety Disorder. I also explain how the processing account deals with general questions about the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality of emot ional experience that motivate theoretical disagreement.
The main competitors in the theory of emotion: Darwinian, Somatic, Feeling and Representational have all focused on a real and important aspect of emotion. Emotions are adaptations, they have bodily consequences and modes of expression, their fel t aspect is essential to their role in human life, and they depend essentially on representational processes. Precisely how these aspects interact and which are causally primary in episodes of emotion cannot be understood in the absence of a proces sing account. Or so I claim!
講演者 : Wilfried Sieg (Carnegie Mellon University)
Church without dogma: what is a computation and why does it matter?
Abstract: Church’s and Turing’s theses assert dogmatically that an informal notion of effective calculability is adequately captured by a particular mathematical concept of computability. I present analyses of calculability that are embedded in a rich historical and philosophical context, lead to precise concepts, and dispense with theses.
To investigate effective calculability is to analyze processes on symbolic configurations that can in principle be carried out by human calculators. This is a philosophical lesson we owe to Turing. Drawing on that lesson, I formulate boundedness and locality conditions for human computing agents.
Turing’s work is then compared with Post’s, and we will diagnose a remarkable conceptual confluence. The confluence found its expression in overlapping mathematical and methodological work. However, we will also note a dramatic divergence as to the ultimate grounds of Post’s “natural law” for computability; there are deep connections to Gödel’s 1972 note “A philosophical error in Turing’s work”.