ワークショップのお知らせ（6月22日）

以下のようにワークショップが開催されます。皆様のお越しをお待ちしております。

An International Workshop on the Cosmos of Dōgen
Date: June 22, 2017
Place: Meeting room on the 1st floor of Rakuyu Kaikan, Kyoto University, (Building number 96 of this map)

Aim: This workshop aims to explore the potentials of philosophy of Dōgen. An international team of philosophers, logicians and Buddhologists will closely work together to make his ideas as viable philosophical options for contemporary metaphysics, theory of self and social ethics. Among participants are world’s frontrunners of analytic Asian philosophy.

Speakers:
Yasuo Deguchi (Kyoto University)
Jay Garfield (Smith College & Harvard University)
Graham Priest (City University of New York) & Filippo Casati (Kyoto University)
Robert Sharf (University of California, Berkeley)

Program:
9:15—10:30 Robert Sharf “Mind in World, World in Mind: Why Paradox Is Inescapable”
10:30—10:45 (Break)
10:45—12:00 Yasuo Deguchi “Self as Anyone: Dōgen viewed from analytic Asian philosophy”
12:00—13:30 (Lunch)
13:30—14:45 Jay Garfield “Dining on Painted Rice Cakes”
14:45—15:00 (Break)
15:00—16:15 Filippo Casati and Graham Priest “Heideggar and Dōgen on the Ineffable” Part I
16:15—16:30 (Break)
16:30—17:45 Filippo Casati and Graham Priest “Heideggar and Dōgen on the Ineffable” Part II


Abstracts:

Roberts Sharf (University of California, Berkeley)
Title: Mind in World, World in Mind: Why Paradox Is Inescapable
Abstracts: TBA


Yasuo Deguchi (KyotoUniversity)
Title: Self as Anyone: Dōgen viewed from analytic Asian philosophy
Abstract: “Self” is among key concepts of Dōgen, a thirteenth century Japanese Zen master. This talk will interpret his philosophy of self from perspectives of Analytic Asian Philosophy. On my reading, Dōgen’s ideas imply the following philosophical stances: Buddha-nature tropism, Eventism, Presentism, Hecism, and Solipsism. Against those philosophical backgrounds, he holds, I claim, the replaceable view of self, according to which self is taken as anyone.


Jay Garfield (Smith College and Harvard University)
Title: Dining on Painted Rice Cakes
Abstract: Dōgen is often explicitly commitment to paradox, not as a kind of upāya to bring one up short, but as a way of saying how reality must be.  Here we consider a few such passages from his lectures in Shōbōgenzō.  We will see how and why Dōgen takes there to be fundamental contradictions in language, thought, and reality.


Filippo Casati (Kyoto University) and Graham Priest (City University of New York)
Title: Heideggar and Dōgen on the Ineffable
Abstract: Many writers have commented on connections between the work of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Chan/Zen Buddhism—a school of Buddhism originating in China around the 6th Century. In this essay, we will explore one aspect of that connection, drawing on the work of the Japanese Zen philosopher Dōgen Kigen (1200-1253). Heidegger held that being is ineffable, and Dōgen held that ultimate reality is ineffable. Now, ineffability is an extreme form of indeterminacy: if something is ineffable it transcends any determinacy whatsoever. However, there is an obvious contradiction involved in talking about the ineffable, as do both Heidegger and Dōgen. Indeed, even to say that something transcends all determinacy is to give it a determination.  Though Heidegger and Dōgen’s concerns are, prima facie, completely different, we will show that they both responded to the contradiction (or came to respond to it) in exactly the same way: they were dialetheists about the matter. Not only did they endorse the contradiction in question; they both, in much the same sense, endorsed the necessary entanglement of the speech of effability and the silence of ineffability.  Finally, by looking at the work of Nishitani Keiji (1900-1990), we will show that the thoughts of Dōgen and Heidegger converge in the fact that the subject of the contradiction for both is, in fact, nothingness.

Acknowledgement
The workshop is organized within a scheme of Topic-setting program to Advance Cutting-Edge Humanities and Social Sciences (Global Initiatives), JSPS.

