CAPE Lecture by Dr. Dirk Kindermann and Dr. Thomas Pölzle

2019年9月6日 @ 3:00 PM – 6:00 PM

講演者: Dr. Dirk Kindermann (Universität Wien) and Dr. Thomas Pölzler (University of Gratz)
日時: 2019年9月6日(金) 15:00-18:00
場所: 京都大学文学部地下小会議室

講演者: Dr. Dirk Kindermann (Universität Wien)

Belief and Questions

Many views of belief make strong idealising assumptions regarding the rationality of believers. One aspect of the resulting problems is known as the problem of logical omniscience: it is presupposed that believers’ overall states of belief – e.g. in graded accounts of belief in formal epistemology, in utility and decision theory, and in possible worlds accounts of belief – are logically consistent and closed under entailment. Fragmentation/compartmentalisation (as defended by Lewis, Cherniak, Stalnaker and more recently, by Egan, Elga & Rayo, Yalcin, Onofri, Borgoni, Kindermann) propose to think of a believer’s overall belief state as simultaneously comprised of different “fragments” of beliefs, each of which is consistent and closed under entailment, but which stand only in loose logical connections. In this talk, I present my version of fragmentation (which is close to Yalcin’s 2016 version). I argue that understanding conversational dynamics and the dependency of linguistic content on questions sheds light on the idea of belief as a fragmented mental state and allows for a formal model of fragmentation that lends more precision to the idea of mental fragmentation.

講演者: Dr. Thomas Pölzler (University of Gratz)

Moral Progress, Knowledge, and Error: What are the Folk’s Implicit Commitments about Moral Objectivity?

According to several philosophers, lay persons are implicitly committed to the view that morality is objective (i.e., independent from what we ourselves or anybody else think about it). This commitment has been claimed to manifest itself in various ways. Among others, it has been suggested that lay persons believe in moral progress, the possibility of moral knowledge, and the possibility of moral errors. In a series of psychological studies my co-authors Lieuwe Zijlstra, Jacob Dijkstra and I are currently putting these hypotheses to the test. My presentation will explain our studies’ motivation, their methodology, their results, and their implications for the philosophical debate about moral objectivity.