Organizers
The workshop is organized by Yasuo Deguchi, Nayuta Miki, Hitoshi Omori, and Takuro Onishi. If you would like to attend this workshop, please contact Takuro (research assistant) at takuro [dot] onishi [at]gmail [dot] com

ワークショップのお知らせ（6月19, 20日）

以下のようにワークショップが開催されます。皆様のお越しをお待ちしております。

Title: Kyoto Workshop on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency II
Date: June 19, 20, 2017
Place: Large conference room in the basement, Faculty of Letters Main Building, Yoshida Campus, Kyoto University. (Building number of this map)

Speakers:
Eduardo Barrio (University of Buenos Aires & CONICET)
Yosuke Fukuda (Kyoto University)
Ryosuke Igarashi (Kyoto University)
Ryo Ito (University of St. Andrews & Kyoto University)
Takuro Onishi (Kyoto University)
Graham Priest (City University of New York)
Damian Szmuc (University of Buenos Aires & CONICET)
Wen-fang Wang (Yang-Ming University)
Timo Weiss (University of Bonn)
Shunsuke Yatabe (Kyoto University)

Program:
June 19:
11:00–12:30 Eduardo Barrio “What is a Paraconsistent Logic?”
12:30–14:00 Lunch
14:00–15:00 Damian Szmuc “On all Weak Kleene generalizations of Classical Logic”
15:00–16:00 Takuro Onishi “Routley’s American plan revisited”
16:00–16:15 Coffee break
16:15–17:15 Yosuke Fukuda “On a computational interpretation of Rumfitt’s bilateral natural deduction”
17:15–18:45 Shunsuke Yatabe “Deflationism, logical notion of truth and proof theoretic semantics”
19:00– Dinner

June 20:
11:00–12:30 Wen-fang Wang “Three-Valued Semantic Pluralism: A Defense of A Three-Valued Solution to the Sorites Paradox”
12:30–14:00 Lunch
14:00–15:00 Ryosuke Igarashi “Kant’s Transcendental Logic and Antinomies of Pure Reason”
15:00–16:00 Ryo Ito “Classes, Fusions and Russell’s Theories of Classes (up to Principia Mathematica)”
16:00–16:15 Coffee break
16:15–17:15 Timo Weiss “Logic, Probability, Belief”
17:15–18:45 Graham Priest “Logical Theory-Choice: the Case of Vacuous Counterfactuals”
19:00– Dinner

Acknowledgement:
Kyoto Philosophical Logic Workshop II is supported by Japan Society of the Promotion of Science (JSPS) through grant 16H03344

アブストラクト等、詳しくはこちらをご覧ください（外部リンク：大森仁さんのページ）

CAPEレクチャー（Prof. Joe Morrison）のお知らせ

以下のようにCAPEレクチャーが開催されます。皆様のお越しをお待ちしております。

Date: May. 26 (Friday), 16:30–18:00
Place: 京都大学 文学部校舎１階 会議室（1F, Faculty of Letters Main Bldg., Kyoto Univ.）
Speaker: Prof. Joe Morrison　(Queen’s University Belfast, UK)
Language: English

Title:  Second Philosophy and logical contingentism

Abstract:
Penelope Maddy argues that logical truths are only contingently true. Her premises include: (1) logical truths are truths about stable features of the world, (2) while humans may struggle to detect worldly features which don’t exhibit such structuring (and struggle to reason non-classically about the world), this is not because such structures necessarily obtain, but because (3) our cognitive abilities have developed in response to these (relatively abundant) structures in our environments.  However, (4) not all parts of the world exhibit the kinds of stable structures which would ground classical reasoning, but instead possess structures which might ground non-classical reasoning. (5) It’s possible that an organism could reliably detect and infer on the basis of those kinds of structures instead, in a way which might count as knowledge, and so (6) might evolve to exhibit and exploit non-classical reasoning. It follows that such organisms could come to know non-classical logical truths.

My line of response to Maddy’s argument concerns the issue of how she conceives of the link between inferential abilities (reasoning) and the domain of logical facts (worldly structures). I argue that the relationships between the types of inferential habits that organisms might in fact adopt and the kinds of structures that might exist in the world is weaker than Maddy requires for her argument for　logical contingentism to work.

CAPEレクチャー（Prof. Christian Coseru, Prof. Sheridan Hough）のお知らせ

以下のようにCAPEレクチャーが開催されます。皆様のお越しをお待ちしております。

Date：2017年5月17日(水), 15:00–18:00
Place：京都大学 文学部校舎１階 会議室
Speaker：Prof. Christian Coseru (College of Charlton), Prof. Sheridan Hough (College of Charlton)
Language：英語
Christian Coseru,
Title：“Consciousness and Causation”
Abstract：
Does consciousness cause behavior? Can causal accounts of generation for material bodies explain how conscious awareness comes to have the structural features and phenomenal properties that it does? In this presentation, I first consider various arguments against reductive physicalism. I then review arguments about the structure of phenomenal consciousness that do not eschew causal-explanatory reasoning. Finally, I entertain the question whether the Buddhist principle of dependent arising, which underscores a dynamic conception of efficient causality, allows for elements defined primarily in terms of their capacity for sentience and agency to be causally efficacious.
Sheridan Hough,
Title：“Nietzsche on Consciousness: Epiphenomenalism, Genealogy and Archaeology”
Abstract：
Is Nietzsche an epiphenomenalist? No. But—why does he occasionally make remarks that tempt the reader to think of his theory of mind in this way? A number of commentators argue that Nietzsche does endorse epiphenomenalism. On the other hand, Nietzsche makes many complex and original remarks about consciousness, and for every passage that casts doubts on the causal efficacy of conscious states there are always a number of counterexamples ready to hand—for example: if conscious states don’t cause anything, then why does Nietzsche occasionally claim that consciousness is dangerous? It seems clear that one of Nietzsche’s complaints about consciousness has more to do with reifying ‘Consciousness’ as a substantive faculty, rather than treating it as a kind of mental state that we can and do have. But what is it about conscious states that Nietzsche finds ‘superfluous’, ‘false’, ‘corrupt’, ‘superficial’? Why is Nietzsche such a critic of consciousness? Nietzsche’s ‘theory of consciousness’ is clearly up to much more than the epiphenomenalist is willing to admit: but why does Nietzsche make these kinds of remarks? What concerns might he have in common with the epiphenomenal approach? I will argue that the conscious, scrupulous examination of our lives is a crucial element in improving them, but that careful examination must be as clear-eyed as possible about the impossibility of obtaining a clear and unbiased view of the human terrain. If what humans say about themselves, their culture, and their environment, can indeed diminish, reduce and distort human possibilities, then the epiphenomenalist’s dismissal of conscious states as a chimera is no remedy; however, the epistemologist’s cheerful confidence in our reflective powers will not save us, either. We must consciously reflect on ourselves with a cannier eye, one that is able, as Nietzsche puts it, to ‘see into the depths’: we must do ‘genealogy’ to discover how we have developed, and in order to make sense of that developmental process. Nietzsche also wants us to become good ‘archaeologists,’ able to reflectively dig into the millennia of habit and custom that shore up our ‘inherited’ ways of seeing the world.

CAPEレクチャー（Prof. Javier Perez-Jara）のお知らせ

以下の要領でCAPEレクチャーが開催されます。ぜひご参加ください。

Date: Jun. 2 (Friday) , 18:00 -19:30
Place: 文学部新館1階会議室, (1F, Faculty of Letters Main Bldg., Kyoto Univ.)
Speaker: Prof. Javier Perez-Jara (Beijing Foreign Studies University)

Title:
World, God, and Being in Heidegger’s Ontological Phenomenology    

Abstract:
      Heidegger insisted from Being and Time to the end of his life in the correlativity of man and being, understood as the meaningful presence of things through time. In order to prove this point, I will pay attention to the development of Heidegger’s theological positions. Until 1928, Heidegger maintained that true philosophy has to be methodologically a-theistic, and that his own thinking denied the ontic existence of God. Nevertheless, after being unable to write the projected second part of Being and Time due to the insufficiencies of traditional metaphysical language, Heidegger started to use poetic and prophetic language around the concept of being. In Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger, influenced by Hölderlin, talked about a future and mysterious “last god” linked to a new understanding of being in general, hidden now in the epoch of planetary technology. In his Letter on Humanism, Heidegger rejected Sartre’s consideration of his own philosophy as atheistic, and in other texts Heidegger divided the world into earth, sky, mortals, and the god(s). Finally, in his Der Spiegel interview from 1966, but which was only allowed to be published posthumously, Heidegger famously held that only a god can save us.

      Simultaneously, Heidegger presented his thinking as a Destruktion of onto-theo-logy, understood as the worldview that considers God as the Supreme Being that explains all the other beings. With the death of the ontotheological God, mankind’s technological prowess has generated the dangerous illusion of man as the new Lord of beings. Using the language of prophecy, Heidegger held that the only salvation from this situation was to wait for the future coming or absence of the last god. Moving away from some known scholars’ perspectives, my paper will investigate who this enigmatic god is, and why Heidegger decided to combine the language of philosophy, poetry, and prophecy in order to lead towards a deeper understanding of existence.

CAPEレクチャー（Dr. Hsun-Mei Chen）のお知らせ

以下の要領でCAPEレクチャーが開催されます。是非ご参加ください。

Date：Apr. 17 (Monday) , 18:15 -19:45
Place：文学部新館1階会議室, (1F, Faculty of Letters Main Bldg., Kyoto Univ).
Speaker：Dr. Hsun-Mei Chen (National Taiwan University/Kyoto University)

Title：
Is Vimalakīrti’s Silence a Denial of Language Expression?

Abstract：
This paper presents an English translation and a novel
philosophical interpretation of the original Sanskrit text of the Entrance
into Non-daulity (Advayadharmamukhapraveśaparivarta), a core fascicle in
Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa sūtra. Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa sūtra, an influential
Mahayana Buddhist sūtra in East Asian, is well known for its profound
explanation of emptiness (śūnyatā) and non-duality (advaya), especially in
chapter on the Entrance into Non-duality. In this chapter, thirty-one
Bodhisattvas expound how one should enter the gate of non-duality
by examining the deluded differentiations made by sentient beings, and then
Mañjuśrī Bodhisattvas concludes that all the previous explanation are still
in the realm of duality and the non-duality should transcend all language
proliferation. Finally, Vimalakīrti, a lay Buddhist practitioner,
demonstrates the ultimate understanding of non-duality by keeping silence
in front all bodhisattvas in the end of this chapter. Traditionally, this
important silence is understood as a denial of any language expression of
the truth. However, in this paper, I will argue that Vimalakīrti’s
silence is not a denial but rather a non-dual embrace of all language
expression.

台湾 政治大学でのカンファレンスのお知らせ

　以下の要領で、カンファレンスが開催されますのでご案内いたします。

Quadrangle Graduate Conference on Asian Philosophy
日時：4月29日・30日
場所：台湾国立政治大学

　プログラム・アブストラクト集が届きましたので、併せてご案内いたします。ご確認ください。
Program of Quadrangle Graduate Conference on Asian Philosophy

2017年度前期授業開講日及び連絡

哲学専修に関連する前期授業の開講日についてお知らせいたします。ご確認ください。

開講日（レギュラー授業）
・月4 哲学演習 I（前期）：出口康夫：論理学入門 –> 4月10日
・月5 哲学ポケゼミ（前期）：出口康夫 –> 4月10日
・火4 哲学特殊講義（前期）：大塚淳：因果性 –> 4月11日 (教室変更有：変更後, 教育学部第五演習室)
・火5 哲学講義（通年）：出口康夫 –> 4月11日
・水5 哲学演習 I（前期）：出口康夫：Dialetheism and Analytic Asian Philosophy –> 4月12日
・金1 哲学演習（前期）：大塚淳：因果性（リーディング）–> 4月14日
・金2 哲学卒論演習（通年）：出口康夫, 大塚淳 –> 4月14日（初回は全員出席）
・金4, 5 哲学第三演習（通年）：出口康夫, 大塚淳 –> 4月14日（教室変更有：変更後, 教育学部第七演習室）

開講日（不定期, 集中講義等）
・月2 哲学（特殊講義）：八木沢敬：Introduction to Analytic Asian Philosophy –> 5月15日
・哲学（集中講義）：Jay Garfield：Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (from the Inside Out) –> 5/8, 11, 15, 18, 22, 25, 29, 6/1, 7/10, 13, 20, 24, 27（16:30-18:00）
・哲学（集中講義）：Mark Siderits：内容未定 –> 6/27, 29, 7/4, 6, 11, 13, 18, 20（時間帯未定）
・哲学（集中講義）：Yumiko Inukai：内容未定 –> 未定
・哲学（集中講義）：入不二基義：現実（性）についての考察 –> 未定（9月予定）

未定となっている講義に関しても随時更新しますので、KULASISと併せて、繰り返しご確認頂けますようお願いいたします。

「道元の思想圏」研究会のお知らせ

以下の要領で研究会が行われましたのでご連絡いたします。

 

「道元の思想圏」研究会

日時：3月27日（月）14:00-18:00

場所：京都大学文学部校舎1階会議室

発表者：

頼住光子（東京大学）：『正法眼蔵』「現成公案」巻の思想

出口康夫（京都大学）：Welcome to Analytic Asian Philosophy!